State v. Hernandez
Decision Date | 09 April 2020 |
Docket Number | No. 20190347-CA,20190347-CA |
Citation | 462 P.3d 1283 |
Parties | STATE of Utah, Appellant, v. Omar HERNANDEZ, Appellee. |
Court | Utah Court of Appeals |
Simarjit S. Gill and Nicole Kunzler Pearce, Attorneys for Appellant
Alan J. Buividas, Attorney for Appellee
Opinion
¶1 Omar Hernandez was arrested and charged for patronizing a prostitute who was actually an undercover detective. Hernandez filed a motion to dismiss the charge, asserting a defense of entrapment. Following a hearing on the matter, the district court ruled that Hernandez was entrapped as a matter of law and dismissed the case with prejudice. The State appeals. We reverse and remand.
¶2 On June 1, 2018, Hernandez pulled into the secluded portion of a McDonald’s parking lot that was frequented by men seeking prostitutes. Hernandez remained in his car for possibly less than a minute and was approached by an undercover detective.1 The detective asked Hernandez if he was "looking for a date"—lingo used to offer prostitution services. Hernandez responded in the affirmative and asked her to get into his vehicle. The detective did not do so but asked Hernandez if he had any money. Hernandez indicated that he did. The detective then inquired whether Hernandez wanted "to fuck" or if he just "wanted a blowjob." Hernandez responded that he "wanted to go all out" and "make it worth [her] while"—which the detective understood to mean that he wanted to have sexual intercourse in exchange for money. The detective told Hernandez to show her the money. Hernandez pulled out a five-dollar bill and several ones, prompting the detective to retort, in character, "I’m not going to fuck you for five dollars." Hernandez indicated he had more money, pulled out a fifty-dollar bill, and asked her, "Fifty dollars?" The detective indicated that was acceptable and inquired whether Hernandez had a condom. Hernandez said he did. The detective then directed Hernandez to meet her at a 7-Eleven around the corner to consummate the transaction. Hernandez pulled out of the parking spot and headed in that direction, at which point he was apprehended by the law enforcement take-down team.
¶3 Hernandez was charged with one count of patronizing a prostitute. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1303 (LexisNexis 2018). Thereafter, Hernandez filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the detective entrapped him. After briefing, an evidentiary hearing, additional briefing, and oral argument, the district court granted Hernandez’s motion and dismissed the case with prejudice. The court found that the "attractive" detective approached Hernandez’s car within possibly less than one minute and initiated contact that "creat[ed] a substantial risk that [she would] convince some people who [were] not there for that purpose [of prostitution] to engage in ... criminal behavior." The court concluded that "a reasonable jury [would] have to entertain at least reasonable doubt about whether or not the entrapment defense applies" and therefore ruled that Hernandez was entrapped as a matter of law. The State appeals.
¶4 The State contends that the district court erred by ruling as a matter of law that Hernandez was entrapped by the detective. When considering a district court’s entrapment determination, we review factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions for correctness. See State v. Torres , 2000 UT 100, ¶¶ 8–14, 16 P.3d 1242 ; State v. Curtis , 542 P.2d 744, 746–47 (Utah 1975).
¶5 The State contends that the district court erred in determining as a matter of law that the detective entrapped Hernandez, arguing that the facts as found by the district court do not, as a matter of law, amount to entrapment under the statute and our case law. We agree.
¶6 A defendant may assert entrapment as a defense to a charge of criminal conduct by making a written motion, Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303(4) (LexisNexis 2017), and pointing to some evidence of entrapment, cf. State v. Tebbs , 786 P.2d 775, 779 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) . The court then hears the evidence on the issue and determines "as a matter of fact and law whether the defendant was entrapped to commit the offense." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303(4). After determining the facts, the court must consider whether those facts establish entrapment as a matter of law. Id. Entrapment is established as a matter of law when an entrapment defense—asserting the offense was impermissibly induced—is sure to leave all reasonable minds reasonably doubting whether the commission of the offense was the product of a defendant’s inclination. See State v. Torres , 2000 UT 100, ¶ 8, 16 P.3d 1242 ; State v. Kaufman , 734 P.2d 465, 468 (Utah 1987) ( ); State v. Curtis , 542 P.2d 744, 746 (Utah 1975) (); State v. Haltom , 2005 UT App 348, ¶ 7, 121 P.3d 42 (). If a court finds that entrapment occurred as a matter of law, then it must dismiss the case with prejudice. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303(5). In contrast, if a court determines that an entrapment defense will leave fewer than all reasonable minds with a reasonable doubt, then the court must deny the motion, but the defendant is able to present the defense to the jury at trial. See id. ; see also Haltom , 2005 UT App 348, ¶ 7, 121 P.3d 42.
¶7 "Entrapment occurs when a peace officer ... induces the commission of an offense in order to obtain evidence of the commission for prosecution by methods creating a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by one not otherwise ready to commit it." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303(1). However, "[c]onduct merely affording a person an opportunity to commit an offense does not constitute entrapment." Id. Utah courts have embraced an objective standard focusing on whether the methods used by law enforcement create a substantial risk of inducement. E.g. , Torres , 2000 UT 100, ¶ 8, 16 P.3d 1242.2 Thus, an entrapment determination rests on whether law enforcement officials or their agents use methods which create a substantial risk that a person would be induced or persuaded to commit an offense when that person was not otherwise ready to commit it. State v. Taylor , 599 P.2d 496, 503 (Utah 1979) ; see Curtis , 542 P.2d at 746–47 ( ). See generally State v. Cripps , 692 P.2d 747, 750 (Utah 1984) ( ).
¶8 In evaluating whether government action impermissibly induces criminal activity, as opposed to permissibly affording the mere opportunity to participate in criminal activity, we consider actions leading up to the offense, interactions between a defendant and the government agent, the nature of the inducements, and the responses to the inducements. State v. J.D.W. , 910 P.2d 1242, 1243–44 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Notably, our courts have previously identified extreme pleas of desperate illness; appeals to sympathy, pity, or close personal relationships; offers of inordinate monetary gain; and excessive or persistent pressure as methods that create a substantial risk of inducing criminal conduct. See State v. Sprague , 680 P.2d 404, 406 (Utah 1984) ; accord J.D.W. , 910 P.2d at 1244.
¶9 For example, in State v. J.D.W. , an undercover officer randomly approached the defendant and his friend who were at the mall to buy a compact disc. 910 P.2d at 1243. After the officer indicated his ability to sell the youths marijuana, he invited them outside and there showed the defendant the product. Id. The defendant evaluated the marijuana by separating the buds from the shake—an action demonstrating familiarity with marijuana—inquired about the price, purchased the marijuana, and took possession of it, whereupon he was arrested for possession. Id. We observed that the officer’s actions did not rely upon a close personal relationship to induce the defendant’s purchase, the offer did not provide an inordinate financial incentive, and the officer did not badger or harass the defendant into making the purchase. Id. at 1244. Accordingly, we held that the officer merely provided the opportunity for the drug purchase and possession. Id.
¶10 In this case, the district court identified the objective standard, but did not apply it correctly. The court focused its analysis on at least two (maybe three) factors: first, the limited time between Hernandez’s arrival and the approach of the detective; second, that "a significant number of people" could be induced to patronize a prostitute even though "they weren’t there for it," if the "opportunity present[ed] itself"; and third, although unclear as to the extent the court actually gave weight to it, the attractiveness of the detective. Based primarily on these factors, the court concluded that Hernandez was entrapped as a matter of law.
¶11 We evaluate whether any of the methods used by the government...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
State v. Dickerson
...minds reasonably doubting" whether the defendant freely and voluntarily committed the crime. State v. Hernandez , 2020 UT App 58, ¶ 6, 462 P.3d 1283 ; see also Hatchett , 2020 UT App 61, ¶ 10, 462 P.3d 1288 ("Only when reasonable minds could not differ can we find entrapment as a matter of ......
-
State v. Smith
...we review factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions for correctness." State v. Hernandez , 2020 UT App 58, ¶ 4, 462 P.3d 1283.ANALYSISI¶10 Smith first argues that the district court, acting as magistrate, erred in binding him over for trial on three of the attempt charges, asse......
-
State v. Smith
...we review factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions for correctness." State v. Hernandez, 2020 UT App 58, ¶ 4, 462 P.3d 1283. I ¶10 Smith first argues that the district court, acting as magistrate, erred in binding him over for trial on three of the attempt charges, asserting t......
- State ex rel. D.M. v. State
-
Race, Entrapment, and Manufacturing 'Homegrown Terrorism
...Code § 2.13, see infra note 482, the statutory language leaves room for a subjective test of predisposition. Compare State v. Hernandez, 462 P.3d 1283, 1286– 87 (Utah Ct. App. 2020) (claiming to follow an objective test), with State v. Dickerson, 511 P.3d 1191, 1201 (Utah Ct. App. 2022) (re......