State v. Heltzel
| Decision Date | 27 March 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 45S03-9003-CR-225,45S03-9003-CR-225 |
| Citation | 552 N.E.2d 31 |
| Parties | , 17 Media L. Rep. 1677 STATE of Indiana, Appellant, v. William HELTZEL and Mark Kiesling, Appellees. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, John E. Crawford, Jr., Pros. Atty., Crown Point, for appellant.
David C. Jensen, Richard A. Hanning, Charles W. Webster, Eichhorn, Eichhorn & Link, Hammond, for appellees.
James P. Fenton, Barrett & McNagny, Fort Wayne, for amici curiae Journal-Gazette Co., Home News Enterprises, Nixon Newspapers, Inc., South Bend Tribune, WSBT Stations, Inc., and Inland Press Ass'n.
Richard L. Rennick, Jr., Chairman, Indiana Pros. Attys. Council, Covington, Stephen J. Johnson, Indiana Pros. Attys. Council, Indianapolis, for Indiana Prosecuting Attorneys Council.
Marce Gonzalez, Jr., Cooperating Atty., Indiana Civil Liberties Union, Hilbrich, Cunningham & Schwerd, Highland, Richard A. Waples, Legal Director, Indiana Civil Liberties Union, Indianapolis, for amicus curiae Indiana Civil Liberties Union.
Edward O. DeLaney, Jan M. Carroll, Barnes & Thornburg, Indianapolis, for amici curiae Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., American Soc. of Newspaper Editors, Reporters Committee for Freedom of Press, Soc. of Professional Journalists and Indiana University School of Journalism.
Richard W. Cardwell, Ober, Symmes, Cardwell Voyles & Zahn, Indianapolis, for Hoosier State Press Ass'n.
William Heltzel and Mark Kiesling were charged with indirect contempt of court, I.C. 34-4-7-3 through -5, in an information filed by the Lake County Prosecutor in August of 1987. At the time, Heltzel and Kiesling were reporters for the Hammond Times, and the contempt charges grew out of their questioning of two men who had served on a grand jury which had been impaneled on July 18, 1984, and discharged in January of 1985. The information charged that on or about July 31, 1987, Heltzel and Kiesling did
unlawfully induce or attempt to induce a Grand Juror to violate the secrecy order of [the] [c]ourt [in that they] induced or attempted to induce DENNIS LONG ... and RICKY MOYETT, ... members of the regular Lake County Grand Jury, duly sworn to secrecy and impaneled ... on July 18, 1984, to disclose evidence given or proceeding had, or to disclose what DENNIS LONG or RICKY MOYETT may have said or what any other Grand Juror may have said or to disclose in what manner DENNIS LONG, RICKY MOYETT or any other Grand Juror may have voted on a matter before the Lake County Grand Jury....
The gravamen of the complaint is found in the accompanying affidavit, in which it was alleged that Kiesling coerced Long to break his oath of secrecy by telling him that what was being sought was public information and could be divulged and that Heltzel induced Moyett to break his oath by telling him that he already had the desired information and therefore it would be all right to discuss it.
The reporters filed a motion to dismiss the charges on the grounds that the facts alleged, even if true, did not constitute indirect contempt of court. The court heard arguments on the dismissal motion and ruled that the court had the inherent authority to enforce its orders through its contempt powers, even against non-parties, for actions occurring outside the presence of the court and regardless of any statutory limits placed on the power by the legislature. The court then directed the parties to argue the First Amendment implications of the issue. After briefs were filed and arguments were heard on the First Amendment issue, the court ruled that the State had "failed to establish a compelling interest to justify the sanction of indirect criminal contempt" against the reporters. The State's motion to correct errors was denied and the State appealed.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and held that the maintenance of secrecy concerning grand jury deliberations and voting, both during and after a hearing, are "of paramount importance." State v. Heltzel (1989), Ind.App., 533 N.E.2d 159, 161. The Court noted that inducing grand jurors to violate a secrecy order "impedes the functioning of the grand jury system and undermines the important policies supporting grand juror secrecy," and went on to state that "[t]he alleged solicitation of information concerning secret grand jury evidence, deliberations and votes from former grand jurors rises to the level of actionable contempt." Id. The Court did not address the First Amendment considerations of the case until it delivered its opinion on petition for rehearing. State v. Heltzel (1989), Ind.App., 535 N.E.2d 1221. In the first decision, it noted that because the case did not involve prior restraint or contempt for publication, the State did not have to demonstrate a compelling interest to support a finding of contempt. Heltzel, 533 N.E.2d at 160. On petition for rehearing, the Court noted that the First Amendment does not give the press a special right of access beyond that of the ordinary citizen, that First Amendment rights do not include an unrestrained right to speak and publish and that, therefore, the trial court erred in dismissing the contempt charges on First Amendment grounds. Heltzel, 535 N.E.2d at 1222. We grant transfer.
In reviewing a motion to dismiss, we apply the same standard as the trial court; that is, assuming the facts alleged in the information to be true, the charge will be dismissed if the facts do not constitute the offense charged. Smith v. State (1960), 241 Ind. 311, 170 N.E.2d 794; I.C. 35-34-1-2 through -6. In this regard, it should be noted that appellants were not charged with inducing or causing a violation of I.C. 35-34-2-10, which makes it a class B misdemeanor for a person present at grand jury proceedings to knowingly and intentionally disclose evidence given, what a grand juror said, or how a grand juror voted. The resolution of the issue before us does not require us to address the validity of that statute, and we assume for the sake of the discussion here that the statute is constitutionally valid. Because the facts here allow the resolution of the present case on narrower grounds, the question of whether a statute which forever bans the disclosure of grand jury information by those involved in the proceedings is impermissibly overbroad will have to await another day. 1
The State has instead charged appellants with indirect contempt of court and is apparently proceeding on an accomplice theory. It argues that those who facilitate contempt violations are themselves guilty of contempt and analogizes to the aiding and abetting statute, I.C. 35-41-2-4, which extends culpability to the accomplices of those who commit crimes. Contempt, however, is not a criminal offense. It is a sui generis proceeding neither civil nor criminal in nature, although both of those labels are used to describe certain categories of contempt. The aiding and abetting statute applies only to "an offense," which is defined as a crime, I.C. 35-41-1-19, which, in turn, is defined as a felony or a misdemeanor, I.C. 35-41-1-6. Furthermore, to be convicted under an accomplice theory, the State must prove that the target crime was committed. The State contends here that the grand jurors committed the target "crime" of contempt by breaking their oaths of secrecy. However, while there may be occasions where breaking one's oath so impedes the administration of justice that it rises to the level of contempt, the usual remedy for grand jurors who violate this duty is discharge from the grand jury panel. I.C. 35-34-2-3(c). The accomplice theory of culpability is not a viable means of finding one guilty of contempt. One's actions either rise to the level of actionable contempt or fail to rise to that level. It is conceivable, therefore, that the reporters' actions, in and of themselves, were contemptuous. In other words, we must examine not whether the reporters' actions induced others to commit contemptuous acts, but whether their own actions rose to the level of actionable contempt.
Criminal contempt is not always readily distinguishable from civil contempt, see 17 C.J.S. Contempt Sec. 5(2), but it is generally regarded as an act directed against the dignity and authority of the court which obstructs the administration of justice and which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect, 17 C.J.S. Contempt Sec. 5(1). Direct criminal contempt charges are generally reserved for acts which are committed in the presence of the court or in such close proximity to it so as to...
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