State v. Herrera

• Decision Date: 21 April 1995
• Docket Number: 920265,Nos. 920209,s. 920209
• Citation: 895 P.2d 359
• Parties: STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Tomas R. HERRERA, Defendant and Appellant. STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Mikell SWEEZEY, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

Page 359

895 P.2d 359

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v.Tomas R. HERRERA, Defendant and Appellant.

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v.Mikell SWEEZEY, Defendant and Appellant.

Nos. 920209, 920265.

Supreme Court of Utah.

April 21, 1995.

R. Paul Van Dam, Atty. Gen., Christine Soltis, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.

Joan C. Watt, Mark R. Moffat, Richard P. Mauro, Salt Lake City, for Herrera.

Lisa J. Remal, Joan C. Watt, Salt Lake City, for Sweezey.

HOWE, Justice:

This is an appeal from two interlocutory orders entered in two cases which we have consolidated for appellate purposes.DefendantsTomas R. Herrera and Mikell Sweezey both challenge the constitutionality of Utah's insanity defense as codified under Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 and other related sections.

FACTS

Since this is an interlocutory appeal, there has been only limited adjudication of the specific facts in either case.The State concedes the following facts only so far as the limited issue of constitutionality is concerned.

State v. Herrera

Defendant Herrera shot and killed his ex-girlfriend, Claudia Martinez.He admitted to the police that he had been visiting "some girl" when "something snapped, something happened to him and he decided to go to the Martinez house and shoot Claudia."He also admitted that he took his gun to her home and shot her twice in the head.He then chased her mother, Rosa Gonzales, into a bedroom where Claudia's brother, Reuben Martinez, was sleeping.Herrera shot at both of them but missed.The police arrested Herrera shortly after the killing while he still had possession of the gun.He had not consumed any alcohol or drugs.He was charged with Claudia's murder and with the attempted murder of the other two, all in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203.

Herrera eventually pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity.He filed several motions attacking Utah's statutory scheme as unconstitutional.The trial court upheld the insanity defense statutes, and Herrera petitioned for this interlocutory appeal.

State v. Sweezey

Steve Matthews was standing outside a hotel in downtown Salt Lake City when Sweezey approached.When Sweezey was within about eight feet, he pulled a gun from his backpack and shot Matthews in the face.The bullet entered Matthews's left cheek but did not kill him.A security officer of the hotel heard Sweezey say, "They wrecked my home so I shot him."Sweezey was charged with attempted murder in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203.

Sweezey also filed several motions that are essentially identical to those filed by Herrera, attacking Utah's insanity defense statutes.The trial court denied these motions, and we granted Sweezey's interlocutory appeal.

STANDING ISSUES

Initially, there is a question whether either Herrera or Sweezey, at this early stage, has demonstrated that he has standing to challenge the statutes.However, it is an adequate showing of standing if an expert provides testimony or an affidavit asserting that a "viable issue of insanity" is involved in the case.State v. Rhoades, 119 Idaho 594, 809 P.2d 455, 459-60(1991).Both Herrera and Sweezey presented such testimony, and we conclude that they have standing to bring this challenge.

ANALYSIS

I.Background

When John Hinckley was found not guilty by reason of insanity for shooting President Ronald Reagan and Press Secretary James Brady, public outrage prompted Congress and some states to reexamine their respective insanity defense laws.As a result, in 1983 Utah abolished the traditional insanity defense in favor of a new statutory scheme.State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 383(Utah1993);Utah Legislative Survey, 1984 UtahL.Rev. 115, 151.Under Utah's current scheme:

It is a defense to a prosecution under any statute or ordinance that the defendant, as a result of mental illness, lacked the mental state required as an element of the offense charged.Mental illness is not otherwise a defense.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305(1).This amendment eradicated the prior law, which allowed a defendant to present an independent affirmative defense of insanity.In other words, the former statute permitted a defendant to defend on the ground that he or she committed the act but did not understand that the act was wrong.The new law limits the defense to simply that the defendant did not have the requisite mens rea of the alleged crime.Young, 853 P.2d at 384.

A common example is helpful to illustrate the difference between the prior law and the new law.If A kills B, thinking that he is merely squeezing a grapefruit, A does not have the requisite mens rea for murder and would be acquitted under both the prior and the new law.See Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law 306, 315 (1987)(citingModel Penal Code § 4.01 cmt., at 166(1985))[hereinafter LaFave].However, if A kills B, thinking that B is an enemy soldier and that the killing is justified as self-defense, then A has the requisite mens rea for murder and could be convicted under the new law but not under the prior law, because he knowingly and intentionally took another's life.Under the amended provision, it does not matter whether A understood that the act was wrong.SeeLoren R. Roth, Tighten But Do Not DiscardJAMA 2947-48(June 8, 1984)(American Psychiatric Association analyzing mens rea approach to insanity defense);Wallace D. Riley, Reform Not Abolition, JAMA 2949(June 8, 1984)(American Bar Association analyzing mens rea approach to insanity defense).The new law does away with the traditional affirmative insanity defense that the killing was perceived to be justifiable and therefore done with innocent intent.We will refer to the amended version as the mens rea model.SeeHarlow M. Huckabee, Avoiding the Insanity Defense Straight Jacket: The Mens Rea Route, 15 Pepp.L.Rev. 1, 25(1987)[hereinafter Huckabee].

II.Legislative Responsibility

Determining accountability for criminal acts is a serious and difficult task.Government must balance society's interests in order, protection, punishment, and deterrence with the particularly arduous responsibility of caring for the insane and mentally deficient.In formulating an insanity defense, government must carry out the demands of punishment and at the same time assure that those without guilty minds are not unjustly condemned.As one state supreme court justice observed, "In a very real sense, the confinement of the insane is the punishment of the innocent; the release of the insane is the punishment of society."State v. Stacy, 601 S.W.2d 696, 704(Tenn.1980)(Henry, J., dissenting).

This delicate balancing of public policy is better accomplished in the legislature than in the courts.United States Supreme Court Justice Black, dealing with the nebulous concepts of compulsion and mental disease, stated, "The range of problems created would seem totally beyond our capacity to settle at all, much less to settle wisely, and even the attempt to define these terms and thus to impose constitutional and doctrinal rigidity seems absurd in an area where our understanding is even today so incomplete."Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 546, 88 S.Ct. 2145, 2161, 20 L.Ed.2d 1254(1968)(Black, J., concurring).We made it very clear in Bastian v. King, 661 P.2d 953, 956(Utah1983), that "[i]t is the power and responsibility of the Legislature to enact laws to promote the public health, safety, morals and general welfare of society ... and this Court will not substitute our judgment for that of the Legislature with respect to what best serves the public interest."(Citation omitted.)This sound policy of judicial restraint applies all the more when determining the culpability of the mentally ill. " 'It is not the function of this Court to evaluate the wisdom or practical necessity of legislative enactments.' "Id.(quotingRedwood Gym v. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 624 P.2d 1138, 1141(Utah1981));seeSullivan v. Scoular Grain Co. of Utah, 853 P.2d 877, 883(Utah1993)("We are not free 'to assess the wisdom of a statutory scheme.' "(quotingWest Jordan v. Morrison, 656 P.2d 445, 446(Utah1982))).

Even if a court finds certain legislation unreasonable or unwise, that alone does not mean it has authority to invalidate it.Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226, 106 S.Ct. 507, 514, 88 L.Ed.2d 523(1985).The law must first rise to the level of violating the constitution before it can be stricken.In this instance, our role is to make such a constitutional evaluation, not to generally critique the legislation.

We emphasize the basic rule of construction that these statutes must be construed, if possible, as being in compliance with both federal and state constitutions.Nelson v. Miller, 25 Utah 2d 277, 282-83, 480 P.2d 467, 471-72(1971)." 'In order to preserve the independence and the integrity of the three branches of government, it is of the utmost importance that the judicial exercise restraint and not intrude into the legislative prerogative.' "Id., 480 P.2d at 472(quotingTrade Comm'n v. Skaggs Drug Ctrs., Inc., 21 Utah 2d 431, 437, 446 P.2d 958, 962(1968)).There is no doubt that we cannot strike down any legislation unless it expressly violates the constitution or it is clearly prohibited by "some plain mandate thereof."Id.;Parkinson v. Watson, 4 Utah 2d 191, 197, 291 P.2d 400, 403-04(1955);seeTrade Comm'n, 446 P.2d at 963(stressing that courts are called upon to state what the law is and not what they think it should be; courts are not the conscience of the people and are not to "express the personal desires or philosophy of its personnel").

III.Federal Due Process Concerns

Defendants argue that the Utah mens rea model violates federal due process because a defendant cannot "rely on insanity as a basis for nonresponsibility for the crime unless he suffers from a form of insanity which serves to negate the mens rea element of the crime."Admittedly, this amended statute...