State v. Heredia

• Decision Date: 31 December 2013
• Docket Number: No. 19111.,19111.
• Citation: 81 A.3d 1163,310 Conn. 742
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Rafael HEREDIA.

310 Conn. 742

81 A.3d 1163

STATE of Connecticut

v.Rafael HEREDIA.

No. 19111.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Sept. 26, 2013.

Decided Dec. 31, 2013.

Bradford Buchta, assistant public defender, with whom were Martin Zeldis, public defender, and Mary Haselkamp, supervisory assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Joseph P. Corradino, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom were Adam Mattei, deputy assistant state's attorney, and, on the brief, John C. Smriga, state's attorney, and Christopher Clark, law student intern, for the appellee (state).

ROGERS, C.J., and PALMER, ZARELLA, EVELEIGH, McDONALD and VERTEFEUILLE, Js.

EVELEIGH, J.

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the trial court properly denied the motion of the defendant, Rafael Heredia, to be released without bond on the ground that, contrary to the procedures dictated by our rules of practice and United States Supreme Court case law, a probable cause finding had not been made within forty-eight hours of the defendant's warrantless arrest. The defendant sought review of the trial court's denial of his motion for release by the Appellate Court, which granted the defendant's motion for review, but denied the relief requested therein. The defendant subsequently filed a petition for certification to appeal from the decision of the Appellate Court. This court treated the defendant's petition for certification as an application filed pursuant to General Statutes § 52–265a,¹ which permits the Chief Justice to consider an interlocutory appeal from a decision of the trial court where the underlying action involves a matter of substantial public interest and delay may work a substantial injustice. See Foley v. State Elections Enforcement Commission, 297 Conn. 764, 767 n. 2, 2 A.3d 823 (2010); State v. Fernando A., 294 Conn. 1, 5 n. 3, 981 A.2d 427 (2009); State v. Kemah, 289 Conn. 411, 414 n. 2, 957 A.2d 852 (2008). The Chief Justice granted the defendant's § 52–265a application.²State v. Heredia, 308 Conn. 903, 61 A.3d 1096 (2013). We conclude that, even if we were to assume the failure to make a judicial determination of probable cause within forty-eight hours of a warrantless arrest constituted a violation of the defendant's rights under the fourth amendment to the United States constitution in the absence of proof by the state of a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance justifying the delayed adjudication, under the specific facts of the present case, the trial court correctly denied the defendant's motion for release because it was a de minimis violation in that: (1) the defendant was present in the courthouse awaiting arraignment, when probable cause findings typically are made, prior to the expiration of the forty-eight hour period; and (2) the trial court found probable cause for the defendant's arrest approximately one hour and thirty-five minutes after expiration of the forty-eight hour time period. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following undisputed facts and procedural history. The state and the defendant stipulated to the following facts: “The defendant was arrested by the Bridgeport Police Department without a warrant on speedy information ... and charged with one count of attempt to commit [felony] murder in violation of [General Statutes §§] 53a–49 and 53a–54c, four counts of threatening in the second degree in violation of [General Statutes] § 53a–62, one count of reckless endangerment in the first degree in violation of [General Statutes] § 53a–63, one count of [unlawful] discharge of a firearm in violation of [General Statutes] § 53–203,³ one count of carrying a pistol without a permit in violation of [General Statutes] § 29–35(a), and criminal possession of a firearm in violation of [General Statutes] § 53a–217.⁴ ... These charges arose out of allegations that the defendant fired a pistol from his automobile at one of the complainants, then exited the car and threatened others with a golf club.... The defendant was arrested on Saturday, August 18, 2012, at 10:40 a.m.... The defendant was brought to the [g]eographical [a]rea [number two] courthouse on Monday, August 20, 2012.... The defendant arrived at the [courthouse] at 8:33 a.m.... No probable cause finding had been made prior to the defendant's presentation before the court.... The defendant appeared before the court, Rodriguez, J., at approximately 12:15 p.m.... The court made a finding of probable cause on all counts at that time.” (Footnotes added.) Thereafter, the defendant filed a motion seeking to be released without bond pursuant to Practice Book § 37–12(a).⁵ After briefs and oral argument, the trial court denied the motion. In doing so, the trial court concluded that, although the forty-eight hour requirement of Practice Book § 37–12(a) had been violated, that rule did not mandate the defendant's release because probable cause had been found.

The defendant then filed a motion for review of the trial court's denial with the Appellate Court. After oral argument, the Appellate Court granted the defendant's motion for review, but denied the relief requested therein. As grounds for its denial, the Appellate Court considered: “the particular facts of this case, including the fact that the defendant was brought to the court within forty-eight hours of his arrest for the specific purpose, inter alia, of having a probable cause determination made on these charges, and the fact that there was an actual finding of probable cause one hour and [thirty-five] minutes after the lapse of the forty-eight hour time period following his arrest.” The defendant filed a petition for certification to appeal from the decision of the Appellate Court. This court treated the defendant's petition as an application to appeal filed pursuant to § 52–265a. After review, the Chief Justice granted the defendant's application. This appeal followed. See footnote 2 of this opinion.

On appeal to this court, the defendant asserts that the trial court improperly denied his motion for release when probable cause was found more than forty-eight hours after his arrest. Specifically, the defendant contends that the finding of probable cause more than forty-eight hours after his arrest violated the fourth amendment to the United States constitution, United States Supreme Court precedent, and Practice Book § 37–12(a). The defendant further asserts that release without bond was the appropriate remedy for these violations based on the plain and unambiguous language of § 37–12(a). In response, the state asserts that the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for release because a judicial determination of probable cause was made less than two hours after the expiration of the forty-eight hour period required by § 37–12(a). Specifically, the state asserts that the fourth amendment to the United States constitution and United States Supreme Court precedent do not require the defendant's release without bail. The state also claims that the plain language of § 37–12(a) does not require the defendant's release without bail and that § 37–12(a) must be read in light of other rules of practice and the overall statutory scheme governing the release of criminal defendants. We agree with the state that the trial court properly determined that, under the facts of the present case, releasing the defendant without bail was not required.

Before undertaking our analysis in the present case, we briefly summarize the genesis and nature of the requirement that a person arrested without a warrant receive a timely judicial determination of probable cause. In Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 105, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975), the United States Supreme Court addressed whether a person arrested without a warrant is constitutionally entitled to a judicial determination of probable cause. In Gerstein, the respondents were arrested and held in custody based on a prosecutor's information. Id. The respondents filed a class action claiming a constitutional right to a judicial hearing on the issue of probable cause and requesting declaratory and injunctive relief. Id., at 106–107, 95 S.Ct. 854. The respondents did not seek release from state custody, and only sought that the state authorities be ordered to give them a probable cause determination. Id., at 107 n. 6, 95 S.Ct. 854.

In Gerstein, the United States Supreme Court recognized that “[t]o implement the [f]ourth [a]mendment's protection against unfounded invasions of liberty and privacy, the [United States Supreme] Court has required that the existence of probable cause be decided by a neutral and detached magistrate whenever possible.” Id., at 112, 95 S.Ct. 854. Drawing from its decision in Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948), the court in Gerstein reiterated as follows: “The point of the [f]ourth [a]mendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gerstein v. Pugh, supra, 420 U.S. at 112–13, 95 S.Ct. 854.

In Gerstein, the United States Supreme Court concluded that there was a need to develop a practical compromise between the “[m]aximum protection of individual rights [that] could be assured by requiring a magistrate's review of the factual justification prior to any arrest” and the legitimate need for law enforcement officers to assess probable cause at the scene of a crime and arrest a person suspected of committing it. Id., at 113, 95 S.Ct. 854. The court in Gerstein continued: “Once the suspect is in custody, however, the reasons that justify dispensing...