State v. Herrera
Decision Date | 03 May 1974 |
Docket Number | No. 9928,9928 |
Citation | 86 N.M. 224,1974 NMSC 37,522 P.2d 76 |
Parties | STATE of New Mexico, Petitioner, v. Anthony HERRERA, Respondent. |
Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
Defendant was convicted of trafficking in heroin in violation of § 54--11--20, N.M.S.A. 1953 (Supp.1973). He was sentenced to serve not less than ten nor more than fifty years and appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for resentencing. State v. Herrera, 86 N.M. 134, 520 P.2d 554 (Ct.App.1974). We granted certiorari and now reverse the Court of Appeals. Various statutes or portions thereof are pertinent to our consideration of the issues. § 54--11--20 is part of the Controlled Substances Act (Laws 1972, ch. 84). § 54--11--20, subd. B. provides:
The Controlled Substances Act is not part of the Criminal Code (Laws 1963, ch. 303) and contains no sentencing authority.
§ 40A--1--7, N.M.S.A.1953, after classifying felonies by degrees, including those of the second and fourth degrees, continues:
'A crime declared to be a felony, without specification of degree, is a felony of the fourth degree.'
§ 40A--29--3, N.M.S.A.1953 provides in subsections B. and D., relating to second and fourth degree felonies, respectively:
§ 40A--29--11, N.M.S.A.1953 provides in its subsections A. and B.:
The Court of Appeals held § 40A--29--11 to be clear and unambiguous. It then reasoned that inasmuch as the sentence to be imposed on conviction of the offense in question was not specified in that statute, or perhaps elsewhere in the Controlled Substances Act, or in any case some place other than the Criminal Code, the offense should have been treated as a fourth degree felony and defendant sentenced to serve not less than one nor more than five years under § 40A--29--3, subd. D., rather than the sentence he received under subsection B. of that statute. Thus it reached its result--remand for resentencing.
The legislative intent disclosed by these statutes is our polestar. Gauged by this criterion, the result reached by the Court of Appeals seems doubtful. Did the legislature really intend that an offense which it specifically denominated a second degree felony should be punished as a fourth degree felony? The legislative scheme disclosed by our criminal statutes generally is that second or subsequent offenses often carry heavier penalties--a thought obvious in § 54--11--20, subd. B. Yet under the reasoning of the Court of Appeals, a second or subsequent offense of trafficking in heroin would still be punished as a fourth degree felony though specifically made a first degree felony in that statute. What was the legislative purpose in classifying these offenses as first and second degree felonies if they can only be punished as fourth degree felonies? What purpose is there is classifying felonies in any case other than to establish the means and magnitude of penalty? Did the legislature truly intend to equate trafficking in heroin, whether a first offense or a second or subsequent offense, with possession of eight ounces of marijuana? § 54--11--23, subd. B. (3), N.M.S.A.1953 (Supp.1973).
These questions tend to answer themselves. We will not construe statutes to achieve an absurd result or to defeat the intended object of the legislature. Trujillo v. Romero, 82 N.M. 301, 481 P.2d 89 (1971); State v. Nance, 77 N.M. 39, 419 P.2d 242 (1966), certiorari denied 386 U.S. 1039, 87 S.Ct. 1495, 18 L.Ed.2d 605 (1967). We do not agree that § 40A--29--11 is...
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