State v. Henry

• Citation: 139 So. 278,224 Ala. 224
• Decision Date: 19 November 1931
• Docket Number: 6 Div. 17.
• Parties: STATE EX REL. WARD v. HENRY.
• Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

139 So. 278

224 Ala. 224

STATE EX REL. WARD v. HENRY.

6 Div. 17.

Supreme Court of Alabama

November 19, 1931

Rehearing Denied Jan. 28, 1932.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County; J. Russell McElroy Judge.

Quo warranto proceeding by the State of Alabama, on the relation of George B. Ward, and Ward individually, against Eugene B Henry. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

W. K Terry and Robert C. Garrison, both of Birmingham, for appellant.

Thos. J. Judge and W. B. Harrison, both of Birmingham, for appellee.

GARDNER J.

By this quo warranto proceeding (State ex rel. Garrett v. Torbert, 200 Ala. 663, 77 So. 37), the constitutional validity of the Act approved July 16, 1931, establishing the office of commissioner of licenses in all counties having a population of three hundred thousand or more according to the last or any subsequent federal census, is assailed.

It is strenuously insisted the act offends section 45 of the Constitution, in that the title as well as the body of the act contains two subjects. This insistence is based upon that feature of the act, specifically mentioned in the title, providing for the assessment and collection by the commissioner of licenses of the ad valorem taxes on motor vehicles; the argument being that such a provision is foreign to and distinct from that of issuance of licenses.

The purpose of the act, as expressly declared in its concluding section, was to unify the work of issuing licenses of all character for the convenience of the public, and appellant's argument, we think, overlooks the fact that as to automobiles, under the General Law (Gen. Acts 1923, pp. 284, 288, § 19 (a), the payment of the ad valorem tax is a condition precedent to the issuance of the license, and that, therefore, to effectuate the purpose of unification of the license work, it became essential that such commissioner also be charged with the duty of assessing and collecting such ad valorem taxes, which duties were therefore merely incidental to the issuance of the license, and tended to promote the public convenience.

By the provisions of the Act approved March 24, 1911 (Gen. Acts 1911, p. 130), in cities over one hundred thousand population, the matter of assessment and collection of the city tax is intrusted to the county assessor and collector, with provision made for their respective compensation for services thus performed. Reference, therefore, in the title of the act to the matter of ad valorem taxes on motor vehicles was appropriate and timely as giving notice of a change in this regard.

It is settled under our decisions that however numerous the subjects stated in the title, and however numerous the provisions in the body of the act may be, if they can be by fair intendment considered as falling within the subject-matter legislated upon in the act, or necessary as ends and means to the attainment of such subject, the act does not offend our constitutional provision that no law shall embrace more than one subject, which must be expressed in its title. Allman v. City of Mobile, 162 Ala. 226, 50 So. 238; Ballentyne v. Wickersham, 75 Ala. 534; Board of Revenue v. Hewitt, 206 Ala. 405, 90 So. 781; State ex rel. Leslie v. Bracken, 154 Ala. 151, 45 So. 841.

As previously noted, the payment of the ad valorem tax on motor vehicles is a condition precedent to the issuance of a license for their operation. The declared purpose of the act was for the public convenience to unify the work of issuing licenses, and the matter of collection of ad valorem taxes on motor vehicles was therefore cognate to the subject-matter, the issuance of licenses by one county official, the commissioner of licenses. The title of the act made reference likewise to the matter of compensation to such commissioner, which, we think, sufficed as notice that he may be so compensated either by salary or fees or commissions. Osborn v. Henry, 200 Ala. 353, 76 So. 119.

It would appear, therefore, that any change in the matter of fees to the detriment of the city of Birmingham, as argued, could not be charged to a lack of sufficient notice in the title of the act. The act is general in form, based upon a population classification. We have approved this character of legislation, provided the substantial difference in population was in good faith, and was reasonably related to the purpose to be effected and to the difference in population which forms the basis thereof, and was not merely arbitrary, though at the time it may be applicable to only one subdivision of the state. Reynolds v. Collier, 204 Ala. 38, 85 So. 465. Much must, in this regard, be left to legislative discretion, and it is the duty of the court not to construe a law as local when it is so worded and framed as to be reasonably susceptible of interpretation as a general law. Reynolds v. Collier, supra.

In counties having a larger population, we think it clearly appears a reasonable basis exists for the establishment of one officer for the issuance of all licenses to the end that the general public be convenienced thereby, and that the population classification in the act here in question suffices as a foundation for a general rather than a local law.

The act is further challenged as a local law upon the ground that by reason of other provisions of the Constitution it cannot apply to other counties as they come within the population basis of classification.

Granting the soundness of the premises, granting that the act can stand in Jefferson county only by virtue of the Jefferson County Amendment to the Constitution (Const. Amend. 1912 [see Acts 1911, p. 47]), and that counties not having a like amendment, although coming within the classification as to population, can never be brought within the act, it would be a local law, notwithstanding its form, and subject to the provisions of section 106. Birmingham Electric Co. v. Harry, 215 Ala. 459, 111 So. 41.

The constitutional provisions relied upon, in support of the premise above stated, are sections 175, 281, and 96.

As to section 175 the argument is that the provision of the act in question, taking out of the hands of the tax assessor and tax collector the assessment and collection of ad valorem taxes on motor vehicles, constitutes a partial abolition of these offices, recognized as constitutional officers by that section.

It is sufficient to say section 175 deals only with the matter of removal from office, the office itself remaining. It expressly covers officers of statutory creation, provided the office has a fixed term. So, the mention of tax assessor and tax collector, in the list of officers removable only by impeachment, by no means constitutes theirs constitutional offices which may not be abolished by the Legislature. The power to abolish an office is as plenary as the power to create it.

The right to hold office for a fixed term is subject to the...