State v. Hedges
| Decision Date | 17 May 1912 |
| Docket Number | 22,041 |
| Citation | 98 N.E. 417,177 Ind. 589 |
| Parties | State of Indiana v. Hedges |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
From Warrick Circuit Court; Ralph E. Roberts, Judge.
Application by Caleb Hedges to be let to bail. From an order admitting the applicant to bail, the State appeals.
Affirmed.
Thomas M. Honan, Attorney-General, Ora A. Davis, Lindsey & Bock and Lindsey & Spradley, for the State.
Hatfield Fulling & Hatfield, Roscoe Kiper and J. M. Kohlmeyer, for appellee.
Appellee was indicted for murder in the second degree, and on the day of his arrest filed his application to be let to bail, to which appellant filed an answer in general denial, and the matter was heard and appellee admitted to bail.
The issues as claimed by the State on that hearing were, (1) whether the proof of appellee's guilt was evident, or the presumption strong, and (2) whether on that hearing appellee could, over the objection of the State introduce the testimony of witnesses who were not before the grand jury, and on whose testimony the State on the hearing declared it would not rely for a conviction.
The errors here relied on and not waived are, admitting in evidence the testimony of six separately-named persons who were not witnesses before the grand jury, as specific causes of error, and in sustaining the motion to let appellee to bail.
The position of the State is that by express constitutional provision, "murder and treason shall not be bailable when the proof is evident or the presumption strong." Const., Art. 1, § 17.
The former portion of the same section, however, is that "offenses, other than murder and treason, shall be bailable by sufficient sureties."
The statute expressly provides that where any person is indicted for murder, he may be admitted to bail "when it appears upon examination that he is entitled to be let to bail." § 2025 Burns 1908, Acts 1905 p. 584.
It has been held that bail is a matter of right upon proper showing. Brown v. State (1897), 147 Ind. 28, 46 N.E. 34; Ex parte Jones (1876), 55 Ind. 176.
On such application, the indictment by the grand jury stands with all its presumptions in favor of its truth until its force is broken by a showing that the grand jury acted on insufficient evidence, and the burden is on the accused to show that the proof of guilt is not evident and the presumption of guilt not strong, and on such application the Supreme Court will weigh the evidence, and pass on it as a trial court. Brown v. State, supra, and cases cited; Ex parte Walton (1881), 79 Ind. 600; Ex parte Sutherlin (1877), 56 Ind. 595; Ex parte Moore (1868), 30 Ind. 197.
The particular objection presented by the State as to the question of practice, is that the applicant on the hearing can only introduce the evidence of witnesses on whose evidence the State relies for conviction.
Several of the witnesses, including appellee whose testimony was introduced by him, were not before the grand jury, and objection was made by the State on the ground that they were not witnesses on whom the State intended to rely for a conviction, on the theory that such witnesses, and none others, must be introduced.
Reliance is here placed on Ex parte Richards (1885), 102 Ind. 260, 1 N.E. 639; Ex parte Heffren (1866), 27 Ind. 87; Ex parte Sternes (1889), 82 Cal. 245, 23 P. 38.
Appellee's position is that the entire question, as to whether the guilt is evident, or the presumption strong, is before the court, and that it is not within the power of the State to limit the witnesses who may be examined, because it declares that it does not rely for conviction on any witness or witnesses offered, and because they were not before the grand jury; that such rule would put it in the power of the State to determine who should, or should not testify, and would hamper the court in the determination of the real question for determination, and that neither the Constitution nor the statute confines the inquiry to the State's witnesses, nor upon whom it may indicate it relies, nor whether the evidence before the grand jury was sufficient to sustain the charge made, and that any other construction would put it in the power of the State to determine who should be let to bail.
Reliance is here placed on the case of In re Fraley (1910), 3 Okla. Crim. 719, 109 P. 295, 139 Am. St. 988, in which that court said: ...
To continue reading
Request your trial