State v. Her, No. A08-0567 (Minn. App. 5/5/2009)
| Decision Date | 05 May 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. A08-0567.,A08-0567. |
| Parties | State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Yatau Her, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the District Court, Anoka County, File No. 02-K6-05-007330.
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, MN; and Robert M.A. Johnson, Anoka County Attorney, Marcy S. Crain, Assistant County Attorney, Anoka County Government Center, Anoka, MN (for respondent)
Melissa Sheridan, Assistant State Public Defender, Eagan, MN (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and Johnson, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant argues the district court erred in (1) failing to bring him to trial within the 180-day deadline under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) and (2) ordering him to pay restitution. Because we conclude that appellant waived the IAD deadline, we affirm in part. But because appellant's conduct did not directly cause the losses underlying the restitution award, we reverse that aspect of the district court's order.
Appellant Yatau Her, a member of the Menace of Destruction (MOD) gang, was involved in a February 2005 Columbia Heights pool-hall shooting. Appellant drove his own car to the pool hall, transporting two MOD members as passengers; other gang members arrived in a second car. An altercation ensued between the MOD group and other pool-hall patrons. When the fight broke out, appellant ran outside. At least one MOD member fired gun shots at the other group. Two people were killed, and four others were wounded.
As the MOD members left the pool hall after the shooting, appellant's original passengers returned to his car, and he drove off. Appellant later noticed that one of his passengers had a gun that had been discharged and that some of the ammunition was missing.
In July 2005, an Anoka County grand jury indicted appellant on two counts of aiding and abetting first-degree premeditated murder, two counts of aiding and abetting first-degree premeditated murder for the benefit of a gang, four counts of aiding and abetting attempted first-degree premeditated murder, and four counts of aiding and abetting attempted first-degree premeditated murder for the benefit of a gang. In December 2006, the Anoka County Sheriff requested that a hold be placed on appellant, who was incarcerated in Wisconsin for attempted first-degree intentional homicide. Appellant requested final disposition of the Minnesota charges against him in accordance with the IAD. The Anoka County Attorney's Office received the request on January 8, 2007.
At a hearing on March 6, 2007, William Ward, the chief public defender for the judicial district encompassing Anoka County, represented appellant. Ward informed the district court that he was having difficulties finding counsel to be appointed for appellant, in part because of the case's complexity and because of conflict-of-interest issues raised by the number of codefendants involved in the pool-hall shooting. Ten days later, Ward represented appellant at another hearing. Ward stated that he had found a suitably skilled trial attorney to represent appellant, but the attorney could not try the case before late August 2007. But Ward noted that the principal difficulty with that trial schedule was that, pursuant to the IAD, appellant's trial needed to begin by July 8. Ward and the district court explained to appellant the advantages of having an experienced, respected defense attorney, despite having to wait for trial. Appellant agreed to waive the 180-day deadline. At a June 25, 2007 meeting in chambers, the state and appellant's new attorney agreed to a jury trial date of September 24; appellant was not present at the chambers meeting.
On August 21, 2007, the state moved for a continuance of trial based on a scheduling conflict between appellant's trial and that of a codefendant, whose trial was scheduled to start October 1. Appellant objected to the continuance. His attorney said that it was his impression his client had waived the 180-day deadline before he was appointed. But appellant was adamant that the deadline still applied. The district court stated that appellant had waived the deadline: 2015You may have been confused about the purpose for the waiver but it clearly was waived.2016
In November, appellant moved the district court to dismiss all the charges against him on the ground that he had not been brought to trial within the 180-day IAD period. At appellant's plea hearing, the district court denied the motion. Contrary to its earlier statement regarding waiver, the district court stated that appellant had not waived the deadline but that the district court had found good cause for the delay based on 2015the inability to get you a lawyer on board, and to get that lawyer prepared in time, your lawyer's schedule, this court's schedule, [and] the [codefendant's] trial that lasted 8 weeks starting October 1st.2016
Appellant pleaded guilty to an amended charge of accomplice after the fact to first-degree murder for the benefit of a gang. The district court sentenced appellant to the agreed-on incarceration of 192 months. The district court later ordered appellant, jointly and severally with six codefendants, to pay a total of $24,428.65 in restitution for the victims' medical expenses, funeral expenses, and lost wages. This appeal follows.
Appellant first argues that the district court should have dismissed the charges against him because he was not brought to trial within the 180-day IAD period. We review construction of the IAD de novo. State v. Burks, 631 N.W.2d 411, 412 (Minn. App. 2001). The IAD is an interstate, congressionally sanctioned compact among almost all the states, the District of Columbia, and the federal government and is subject to federal construction. New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 111, 120 S. Ct. 659, 662 (2000); State v. Wells, 638 N.W.2d 456, 459 (Minn. App. 2002), review denied (Minn. Mar. 19, 2002); cf. Johnson v. Murray, 648 N.W.2d 664, 670 (Minn. 2002) ().
A prisoner who properly requests 2015a final disposition to be made of the indictment2016 against him 2015shall be brought to trial within 180 days2016 of delivering his request. Minn. Stat. § 629.294, art. III(a) (2006). But 2015for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance.2016 Id. If trial does not take place as required, 2015the court shall enter an order dismissing the [indictment] with prejudice.2016 Id., art. III(d) (2006).
Appellant argues that there was not good cause for the delay in bringing him to trial. We decline to reach the merits of appellant's argument, because we conclude that he waived the alleged defect by pleading guilty.
When a criminal defendant, with benefit of counsel, enters a guilty plea, the defendant waives all nonjurisdictional defects arising prior to the plea. State v. Johnson, 422 N.W.2d 14, 16 (Minn. App. 1988), review denied . Our courts have not addressed whether defects claimed under the IAD are jurisdictional. Appellant cites State v. Miller, 525 N.W.2d 576 (Minn. App. 1994), for the proposition that IAD defects are jurisdictional and therefore not waived upon entry of a guilty plea.
But the Miller court addressed the IAD's companion statute governing intrastate detainers, the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act (UMDDA). 525 N.W.2d at 579. And its decision relied on two bases: (1) the UMDDA's 2015language reasonably implies that the defendant's right to speedy disposition of untried charges is jurisdictional2016 and (2) the defendant 2015consistently asserted that he was not waiving his right to appeal the detainer issue.2016 Id. Neither predicate is present here. The IAD does not contain statutory language similar to the UMDDA language cited in Miller. And appellant did not assert that he was preserving his right to appeal the IAD issue. He told the district court specifically that he understood that pleading guilty would make it 2015very difficult2016 to appeal or withdraw the plea. Even though his IAD-based motion to dismiss was heard at his plea hearing, appellant did not seek to preserve the issue for appeal. We therefore decline to extend Miller's reasoning under the UMDDA to the IAD.
Further, the majority of jurisdictions that have considered the issue have held that a prisoner's rights under the IAD are nonjurisdictional and can be waived by the entry of a guilty plea. E.g., Baxter v. United States, 966 F.2d 387, 389 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Fulford, 825 F.2d 3, 10 (3d Cir. 1987); Kowalak v....
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