State v. Hiebert

• Decision Date: 10 July 2014
• Docket Number: No. 41402.,41402.
• Citation: 329 P.3d 1085,156 Idaho 637
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Dennis Earl HIEBERT, Defendant–Appellant.

156 Idaho 637

329 P.3d 1085

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff–Respondent,

v.Dennis Earl HIEBERT, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 41402.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

July 10, 2014.

Rex A. Finney of Finney, Finney & Finney, P.A., Sandpoint, for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Jessica M. Lorello, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

MELANSON, Judge.

Dennis Earl Hiebert appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled substance.Specifically, he alleges that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the grounds supporting the warrant to search his property were gained from an unconstitutional warrantless search.For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I.FACTS AND PROCEDURE

Hiebert is the owner of a junk and salvage yard known as "Mr. D's."Hiebert also resides on the property.After receiving a tip that two fugitive felons might be on Hiebert's property, three officers entered onto the property during normal business hours through an open gate that had an " open" sign on the front.One of the officers approached a building in the front and knocked on the door, but there was no answer.The officer then walked further down the driveway into the junk yard, passing a "stop" sign, a "no thru traffic" sign, and a small "no trespassing" sign.The officer was checking to see if someone with information about the two felons was elsewhere on the property as, on prior occasions, officers had encountered workers in the back of the junk yard area.

As the officer walked along the dirt pathway of the junk yard, he noticed a clean, late model vehicle in good condition that had no license plates and appeared out of place amongst the mostly dilapidated vehicles in the yard.The vehicle was partially hidden behind two other vehicles and between two trailers, but the front of the vehicle could be clearly seen from the pathway.The officer left the pathway and approached the vehicle, which was approximately 15 to 30 feet away.The officer saw through the vehicle windows that the steering column was opened and a screwdriver lay nearby on the driver's side floorboard.Suspecting that the vehicle was stolen, the officer ran the Vehicle Identification Number (VIN), which was visible from outside the vehicle.Dispatch confirmed that the vehicle was stolen.Additionally, another officer observed several license plates that returned as registered to vehicles different from the ones to which they were affixed.

Based on this information, two search warrants were issued for various parts of Hiebert's property, including his residence.Methamphetamine, several other stolen vehicles, and stolen vehicle parts were discovered during execution of the warrants.Hiebert was charged with seven counts of grand theft by possession of stolen property and one count of possession of a controlled substance.

Hiebert filed a motion to suppress all of the evidence in the case, arguing that the evidence supporting the probable cause to issue the search warrants was gained from an unconstitutional warrantless search.Specifically, he argued that the officers violated his reasonable expectation of privacy by entering into the junk yard portion of his property, and even if that entry was proper, one of the officers exceeded any implied invitation to enter by leaving the normal access route to inspect a vehicle.The district court denied the motion, finding that Hiebert did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area accessed by the officers, as it was open to the public and there was an implied invitation to enter the property.Additionally, the district court determined that the officer's observation of the vehicle was made from a lawful vantage point under the open view doctrine.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Hiebert pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance, I.C. § 37–2732(c)(1), preserving his right to appeal the order denying his motion to suppress.The remaining charges were dismissed.The district court sentenced Hiebert to a unified term of five years, with a minimum period of confinement of two years.The district court then suspended the sentence and placed Hiebert on probation for four years.Hiebert appeals.

II.STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated.When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found.State v. Atkinson,128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286(Ct.App.1996).At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court.State v. Valdez–Molina,127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997(1995);State v. Schevers,132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662(Ct.App.1999).

III.ANALYSIS

Hiebert argues that all of the evidence in his case, including that obtained from the search warrants, should be suppressed as the products of an unconstitutional warrantless search.¹The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Article I, Section 17, of the Idaho Constitution is virtually identical to the Fourth Amendment, except that "oath or affirmation" is termed "affidavit."In order for a search warrant to be valid, it must be supported by probable cause to believe that evidence or fruits of a crime may be found in a particular place.State v. Josephson,123 Idaho 790, 792–93, 852 P.2d 1387, 1389–90(1993).

When a warrant is predicated on information discovered during a previous warrantless search, the State must show that the evidence supporting the warrant was not itself unlawfully obtained.State v. Tietsort,145 Idaho 112, 116, 175 P.3d 801, 805(Ct.App.2007);see alsoState v. Johnson,110 Idaho 516, 526, 716 P.2d 1288, 1298(1986).That is, the State bears the burden of demonstrating that the initial, warrantless search fell within a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement.Coolidge v. New Hampshire,403 U.S. 443, 454–55, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2031–32, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 575–76(1971);Halen v. State,136 Idaho 829, 833, 41 P.3d 257, 261(2002);State v. Prewitt,136 Idaho 547, 550, 38 P.3d 126, 129(Ct.App.2001).

Hiebert argues that, because the officers did not restrict their movements to the normal access routes and places where an ordinary visitor would reasonably be expected to go, their entry upon his property violated his constitutional rights.This claim is allegedly manifest in two specific instances of the officers' conduct: first, when the officers failed to leave the property after receiving no response at the front shop, instead walking beyond the "stop,""no thru traffic," and small "no trespassing" signs into the back of the junk yard; and second, when one of the officers strayed from the normal travel route of the dirt pathway to investigate the stolen vehicle.²

A.Entering the Junk Yard

Initially, Hiebert argues that the officers failed to leave the premises—as normal visitors would reasonably be expected to do—after receiving no response upon approaching one of the front buildings, knocking, and waiting briefly to be received.SeeFlorida v. Jardines,–––U.S. ––––, ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 1416, 185 L.Ed.2d 495, 502–03(2013)(holding that the implied license to approach typically permits approaching by the normal access route, knocking promptly, waiting briefly to be received, and then leaving absent an invitation to linger longer);State v. Howard,155 Idaho 666, 671, 315 P.3d 854, 859(Ct.App.2013)(citing to Jardines for this same proposition).However, this ignores the unique context in which this case occurs.Unlike in Jardines or Howard, which both involved police entry onto the curtilage of a normal residence, this case involves a residence located on property that has been opened to the public for business purposes.As a result, the expectation of what an ordinary visitor (in many cases, a customer of the business) might reasonably do is expanded.When an individual lives on the same property as his or her place of business, it is reasonable to expect that an ordinary visitor may look for the proprietor of the business somewhere on the property where he or she might be working.Cf.Doe v. State,131 Idaho 851, 854, 965 P.2d 816, 819(1998)(finding that it was reasonable for officers to look for a minor suspected of robbery on his family dairy farm in an area where he might be found working, such as an illuminated barn).Indeed, it is entirely reasonable to expect an ordinary customer to travel the available, unobstructed access routes of the property to inspect the wares of the business that are open to the public and within view of those established access routes.

In this case, Hiebert operates a business that is open to the public, creating an implied—if not explicit—invitation to enter upon his property and travel in the established pathways of the business.Indeed, the officers passed through an open gate with a clearly visible "open" sign during normal business hours.Although Hiebert's father, who also lives on the property, testified that the back of the junk yard is closed to the public and that people are supposed to stop at the shop, the question is what an ordinary visitor to the business property, not knowing the subjective intent of the owner, would have objectively perceived as reasonable conduct.The officers stopped their vehicles near the posted "stop" and "no thru traffic" signs, obeying the admonitions to take their vehicles no further into the...