State v. Henderson

• Decision Date: 23 November 1988
• Citation: 764 P.2d 602,94 Or.App. 87
• Parties: STATE of Oregon, Respondent, v. Roddy Dean HENDERSON, Appellant. 87-0074; CA A44842.
• Court: Oregon Court of Appeals

Page 602

764 P.2d 602

94 Or.App. 87

STATE of Oregon, Respondent, v. Roddy Dean HENDERSON, Appellant.

87-0074; CA A44842.

Court of Appeals of Oregon.

Argued and Submitted Aug. 30, 1988.

Decided Nov. 23, 1988.

Ingrid A. MacFarlane, Salem, argued the cause for appellant. With her on the brief was Gary D. Babcock, Public Defender, Salem.

Robert M. Atkinson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Dave Frohnmayer, Atty. Gen., and Virginia L. Linder, Sol. Gen., Salem.

Before BUTTLER, P.J., and WARREN and ROSSMAN, JJ.

BUTTLER, Presiding Judge.

Defendant appeals his conviction for rape, kidnapping, and resisting arrest, contending that the state violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the laws by exercising a peremptory challenge, over his timely objection, to the only black person on the jury. The question is whether the record supports an inference of purposeful discrimination requiring the state to rebut that inference with a neutral explanation. We conclude that it does, and remand for a determination of whether the prosecution had a neutral, legitimate reason for its challenge related to this case.

Defendant, a black man, is charged with raping and kidnapping a white woman. In the course of jury selection, the state exercised one of its peremptory challenges to the only black person on the panel, resulting in an all-white jury, which convicted him.

Although defendant argues here that the challenge violated other constitutional rights, both state and federal, his only objection at trial was that the challenge violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the laws, relying solely on Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1722, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). Given that limited objection, we confine our consideration to his equal protection claim under the federal constitution. State v. Stroup, 290 Or. 185, 205, 620 P.2d 1359 (1980).

It has long been recognized that a state denies a criminal defendant equal protection of the laws if he is put on trial before a jury from which members of his race have been purposefully excluded. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 25 L.Ed. 664 (1880). However, it was not until Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965), that the Supreme Court considered the effect of the state's use of peremptory challenges in a purposefully discriminatory manner. In that case, the Court attempted to accommodate the prosecutor's right to challenge a juror for any or no reason, and the defendant's right not to have jurors excluded on account of race. To preserve the peremptory challenge, the Court declined to scrutinize the prosecutor's actions in the particular case by relying on a presumption that the state's challenges were properly exercised.

However, the court went on to say that a challenge may not be used in contravention of the Equal Protection Clause. The defendant, in order to make a successful objection to a challenge, may make out a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by showing that challenges were used to exclude blacks from the jury "for reasons wholly unrelated to the outcome of the particular case on trial" or to deny blacks "the same right to participate in the administration of justice enjoyed by the white population." 380 U.S. at 224, 85 S.Ct. at 838. As an example, the Court explained that an inference of purposeful discrimination would be raised on evidence that a prosecutor, in case after case, whatever the circumstances or crime, excused blacks who have survived challenges for cause.

Following Swain, it was generally understood that a defendant would be required to show a pattern of discrimination over a number of cases to establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. In Batson v. Kentucky, supra, the Supreme Court reconsidered Swain, because the showing that it had been interpreted as requiring "placed on defendants a crippling burden of proof," with the result that "prosecutors' peremptory challenges are now largely immune from constitutional scrutiny." 476 U.S. at 92, 106 S.Ct. at 1720. It expressly rejected that evidentiary formulation as inconsistent with standards for assessing a prima facie case under the Equal Protection Clause.

In its place, the Court adopted the following formulation to establish a prima facie case:

"[A] defendant may establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in selection of the petit jury solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges at the defendant's trial. To establish such a case, the defendant must first show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group, * * * and that the prosecutor had exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant's race. Second, the defendant is entitled to rely on the fact, as to which there can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits 'those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.' * * * Finally, the defendant must show that these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race. This combination of factors in the impaneling of the petit jury, as in the selection of the venire, raises the necessary inference of purposeful discrimination.

"In deciding whether the defendant has made the requisite showing, the trial court should consider all relevant circumstances."

It is clear that defendant need no longer show a pattern of discrimination. He has fulfilled the first requirement of Batson: he has shown that he is a member of a cognizable racial group and that the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge to remove from the jury a member of defendant's race. He may rely on the fact that such challenges permit those to discriminate who are of a mind to do so. The question boils down to whether those facts, "and any other relevant circumstances," raise an inference that the prosecutor used the challenge to exclude the juror on account of his race.

Although it is not clear what the Court means by "other relevant circumstances," we believe that these factors are relevant: (1) Defendant, a black man, is on trial for raping a white woman; (2) there is only one black juror available; (3) during the voir dire, ¹...