State v. Henderson

• Decision Date: 24 April 1893
• Citation: 24 Or. 100,32 P. 1030
• Parties: STATE v. HENDERSON.
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

32 P. 1030

24 Or. 100

STATE v. HENDERSON.

Supreme Court of Oregon

April 24, 1893

Appeal from circuit court, Clackamas county; T.A. McBride, Judge.

William Henderson was convicted of murder, and appeals. Reversed.

H.E McGinn, for appellant.

W.N Barrett, Dist.Atty., for the State.

BEAN, J.

The defendant was indicted, tried, and convicted of murder in the first degree in killing one Cyrus Suter, by stabbing him with a pocketknife. The evidence tended to show that the deceased and the defendant had, for some two or three hours immediately prior to the homicide, been playing cards and drinking liquor in a saloon at Canby; that some dispute had arisen over the game, and defendant had threatened to quit playing, but, at the solicitation of the deceased continued in the game, and, just prior to the killing, the dispute or quarrel was renewed, when the defendant again arose from the table, and said he would not play any more that Suter had been trying to run over him all day. The deceased, who was a much larger and stronger man than the defendant, then got up from the table, approached and took hold of the defendant,--whether in a peaceable or violent manner the witnesses are not agreed,--when, as claimed by the state, defendant stabbed him with an ordinary pocketknife whereupon the deceased seized a chair, and attempted to strike him with it, but was prevented from doing so by a bystander. The defendant and deceased then engaged in a hand to hand conflict, and defendant was thrown and held down on the floor by the deceased until the bystanders interfered. At some time during this affray the fatal wound was inflicted, but just at what time is not clear.

1. The court, in its instructions to the jury, in defining the crime of murder in the first degree, said: "The law also requires, in order to constitute murder in the first degree that the design should be formed in cool blood, and not hastily, on the occasion, and, unless it is so formed in cool blood, there can be no murder in the first degree; but by 'cool blood' is not meant that a party must be in a wholly unexcited and philosophical state of mind. If he still has left the power of controlling the operations of his mind, and realizing the act that he is doing, and its nature and quality and wrongfulness, he may be said to be in cool blood, even though he may be somewhat excited or somewhat angry." As applied to the facts of this case, it seems to us this instruction must have led the jury to believe that no heat of passion on the part of the defendant short of the dethronement of reason would reduce the crime below murder in the first degree. To constitute murder in the first degree, it is necessary that the design to take life be formed and matured in cool blood, and not hastily, upon the occasion. Code, § 1727. It must be the result of a deliberate and premeditated act, in pursuance of a design formed, and matured when the perpetrator is master of his own understanding, and after time and opportunity for deliberate thought. But if, after the mind conceives the thought of taking life, the conception is meditated upon, and a deliberate determination formed to do the act, then, no difference how soon the fatal resolve is carried into execution, it is murder in the first degree. But when the purpose or intent to kill is formed in the midst of the conflict, and followed immediately by the act, it can only be murder in the second degree, even if the passion and provocation are not sufficient to reduce it to manslaughter; for the time and circumstances are not such as to allow deliberate thought, and yet it is the result of a formed design and purpose to kill, and the perpetrator still has left the power of controlling the operations of the mind, and realizing the act he is doing, and its nature and quality and wrongfulness, and, under the instruction given by the court in this case, would be in cool...