State v. Hernia
| Decision Date | 20 September 1902 |
| Citation | 53 A. 85,68 N.J.L. 299 |
| Parties | STATE v. HERNIA. |
| Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
(Syllabus by the Court.)
Error to court of oyer and terminer, Bergen county.
Peter Hernia was convicted of murder, and brings error. Affirmed.
Peter W. Stagg, for plaintiff in error.
Ernest Koster, for the State.
The judgment of death pronounced upon the defendant on an indictment for murder is here upon a record that is certified in its entirety under the statute. The causes for reversal filed in this court raise certain questions which will be considered in their order.
The facts to be premised are that on the 4th day of March the defendant went to the butcher shop of Barney Kanter, at Wallington, in Bergen county, and asked for meat for his dog, which Kanter refused to give him. The defendant at the time said, "If you will not give me meat, I will fix you for it." The butcher then threatened to "shove him out," whereupon the defendant left the shop, saying as he went, This threat he repeated at a near-by hotel, where he complained that Barney "wouldn't favor him with five cents' worth of meat for his dog." About an hour later the defendant returned to the butcher shop, and again asked for meat, repeated his former threat, and drew a pistol, which he fired twice, Inflicting upon Kanter a mortal wound. Afterward, when arrested, he said, "I sold my life for five cents." Convicted of murder in the first degree, the defendant brought this writ of error.
The first ground for reversal is the overruling of the question, "Is it not a fact that the people of the town were all excited on account of the flood?" and also the question, "Is it not a fact that during the four days that this town was under water the people in the town—especially those whose houses were filled with water—were very excited?" The physical fact upon which these questions were based, to wit, the flooding of Paterson and Wellington, was in evidence without objection; and nothing in these questions or in the remarks of counsel tended in any way to direct the attention of the witnesses to the mental condition of the defendant, which was the only pertinent object of inquiry. The questions were obviously irrelevant, and were properly overruled.
The second ground of complaint is that the testimony that the defendant had said to the officer who arrested him, "I have sold my life for five cents," was a confession of guilt, and should not have been received without affirmative proof by the state of its voluntary nature. No such ground of objection was made at the trial. In fact, no ground at all for excluding the testimony appears to have been stated. Assuming that the defendant is entitled to review the reception of this testimony, and also that the testimony was in effect a confession, the question of its admissibility has been considered in the light of the principles that govern admissions of that nature.
The general rule that incriminating statements made by a defendant are admissible on behalf of the state is qualified by another rule which makes it the duty of the trial court to ascertain that such statements, when they amount to admissions of guilt, were made by the defendant of his free will, and not because of threats that were held over him, or of hopes that were held out to him. Inasmuch as ordinarily the officers of the law alone are in a position to make good such threats or promises, this subsidiary rule finds application chiefly in cases where the defendant is a prisoner in their custody. The fact of custody, however, standing alone, raises no presumption that illicit methods had been employed. Such an inference arises, if at all, from the circumstances of each case, among which the fact of custody is to be included and considered. To repel such an inference, the state may, among other things, show that the prisoner, before making the statement sought to be proved against him, had been informed that he was not under any compulsion to speak, and that, if he chose to speak, he did so without any inducement being offered to him. Such preliminary information, which is usually referred to as cautioning or warning a prisoner, is not, however, an essential step in the orderly adduction of testimony of this sort, although it sometimes seems to be so regarded. The qualifying rule, in its nature and reason, is limited to those cases in which the circumstances raise, or are capable of raising, the inference which such a warning would tend to rebut. Where no ground exists for the inference, no reason exists for the warning, and the prisoner's statement is admissible because of its evident spontaneity. To this category the...
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State v. Cooper
...cautionary instructions are not an essential step in the establishment of the fact that a confession is voluntary. State v. Hernia, 68 N.J.L. 299, 53 A. 85 (E. & A. 1902); State v. Cole, supra; State v. Pierce, We note, although the point is not specifically raised by the State, that Rule 2......
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State v. Wise
...cautionary instructions are not an essential step in the establishment of the fact that a confession is voluntary.' State v. Hernia, 68 N.J.L. 299, 53 A. 85 (E. & A.1902); State v. Cole, supra. The general rule is, in the absence of a statute to the contrary, a voluntary confession is not r......
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State v. Bunk
...cautionary instructions are not an essential step in the establishment of the fact that a confession is voluntary. State v. Hernia, 68 N.J.L. 299, 53 A. 85 (E. & A.1902); State v. Cole, supra; State v. Pierce, When the jury considered the confessions it had before it all the facts relating ......
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State v. Pierce
...cautionary instructions are not an essential step in the establishment of the fact that a confession is voluntary.' State v. Hernia, 68 N.J.L. 299, 53 A. 85 (E. & A. 1902); State v. Cole, supra (136 N.J.L. 606, 56 A.2d 902). The general rule is, in the absence of a statute to the contrary, ......