State v. Henage

Decision Date26 January 2007
Docket NumberNo. 31205.,31205.
Citation143 Idaho 655,152 P.3d 16
PartiesSTATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Jeremy Richard HENAGE, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtIdaho Supreme Court

Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Sara B. Thomas argued.

Honorable Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondents. Lori A. Fleming argued.

JONES, Justice.

This case involves a routine traffic stop that turned into a contraband-yielding roadside pat down search. Jeremy Henage appeals from the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence a police officer discovered while searching Jeremy's person. We reverse.

I.

This case commenced when the Jerome City Police cited Jeremy Henage for possession of a controlled substance and drug paraphernalia following a traffic stop. Officer Johnson was on patrol when he stopped a vehicle with a broken taillight. Jeremy was a passenger in the subject vehicle and his brother, Zach, was the driver. Officer Johnson conversed with Zach about the taillight. Sergeant Baker arrived shortly after the initial stop and approached Jeremy while he was still in the vehicle. Sgt. Baker told Jeremy he was not under arrest and was free to go, but that he wanted to talk to him "about some things." He stated that Jeremy was "nervous, but he was real cooperative and he was polite," and agreed to answer his questions. Jeremy exited the vehicle and Sgt. Baker asked if he could search the vehicle. Jeremy declined, stating that the vehicle belonged to his father. Sgt. Baker then asked Jeremy if he had any contraband on his person and Jeremy responded that he had a knife. Sgt. Baker proceeded to perform a pat down search of Jeremy. After Sgt. Baker retrieved the object for which he was searching, Jeremy specified that it was a Leatherman and Sgt. Baker resumed the search. As the search continued, he "felt a large hard object in one of [Jeremy's] cargo pockets." When asked what the object was, Jeremy responded that he did not know. Sgt. Baker reached into the pocket and removed two objects, which he identified as a glass pipe and a cigar tube. Sgt. Baker opened the cigar tube and found a white rock later identified as methamphetamine.

Jeremy was subsequently cited for possession of a controlled substance and drug paraphernalia. He moved to suppress the contraband, contending that the extended questioning and search were illegal under the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied his motion to suppress. Jeremy subsequently entered a guilty plea but reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.

II.

In reviewing an order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence, this Court will defer to the trial court's factual findings unless clearly erroneous. State v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469, 470, 20 P.3d 5, 6 (2001). However, free review is exercised over a trial court's determination as to whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts found. Id.

III.

We address two questions: (1) whether the district court erred in holding that the traffic stop evolved into a consensual encounter prior to Sgt. Baker's extended questioning of Jeremy, and (2) whether the district court erred in holding that Sgt. Baker's search of Jeremy's person was constitutionally justified.

A.

Jeremy argues that the period of extended questioning conducted by Sgt. Baker constituted a seizure to which Fourth Amendment protections apply. The Fourth Amendment provides that "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." Traffic stops constitute seizures under the Fourth Amendment. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1395-96, 59 L.Ed.2d 660, 667 (1979); State v. Silva, 134 Idaho 848, 852, 11 P.3d 44, 48 (Ct.App.2000). The U.S. Supreme Court has held that traffic stops "must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1325, 75 L.Ed.2d 229, 238 (1983). However, in certain circumstances, a traffic stop may evolve into a consensual encounter to which Fourth Amendment protections do not apply. State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 650, 51 P.3d 461, 464 (Ct.App. 2002); State v. Martinez, 136 Idaho 436, 441, 34 P.3d 1119, 1124 (Ct.App.2001). The test to determine if an individual is seized for Fourth Amendment purposes is an objective one, evaluating whether under the totality of the circumstances "a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter." Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 2387, 115 L.Ed.2d 389, 399 (1991).

Jeremy does not dispute that he was initially subjected to a lawful detention when his brother was stopped for having a broken taillight. Rather, Jeremy argues that the officers impermissibly extended the traffic stop by continuing to question him beyond the time necessary to effectuate the stop. The district court disagreed, holding that the traffic stop evolved into a consensual encounter before the period of extended questioning. Jeremy contends that the district court erred in holding that the traffic stop evolved into a consensual encounter because: (1) Officer Johnson failed to return Zach's documentation, and (2) the State failed to prove the officers had deactivated their patrol cars' overhead lights. Jeremy's arguments require us to review the district court's factual findings.

This Court will not set aside factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Donato, 135 Idaho at 470, 20 P.3d at 6. To be found clearly erroneous, factual findings must be unsupported by substantial and competent evidence. State v. Davis, 139 Idaho 731, 734, 85 P.3d 1130, 1133 (Ct.App.2003). At the suppression hearing, Sgt. Baker testified that once the initial investigation regarding the broken taillight had ended, he and Officer Johnson conferred and, based on police intelligence of previous drug involvement on the part of the brothers, decided to conduct a criminal patrol procedure, which involves an officer-initiated conversation with an individual. At that time, he understood that "[Officer Johnson] had given [Zach's] stuff back." Sgt. Baker further testified that generally before effectuating a criminal patrol procedure, they "return the documents or issue citations or whatever [they] have to do to conclude the traffic stop," and that they followed those procedures in this case. Thus, the district court's finding that the officers returned the driver's information prior to the extended questioning of Jeremy was supported by substantial and competent evidence and was not clearly erroneous.

Sgt. Baker could not recall whether the overhead lights on the cars had been turned off during the extended conversation with Jeremy. Jeremy testified that Sgt. Baker's overhead lights were no longer going at the time, but that Officer Johnson's were. The district court determined that, although Officer Johnson's overhead lights may have remained activated, it did not preclude the traffic stop from evolving into a consensual encounter. In a factually similar case, the Court of Appeals held that "[i]t is not practical nor necessary that an officer turn off his emergency lights before he may effectively instruct an individual who has been stopped that he may leave." State v. Roark, 140 Idaho 868, 871, 103 P.3d 481, 484 (Ct.App. 2004). The court went on to say that "[n]o reasonable person who has been unequivocally told that he may go, as Roark was, would believe that he should disregard the statement merely because the patrol car's overhead lights are still flashing." Id. Jeremy, like the defendant in Roark, was told by Sgt. Baker that he was free to go and, therefore, the fact that Officer Johnson's overhead lights were activated did not preclude the traffic stop from evolving into a consensual encounter. The district court's finding in this regard is supported by the record.

B.

Jeremy contends that even if his continued conversation with Sgt. Baker was consensual at first, it resulted in an illegal search and seizure. According to Jeremy, the encounter took a nonconsensual turn when he told Sgt. Baker he had a knife. That is, Sgt. Baker then directed Jeremy to keep his hands out where he could see them and proceeded with a search, without asking or receiving Jeremy's consent to do so. Jeremy argues that when Sgt. Baker laid hands upon him, the encounter became nonconsensual and constituted an unlawful seizure.

Just as a traffic detention can turn into a consensual encounter, a consensual encounter can turn into a seizure. In State v. Baker, 141 Idaho 163, 165, 107 P.3d 1214, 1216 (2004), this Court stated the matter as follows:

An encounter between an officer and a citizen does not trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny, however, unless it is nonconsensual. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 2386, 115 L.Ed.2d 389, 398 (1991). An encounter becomes a seizure only when an officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has restrained the liberty of a citizen. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1876-77, 64 L.Ed.2d 497, 508-09 (1980). The test for deciding whether someone has been seized by a show of authority is an objective one. Id. at 554, 100 S.Ct. at 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d at 509. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that a seizure occurs "only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." Id. Examples of circumstances that might indicate a seizure would be the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, physical touching of the person, or the tone or use of language indicating that compliance with an officer's request might be compelled. Id. In the absence...

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