State v. Hernandez
| Decision Date | 15 January 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. COA06-1591.,COA06-1591. |
| Citation | 655 S.E.2d 426 |
| Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. Cristanto R. HERNANDEZ and Magdalena Garcia Pedro. |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Anne Bleyman, Chapel Hill, for defendant-appellee Cristanto R. Hernandez.
Appellate Defender Staples S. Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Daniel Shatz, for defendant-appellee Magdalena Garcia Pedro.
The State of North Carolina appeals from judgments vacating the jury's guilty verdicts against Cristanto R. Hernandez ("Hernandez") for driving while impaired and driving without a license and against Magdalena Garcia Pedro ("Pedro") for giving false information required in a report of a reportable accident. We reverse.
On 17 September 2005, Hernandez and Pedro were traveling home from a child's birthday party when they were involved in an automobile accident at approximately 9 p.m. at the intersection of N.C. 210 and Little Kelly Road in Pender County. Their vehicle hit a ditch, and landed approximately thirty to forty feet in a bean field. Two North Carolina Highway Patrol Troopers, Allen Dezso ("Trooper Dezso") and Barry Henline ("Trooper Henline"), arrived after the accident occurred. When Trooper Dezso arrived, no one was in the vehicle. Trooper Dezso observed the steering wheel air bag had deployed and there was blood on the air bag. Trooper Dezso noticed Hernandez had blood near his nose and on his shirt. Trooper Henline observed Pedro had a fabric burn extending from her right shoulder to her collarbone, Hernandez's nose was bleeding, and bloodstains were on his shirt. Trooper Henline asked Hernandez to produce a driver's license. Hernandez did not have a North Carolina driver's license in his possession. Later, Pedro told Trooper Henline, through the assistance of a translator, that she was the driver of the vehicle.
Trooper Henline detected a strong odor of alcohol from Hernandez. Trooper Henline properly transported Hernandez to a law enforcement center and an Intoxilyzer test was administered. The test revealed Hernandez's blood alcohol concentration level was .26. Hernandez was charged with driving while impaired under N.C. Gen.Stat. § 20-138.1, operating a motor vehicle without a valid driver's license under N.C. Gen.Stat. § 20-7(a), and possession of an open container. Pedro was charged with giving false information for a motor vehicle crash report in violation of N.C. Gen.Stat. § 20-279.31(b).
On 14 December 2005, Pender County District Court Judge James H. Faison, III found Hernandez guilty of driving while impaired and operating a motor vehicle without a valid driver's license and not guilty of the open container charge. Pedro was found guilty of providing false information in violation of N.C. Gen.Stat. § 20-279.31(b).
Hernandez and Pedro appealed to Pender County Superior Court. This case came to trial in the Superior Court of Pender County on 25 July 2006, the Honorable Ernest B. Fullwood presiding. On 26 July 2006, the jury returned a verdict of guilty against Hernandez for driving while impaired and operating a motor vehicle without a valid operator's license, and a guilty verdict against Pedro for giving false information required in a report of a reportable accident.
Both Hernandez and Pedro moved to dismiss the charges at the close of the State's evidence. The trial court denied their motions. The defendants again moved to dismiss the charges at the close of all the evidence. The trial court reserved its ruling on those motions. After the jury returned the guilty verdicts, defendants moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdicts and asked the trial court for a decision on the motions to dismiss at the close of all the evidence. The trial court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss at the close of all the evidence and vacated the guilty verdicts. The State appealed.
The State assigns as error the trial court's dismissal of the charges and vacating the jury's guilty verdicts on the grounds that the evidence was sufficient to submit the case to the jury and the court erroneously relied on the principle that stacking inferences is not permitted in determining guilt or innocence on a motion to dismiss, a principle of law that was overruled by State v. Childress, 321 N.C. 226, 232, 362 S.E.2d 263, 267 (1987).
Hernandez and Pedro cross-assign prejudicial error to the trial court's decision to reserve its ruling on defendants' motions to dismiss at the close of all the evidence in violation of N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A-1227(c) and defendants' rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution.
The standard of review of a motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence is whether the State presented substantial evidence of each element of the offense and "defendant's being the perpetrator." State v. Nettles, 170 N.C.App. 100, 102-03, 612 S.E.2d 172, 174, review denied by, 359 N.C. 640, 617 S.E.2d 286 (2005) (citations omitted). Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion. Nettles, 170 N.C.App. at 103, 612 S.E.2d at 174 (citing State v. Brown, 310 N.C. 563, 566, 313 S.E.2d 585, 587 (1984)). The court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, giving every reasonable inference arising from that evidence to the State, even if the same evidence supports reasonable inferences of the defendant's innocence. State v. Scott, 356 N.C. 591, 596, 573 S.E.2d 866, 869 (2002); Nettles, 170 N.C.App. at 103, 612 S.E.2d at 174. Where the evidence is contradictory, "[a]ll contradictions must be resolved in favor of the State." State v. Myers, 181 N.C.App. 310, 313, 639 S.E.2d 1, 3 (2007). Whether the evidence is circumstantial or direct does not preclude a reasonable inference of defendant's guilt. Id. (citing State v. Trull, 349 N.C. 428, 447, 509 S.E.2d 178, 191 (1998)).
However, where the evidence is "sufficient only to raise a suspicion or conjecture as to either the commission of the offense or identity of the defendant as the perpetrator, the motion to dismiss must be allowed." State v. Malloy, 309 N.C. 176, 179, 305 S.E.2d 718, 720 (1983) (citation omitted). "This is true even though the suspicion aroused by the evidence is strong." Id.
The grounds for the State's appeal are provided in N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A-1445(a)(1) which states "[u]nless the rule against double jeopardy prohibits further prosecution, the State may appeal from the superior court to the appellate division: (1) When there has been a decision or judgment dismissing criminal charges as to one or more counts." N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A-1445(a)(1) (2007).
Here, the State appeals the trial court's dismissal of charges of driving while impaired, driving without a license, and giving a false report. Double jeopardy does not prohibit prosecution because the jury already rendered the verdicts. State v. Scott, 146 N.C.App. 283, 286, 551 S.E.2d 916, 918-19 (2001), rev'd on other grounds by, 356 N.C. 591, 573 S.E.2d 866 (2002). If the State succeeds in its appeal, then defendants would not be subject to re-trial. The court would reinstate the jury's verdicts. Id.
The substantial evidence standard of review is applied on a case-by-case basis and the outcome varies depending on the facts of each case. State v. Bell, 65 N.C.App. 234, 240, 309 S.E.2d 464, 468 (1983) ().
Hernandez was charged with driving while impaired in violation of N.C. Gen.Stat. § 20-138.1 and operating a motor vehicle on a street or highway without a license in violation of N.C. Gen.Stat. § 20-7(a). The essential elements of driving while impaired are (1) driving any vehicle, (2) upon any highway, any street, or any public vehicular area within the State, and (3) while under the influence of an impairing substance. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 20-138.1(a) (2007); State v. Tedder, 169 N.C.App. 446, 450, 610 S.E.2d 774, 777 (2005) (citation omitted). Defendants do not contest that Hernandez was impaired, that the vehicle was driven on a public vehicular area, or that Hernandez was not in possession of a driver's license. Therefore, in order to determine whether the motion to dismiss by Hernandez was properly granted, the issue is whether the State presented substantial evidence for a rational juror to infer that Hernandez was the driver.
The State argues that the trial court should have denied defendants' motions to dismiss because the State's evidence, although circumstantial, was sufficient for a reasonable mind to determine that Hernandez was driving the vehicle, and therefore guilty of the charges. According to the State, a jury could reasonably infer from the physical evidence that Hernandez was the driver. We agree. Specifically, the officers' observations of Pedro's right shoulder burn, the lack of blood on the passenger's side, the blood on the driver's side of the air bag, and blood on Hernandez are sufficient to support an inference that Hernandez was the driver.
In State v. Scott, the State appealed the trial court's dismissal of a driving while impaired charge granted after the jury returned a guilty verdict. Scott, 356 N.C. at 593, 573 S.E.2d at 867. The State presented evidence that defendant had been speeding in excess of sixty miles per hour and failed to immediately stop although the police officer...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Collins
... ... See State v. Kiselev , 241 N.C. App. 144, 151, 772 S.E.2d 465, 470 (2015) ("The trial court violated N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-1227(c) by reserving judgment on the defendant's motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence until after the jury returned a verdict."); State v. Hernandez , 188 N.C. App. 193, 204, 655 S.E.2d 426, 433 (2008) (considering whether the trial court's reservation of ruling on motions to dismiss at the close of all evidence until after the jury returned its verdict amounted to prejudicial error). 16 Here, after the State rested for the first time, defense ... ...
-
State v. Godfrey
... ... In order to warrant a new trial, a defendant must show that he was prejudiced by the alleged error; that is, that there exists "a reasonable possibility that had the error not been committed a different result would have been reached at the trial." State v ... Hernandez , 188 N.C. App. 193, 204, 655 S.E.2d 426, 433 (2008) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-1443). Where "abundant evidence" exists to otherwise support a defendant's guilty verdict, "the admission of evidence, even though technically incompetent, will not be held prejudicial when [the] defendant does not ... ...
-
State Of North Carolina v. Ligon
... ... See N.C. Gen.Stat. § 14-190.16 (2009). We are barred from reading 697 S.E.2d 490 ... the statute broadly enough to prohibit Defendant's conduct because we are compelled to construe this statute strictly ... State v. Hernandez, 188 N.C.App. 193, 202, 655 S.E.2d 426, 432 (2008). If our legislature had intended to criminalize such behavior as Defendant's, it certainly could have done so. Because we hold that the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the charge of first degree sexual ... ...
-
State v. Love, COA14–1330.
... ... State v. Love,177 N.C.App. 614, 623, 630 S.E.2d 234, 24041 (2006) (citation omitted). An error is not prejudicial unless there is a reasonable possibility that had the error in question not been committed, a different result would have been reached at trial. See State v. Hernandez,188 N.C.App. 193, 204, 655 S.E.2d 426, 433 (2008). Where a defendant contests the admissibility of evidence at trial, alleged error is reversible if it appears that the jury would have reached a different verdict had it not considered the challenged evidence. State v. Mason,144 N.C.App. 20, 2728, ... ...