State v. Herrera
| Decision Date | 19 October 2011 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 34193,34818,37619.,s. 34193 |
| Citation | 266 P.3d 499,152 Idaho 24 |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Valentino HERRERA, Defendant–Appellant. |
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett LLP, Boise, for appellant. Robyn A. Fyffe argued.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.
Valentino Herrera was convicted of battery on a peace officer, with a sentence enhancement for being a persistent violator of the law. Herrera raises numerous claims of error, including a contention that the State's evidence did not show the alleged victim had been a peace officer.
The following events were described in the State's evidence at Herrera's trial. In June of 2006, Herrera and Alan Garrett, who was a former Cassia County sheriff's deputy and court bailiff, were both incarcerated in Cassia County for unrelated criminal charges. While Garrett was wiping down tables after breakfast, he moved Herrera's coffee cup. This angered Herrera, who commented to another inmate that Garrett had previously "cost [him] five years" and "he put me in prison." Garrett tried to calm Herrera down but was unsuccessful. Herrera then threw hot coffee in Garrett's face, hit him in the face with the coffee mug, punched Garrett in the face and gouged his eye. During the altercation, Herrera called Garrett a "narc cop."
The State charged Herrera with battery, Idaho Code § 18–903, enhanced from a misdemeanor to a felony pursuant to former I.C. § 18–915(d) (2001), on the allegation that the battery was committed because of Garrett's former status as a "peace officer." The State later filed an amended information seeking a persistent violator sentence enhancement.
Prior to trial, Herrera filed a motion to dismiss the charge, contending that Garrett had not been a peace officer, but instead had been a bailiff, when Herrera's animosity towards Garrett arose, and therefore the charging enhancement could not apply. The district court denied the motion, concluding that one could be both a peace officer and a bailiff.
On the morning of trial, Herrera filed a motion to dismiss the amended information on the basis that the district court had never arraigned him on the amended information's allegation of the persistent violator enhancement. In response, the district court arraigned Herrera, effectively denying the motion.
After the jury returned a guilty verdict on the charged offense, Herrera's counsel admitted that Herrera was a persistent violator by stipulating that Herrera had thrice previously been convicted of felonies. However, on Herrera's post-trial motion, the district court set aside the persistent violator admission because the court had not asked Herrera personally whether he wanted to plead guilty to the sentencing enhancement. At a new trial on the persistent violator allegation, Herrera was again found to have at least two prior felony convictions. The district court imposed a term of imprisonment of thirty years with ten years fixed.
Herrera appeals.
Prior to trial, Herrera filed a motion to dismiss the charge. He asserted that Garrett's former service was as a bailiff and not as a peace officer even though he also had been a deputy sheriff, and therefore the provisions of Idaho Code § 18–915(d), enhancing the offense to a felony, could not apply. The district court denied the motion, holding that the two terms were not mutually exclusive and that one could be both a peace officer and a bailiff. The district court said: "I believe it's possible that in some situations in some counties bailiffs might not be peace officers, but I think based upon the facts in this case the alleged victim Mr. Garrett was." Herrera claims error.
Herrera's argument is that because Idaho Code § 18–915 refers to peace officers and bailiffs in the disjunctive, as a matter of law the two offices are mutually exclusive and a person cannot be both, either simultaneously or sequentially. This argument carries no logic and therefore demonstrates no error in the denial of his motion.
Herrera next contends that the State did not introduce sufficient trial evidence to prove that Garrett was a former peace officer. Appellate review of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is limited. A jury verdict will not be set aside if it is supported by substantial and competent evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could find all elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Thomas, 133 Idaho 172, 174, 983 P.2d 245, 247 (Ct.App.1999) ; State v. Haley, 129 Idaho 333, 334, 924 P.2d 234, 235 (Ct.App.1996). We may not substitute our opinion for that of the jury as to the credibility of witnesses or the weight to be given to their testimony. State v. Gonzalez, 134 Idaho 907, 909, 12 P.3d 382, 384 (Ct.App.2000). The facts, and inferences to be drawn from those facts, are construed in favor of upholding the jury's verdict. State v. Herrera–Brito, 131 Idaho 383, 385, 957 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Ct.App.1998) ; State v. Peite, 122 Idaho 809, 823, 839 P.2d 1223, 1237 (Ct.App.1992).
Herrera's argument here involves the interplay between three statutes, the first of which is I.C. § 18–915, which, at the time of Herrera's alleged offense, provided:
(emphasis added). The other two statutes are not in the criminal code but are part of Title 19, Chapter 51 of the Idaho Code, which establishes a training program for Idaho law enforcement officers. One of these statutes, I.C. § 19–5101(d), defines "peace officer" as used in that chapter to mean, in relevant part, "any employee of a police or law enforcement agency which is a part of or administered by the state or any political subdivision thereof and whose duties include and primarily consist of the prevention and detection of crime and the enforcement of penal, traffic or highway laws of this state or any political subdivision." The final statute is I.C. § 19–5109(3)1 which provides in part:
No peace officer shall have or exercise any power granted by any statute of this state to peace officers unless such person shall have been certified by the council within one (1) year of the date upon which such person commenced employment as a peace officer, except in cases where the council, for good cause and in writing, has granted additional time to complete such training.
Herrera contends that because trial evidence showed that Garrett was first sworn into office as a deputy on October 2, 1989, and was not certified by the Peace Officer Standards and Training Council (POST) until more than one year later on October 24, 1990, and because the State failed to prove that Garrett was granted additional time from the POST Council, by application of Idaho Code § 19–5109(3) the State necessarily failed to prove that Garrett ever had "official status" as a peace officer. Therefore, Herrera reasons, an element of the offense under I.C. § 18–915(d) was not satisfied. On this theory, Herrera asks this Court to reverse his conviction for insufficient evidence.
Herrera's argument presents an issue of statutory interpretation. The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent. State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 475, 163 P.3d 1183, 1187 (2007). In this task, we are "guided by general principles of statutory construction and a common sense appraisal of what the legislature intended." Lawless v. Davis, 98 Idaho 175, 176, 560 P.2d 497, 498 (1977) ; State v. Paciorek, 137 Idaho 629, 632, 51 P.3d 443, 446 (Ct.App.2002). Constructions of a statute that would yield an absurd result are disfavored. State v. Allen, 148 Idaho 578, 580, 225 P.3d 1173, 1175 (Ct.App.2009). Therefore, courts are free to consider the effect and consequence of differing possible interpretations. State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 690, 85 P.3d 656, 666 (2004).
Herrera's argument is untenable. It inherently requires an interpretation of Section 19–5109(3) to mean that if a person is not POST certified within one year of commencing employment as a peace officer, that person can never thereafter have "official status" as a peace officer or be "duly authorized" to be a peace officer; and even if the individual is later POST certified and works as a peace officer for many years, he or she never becomes one. This could not have been the legislature's intent, and such an interpretation would lead to an absurd result. We construe this statutory provision to mean that if a peace officer is not POST certified within one year of commencing employment and no extension is granted, the statute precludes the individual from having or exercising any statutory authority as a peace officer until he or she is certified.
Here, the State presented evidence that...
To continue reading
Request your trial