State v. Hernandez, 20090080.

• Decision Date: 08 November 2011
• Docket Number: No. 20090080.,20090080.
• Citation: 2011 UT 70,695 Utah Adv. Rep. 11,268 P.3d 822
• Parties: STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Victor HERNANDEZ, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

2011 UT 70
268 P.3d 822
695 Utah Adv. Rep. 11

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Victor HERNANDEZ, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 20090080.

Supreme Court of Utah.

Nov. 8, 2011.

[268 P.3d 823]

Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Christine F. Soltis, Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.

Neal G. Hamilton, Elizabeth A. Lorenzo, Salt Lake City, for defendant.

AMENDED OPINION ^* On Certification from the Utah Court of Appeals Justice PARRISH, opinion of the Court:INTRODUCTION

¶ 1 This case requires us to determine whether article I, section 13 of the Utah Constitution entitles a defendant charged with Class A misdemeanors to a preliminary hearing. The district court denied Victor Hernandez's request for a preliminary hearing because it concluded that the right to a preliminary hearing guaranteed under article I, section 13 does not apply to Class A misdemeanors. We hold that it does and accordingly reverse the decision of the district court.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 On November 30, 2007, an information was filed charging Mr. Hernandez with four Class A misdemeanor offenses: negligent homicide, obstruction of justice, unlawful sale/supply of alcohol to minors, and possession of drug paraphernalia. On June 6, 2008, Mr. Hernandez filed a request for a preliminary hearing. He argued that article I, section 13 of the Utah Constitution guarantees the right to a preliminary hearing for defendants charged with felony or Class A misdemeanor offenses. The district court originally granted Mr. Hernandez's request for a preliminary hearing, but later, on a motion to reconsider, denied it. The district court found that the offenses with which Mr. Hernandez was charged did not exist and were not indictable offenses under Utah territorial law. Accordingly, it held that he was not

[268 P.3d 824]

entitled to the protections provided by article I, section 13. Mr. Hernandez filed a petition for interlocutory appeal challenging the district court's denial of his request for a preliminary hearing. The court of appeals granted Mr. Hernandez's petition for interlocutory appeal and then certified his appeal to this court. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78A–3–102(3)(b) (Supp.2010).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 3 Interpretation of the Utah Constitution is a question of law. State v. Timmerman, 2009 UT 58, ¶ 7, 218 P.3d 590. We therefore review for correctness the district court's determination that article I, section 13 of the Utah Constitution does not grant Mr. Hernandez the right to a preliminary hearing. Under this correctness standard of review, we give no deference to the district court's legal conclusions. Id.

ANALYSIS I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT DETERMINED THAT ARTICLE I, SECTION 13 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION DOES NOT APPLY TO CLASS A MISDEMEANORS

¶ 4 Article I, section 13 of the Utah Constitution provides that “ [o]ffenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after examination and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be waived by the accused with the consent of the State, or by indictment, with or without such examination and commitment.” Utah Const. art. I, § 13 (emphases added).

¶ 5 Relying on article I, section 13, Mr. Hernandez argues that defendants charged with Class A misdemeanors are entitled to a preliminary hearing. Specifically, he argues that the phrase “offenses heretofore” refers to a class of offenses over which district courts had original jurisdiction under Utah territorial law and that, under Utah territorial law, district courts had original jurisdiction over “indictable offenses.” Under territorial law, “indictable offenses” were crimes punishable by imprisonment of more than six months. Because Class A misdemeanors are punishable by imprisonment of more than six months, Mr. Hernandez argues that they constitute “indictable offenses” that must be prosecuted by information after “examination and commitment” by a magistrate. Mr. Hernandez further contends that the “examination and commitment” referred to in article I, section 13 means a preliminary hearing.

¶ 6 The State disagrees that the phrase “offenses heretofore” refers to “indictable offenses” under Utah territorial law. Rather, it argues that the phrase refers only to felony offenses for which an accused was entitled to a grand jury indictment under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The State also disagrees that “examination and commitment” means a preliminary hearing.

¶ 7 We first consider what offenses are entitled to the protections afforded by article I, section 13 of the Utah Constitution. Because we determine that article I, section 13 refers to offenses that were considered “indictable” under Utah territorial law, we then consider what constituted an “indictable offense” in the Utah Territory. We finally consider what type of proceeding is contemplated by the “examination and commitment” requirement.

A. Article I, Section 13 Refers to Utah Territorial Law

¶ 8 We first consider which offenses were “heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment” as that phrase is used in article I, section 13 of the Utah Constitution. In interpreting our constitution, our goal is to ascertain the drafters' intent. Am. Bush v. City of S. Salt Lake, 2006 UT 40, ¶ 12, 140 P.3d 1235. Because the best evidence of the drafters' intent is the text itself, our analysis “begin[s] with a review of the constitutional text.” Dexter v. Bosko, 2008 UT 29, ¶ 11, 184 P.3d 592. Our textual interpretation “recognize[s] that constitutional ‘language ... is to be read not as barren words found in a dictionary but as symbols of historic experience illumined by the presuppositions of those who employed them.’ ”

[268 P.3d 825]

Am. Bush, 2006 UT 40, ¶ 10, 140 P.3d 1235 (second alteration in original) (quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 523, 71 S.Ct. 857, 95 L.Ed. 1137 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). Therefore, our interpretation is informed not only by the plain meaning of the text but also by “historical evidence of the [drafters'] intent.” Id. Additionally, our interpretation “may consider well-reasoned and meaningful decisions made by courts of last resort in sister states with similar constitutional provisions.” Id.

¶ 9 We therefore begin with the text of article I, section 13. This provision specifies the procedure for prosecuting “[o]ffenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment.” Utah Const. art. I, § 13. The drafters' choice of the phrase “offenses heretofore” is revealing. The word “offense” means “[a] violation of the law; a crime, often a minor one.” Black's Law Dictionary 1110 (8th ed. 2004). This word “comprehend[s] every crime and misdemeanor, or may be used in a specific sense as synonymous with ‘felony’ or with ‘misdemeanor,’ as the case may be.” 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 3 (1989). As for the term “heretofore,” it means “[u]p to now; before this time.” Black's Law Dictionary 745. Thus, the plain meaning of the phrase “offenses heretofore” is any crime—felony or misdemeanor—that up to now has been required to be prosecuted by indictment. Our next task therefore is to determine which crimes were required to be prosecuted by indictment up to the adoption of the Utah Constitution.

¶ 10 To answer this question, we turn to the historical context in which article I, section 13 was adopted. The State argues that this provision refers only to felony offenses because only felony offenses were required to be prosecuted by indictment under the federal constitution. Before statehood, the Utah Territory was required to abide by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which required that felonies be prosecuted by indictment. The State therefore reasons that the phrase “offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment” applies only to those crimes that were required to be prosecuted by indictment under federal law. The State further reasons that because the Fifth Amendment did not apply to the states, upon achieving statehood, Utah was free to adopt a different procedure for prosecuting felony offenses and that article I, section 13 reflects the framers' intent that felony offenses could be prosecuted either by way of information or indictment. We are unpersuaded by the State's reasoning.

¶ 11 While the State correctly notes that the Fifth Amendment applied to the territories of the United States, see State v. Rock, 20 Utah 38, 57 P. 532, 533 (1899); Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 348–49, 18 S.Ct. 620, 42 L.Ed. 1061 (1898), overruled on other grounds by Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990), it fails to recognize that the Utah Territory was also governed by its own territorial law. State v. Norman, 16 Utah 457, 52 P. 986, 988 (1898).¹ And while Utah territorial law could not abridge the protections provided by the United States Constitution, it could provide broader protections. Id. (noting that if territorial law was not disapproved by Congress “it was valid, unless in conflict with the constitution of the United States, or unless the legislation of congress on the same subject was exclusive”); cf. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 300, 102 S.Ct. 2442, 73 L.Ed.2d 16 (1982) (“State law may recognize liberty interests more extensive than those independently protected by the Federal Constitution.”). Indeed, Utah territorial law did provide broader protections than those contained in the Fifth Amendment. While the Fifth Amendment right to prosecution by indictment applied only to felonies, Utah territorial law extended this right to misdemeanors punishable by more than six months in the city or county jail. See Utah Comp. Laws §§ 3023, 4783 (1888) (stating that every public

[268 P.3d 826]

offense must be prosecuted by indictment, except offenses triable in justice courts, and providing that justice courts do not have jurisdiction over crimes punishable by imprisonment in the city jail for more than...