State v. Hickman

Decision Date10 July 2014
Docket NumberSC S061409).,CA A144741,(CC 081235225
Citation330 P.3d 551,355 Or. 715
PartiesSTATE of Oregon, Petitioner on Review, v. Jerrin Lavazie HICKMAN, aka Jerrim Lavezie Hickman, Respondent on Review.
CourtOregon Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

On review from the Court of Appeals.*

Andrew M. Lavin, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause for petitioner on review. With him on the briefs were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Anna M. Joyce, Solicitor General.

Ryan Scott, Scott and Huggins Law Offices, Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.

Matthew McHenry, Levine & McHenry LLC, Portland, filed a brief on behalf of amicus curiae The Innocence Network and Oregon Innocence Project.

BREWER, J.

A jury found defendant guilty of murder. The Court of Appeals reversed defendant's conviction and remanded the case based on its conclusion that the trial court had erroneously admitted eyewitness testimony of two witnesses who identified defendant as the perpetrator. On review, we conclude that the trial court properly admitted the challenged identification testimony of one of the witnesses. We also conclude that any error in admitting the identification testimony of the other witness under OEC 403 was harmless. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals' decision and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

We begin with an overview of pertinent evidence the admission of which is not challenged on review. On December 31, 2007, a number of men, including defendant and another man, Porter, attended a party at a house in Portland. When Porter arrived at the party, he observed a fight in progress, during which a man ran into the house. That man was Christopher Monette, who was later shot and killed. Soon thereafter, [w]ords were exchanged” between Porter and Monette. The exchange was sufficiently heated to cause two other people to intervene. Porter pulled out a pocketknife, because Monette was “a big individual.” Shortly thereafter, defendant arrived, and he also exchanged words with Monette. The argument stopped and defendant walked away.

Porter, a convicted felon who testified with the hope of receiving lenient treatment on criminal charges that were pending against him, testified that defendant then grabbed a ski mask out of Porter's back pocket. According to Porter, defendant put on the ski mask, approached Monette, and shot him four times with a handgun in front of several eyewitnesses. Monette died at the scene. Porter testified that, after shooting Monette, defendant walked into the street and fired several shots in the air.

Defendant's uncle, Miller, another convicted felon who testified with the hope of receiving leniency on an unrelated criminal charge, also was an eyewitness to the shooting. Miller, too, testified that defendant was the shooter. Miller stated that, after shooting Monette, defendant took off the ski mask and left the scene. Three other people, Anderson, Grant, and Pskar, none of whom could specifically identify defendant as the shooter, each provided eyewitness testimony that the shooter was an African–American male, approximately 5'7? tall, and with a stocky build. Defendant is 5'6? tall and has a stocky build. Porter is 6'1? tall.

After the shooting, people fled from the party on foot and in cars. The police arrived within minutes of the shooting. Officer Mast approached Porter and defendant, who were walking away from the scene. Porter stopped to talk to Mast, but defendant continued walking away. At that point, a woman, G, ran up yelling and screaming; she claimed that the shooter was getting away in a car. Hearing for the first time that someone had been shot, Mast went with G to the driveway and found Monette's body. G identified the shooter as “Cello.” The car that she identified the shooter getting into was stopped. Moncello James, also known as Cello, was not in the car, but his identification was found there.

After his encounter with Officer Mast, defendant fled from the area. During his flight, both of his shoes came off, and he lost his watch when he jumped over a fence. As he approached a nearby golf course, he jumped over another fence and fell on the other side, breaking his leg.1

At the crime scene, the police found the handgun and the ski mask. They submitted the ski mask to the crime lab for DNA testing. The lab found DNA from three people on the ski mask. The lab further determined that defendant was the primary source of the DNA.

Shortly before the shooting, two women, D (19 years old) and N (18 years old), had arrived by car at the house party. D and N are both white. The east side of Portland was “out of [D's] element.” D and N were in the back seat of the car. D told a police investigator on the night of the shooting that she didn't see the shooting and really couldn't describe much. Knew that there was an argument occurring, but could not give specific descriptions of who was involved.” D also told the investigator that another man, who identified himself as “Corey,” jumped into the car as it left the scene.

N told police on the night of the crime that she witnessed the shooting and that the perpetrator was a “black male, stocky, in his mid-twenties, and wearing a do-rag.”

D was interviewed by a defense investigator a few weeks before defendant's trial. In that conversation, D told the investigator that she could describe the men in the altercation only as “big black men.” According to the investigator, D explained that “all black men look the same” to her. At trial, D denied making that statement. D told the investigator that the shooter had a “big Afro,” but could give no further details about the shooter's hair. A day later, in an interview with the prosecutor, D stated that the shooter had “twisties” with “close black hair.” In that interview, D told the prosecutor that she was not certain that she could identify the shooter. In response, the prosecutor proposed that, at trial, D should signal him with a “look in the eye” if she recognized the shooter while on the witness stand. The prosecutor told D, “If you do [recognize the perpetrator], then let the Court know—let the trier of fact know. If you don't, then you don't.”

Between the night of the crime and defendant's trial, 23 months passed. During that time, the state made no attempt to have D or N identify the perpetrator, nor did the state inform defense counsel that it intended to ask D or N to make an in-court identification of the perpetrator at trial.

D testified on the third day of defendant's trial. At that time, defendant was present in the courtroom and seated next to his counsel. Defendant was the only African–American in the well of the courtroom, although there were six to 12 African–American men seated in the back of the courtroom. D was aware that defendant was the person charged with Monette's murder. Shortly after the state began its direct examination of D, an equipment malfunction occurred in the courtroom, and the court recessed. As the jurors left the courtroom, everyone, including defendant, stood up. The court staff cleared the public from the courtroom, but defendant remained in the courtroom with his counsel. D left the stand and walked past defendant into the hallway. One of the prosecutors accompanied D as she left the courtroom and noticed that she was hyperventilating. D said to the prosecutor: “Oh, my God, that's him, that's him, that's him.” Without saying anything to her, the prosecutor sat D down next to D's mother. During the recess, D had no contact with any of the other witnesses.

After the court resolved the equipment malfunction, D resumed the witness stand. D testified that, before the shooting, she saw three or more African–American men fighting near the front door of the house. She stated that there were 25 to 50 other people in the yard. Monette wore a tank top, which he took off during the fight. The other people whom D noticed “pretty much all looked, like, the same. They were all wearing really baggy clothing and many of them were very husky gentlemen.”

D testified that the overhead street lighting at the scene was “fluorescent.” D further testified that, before the shooting, she focused her attention on the shooter and the victim because the two men were engaged in an argument. She stated that she “got a good view of both of the gentlemen.” D explained that she was talking to N and not looking in the direction of the shooting when it occurred. D testified that, moments after the shooting, she saw one of the men who had been fighting fire several gunshots into the air. According to D, the shooter was then standing 12 feet away from her and under street lighting. D described the shooter as being black, in his 20s to early 30s, stocky, tall 5' 7?. to 6'), and having a “close” Afro hairstyle or braids. She also described his facial features. The prosecutor asked D if she saw that person in the courtroom, and D said that she did.

Before D identified anyone, however, defendant objected, citing the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and OEC 403. Outside the jury's presence, the trial court had a lengthy discussion with counsel and, ultimately, overruled defendant's objection. The state resumed its direct examination, and D identified defendant as the man whom she had seen firing gunshots into the air. She explained to the jury that, before entering the courtroom, she did not know whether she would recognize the shooter. She further explained that, after the equipment malfunction occurred and when she walked into the hallway, she became emotional and told the prosecutor “that that was the shooter, that [was] him.” D testified that she was 95 percent certain of the accuracy of her identification.

D also testified that, after the shooting, people started “running westbound, jumping into cars, cars were...

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23 cases
  • State v. Dickson
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    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • August 9, 2016
    ...the reliability of the . . . identification"), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1038, 107 S. Ct. 893, 93 L. Ed. 2d 845 (1987); State v. Hickman, 355 Or. 715, 735, 330 P.3d 551 (2014) (when identification is made for first time in court, jury can observe "variables such as indications of witness certa......
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    ...Ramirez , 409 P.3d 902, 913 (N.M. 2017) ; People v. Brazeau , 304 A.D.2d 254, 257, 759 N.Y.S.2d 268 (2003) ; State v. Hickman , 355 Or. 715, 330 P.3d 551, 572 (2014) (en banc ), modified on reconsideration , 356 Or. 687, 343 P.3d 634 (Or. 2015) (en banc ) (per curiam ); State v. Lewis , 363......
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    • March 18, 2019
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  • Commonwealth v. Crayton
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    ...witness's demeanor and hear the witness's statements during the identification procedure” (emphasis in original). State v. Hickman, 355 Or. 715, 735, 330 P.3d 551 (2014), citing Byrd v. State, 25 A.3d 761, 766 (Del.2011), and United States v. Domina, 784 F.2d 1361, 1368 (9th Cir.1986), cert......
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5 books & journal articles
  • Eyewitness identification
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Suppressing Criminal Evidence Other evidence subject to suppression
    • April 1, 2022
    ...a good reason why there should be a second pretrial opportunity to make an out of court identification. The court in State v. Hickman , 330 P.3d 551 (Ore. 2013), a murder case, did not rule on whether or not the trial court should have precluded a first time in court identification because ......
  • Who could it be now? Challenging the reliability of first time in-court identifications after State v. Henderson and State v. Lawson.
    • United States
    • Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology Vol. 105 No. 4, September 2015
    • December 22, 2015
    ...Evan J. Mandery, Due Process Considerations of In-Court Identifications, 60 ALB. L. REV. 389, 391-92 (1996). (8) State v. Hickman, 330 P.3d 551, 554-57 (Or. (9) See Dana Carver Boehm, The New Prosecutor's Dilemma: Prosecutorial Ethics and the Evaluation of Actual Innocence, 2014 UTAH L. REV......
  • Chapter 3 Eyewitness Identification
    • United States
    • Carolina Academic Press Wrongful Conviction: Law, Science, and Policy (CAP) 2019
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    ...the witness's demeanor and hear the witness's statements during the identification procedure" (emphasis in original). State v. Hickman, 355 Or. 715, 735, 330 P.3d 551 (2014). This conclusion appears to be premised on the ability of the jury during an in-court identification to see "indicati......
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    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Suppressing Criminal Evidence - 2020 Contents
    • July 31, 2020
    ...a good reason why there should be a second pretrial opportunity to make an out of court identiication. The court in State v. Hickman , 330 P.3d 551 (Ore. 2013), a murder case, did not rule on whether or not the trial court should have precluded a irst time in court identiication because it ......
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