State v. Higgs

• Decision Date: 24 January 1956
• Citation: 143 Conn. 138,120 A.2d 152,54 A.L.R.2d 1199
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: , 54 A.L.R.2d 1199 STATE of Connecticut v. James HIGGS. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Page 152

120 A.2d 152

143 Conn. 138, 54 A.L.R.2d 1199

STATE of Connecticut v. James HIGGS.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Jan. 24, 1956.

Jack Greenberg, of the New York bar, New York City, and Peter Marcuse, Waterbury, with whom, on the brief, were Thurgood Marshall, of the Maryland bar, New York City, and Constance B. Motley, of the New York bar, New York City, for appellant (defendant).

Lorin W. Willis, State's Atty., Bridgeport, for appellee (state).

Before INGLIS, C. J., BALDWIN, O'SULLIVAN, and DALY, JJ., and BORDON, Superior Court Judge.

INGLIS, Chief Justice.

On a trial to the jury, the defendant was found guilty of rape. From the judgment rendered on that verdict he has appealed. His assignments of error are numerous but can be grouped in five categories. He claims error, first, in the court's refusal to allow questions on the voir dire concerning possible race prejudice on the part of prospective jurors; second, in various rulings on evidence; third, in the denial of his motion for a mistrial; fourth, in the charge; and lastly, in the court's conduct, which he maintains was so prejudicial to him throughout the whole trial that it constituted a denial to him of due process of law. There is no merit to any of these claims of error except the first.

The defendant is a Negro. His alleged victim is a white woman. The printed record contains excerpts from the examination on the voir dire of six of the veniremen. To the first of these, the defendant's attorney propounded the question: 'Would it require any less evidence for you to find a Negro person guilty of such a crime [rape] than it would to find a white person?' The court on its own motion ruled the question out, saying: 'You can't make a distinction, you know, between the temperament and mentality of the white horses and the black horses.'

To the second venireman, the following question was propounded: 'Mrs. Herdeg, would you have any reluctance in following any instruction the Court may give you as to the weight which may be given to the fact that the defendant or any witness in this case is a Negro?' Thereupon the court said: 'Now, what has that to do with it? Negroes stand before the Bar of Justice the same as white people. We make no distinction between colors in [either] the justice [or] the brand of justice which is given to one or the other.' To the same prospective juror was put the question: 'Mrs. Herdeg, would you have any prejudice against a defendant because of his color?' The court interjected: 'Now, I have told you before it does not make any difference about his color. The question is whether or not any witness or any principal in the case is such that this witness would have a prejudice against them. The color does not enter into it.' The defendant's attorney then said: 'The color is a possible source of prejudice and I would like to inquire of the respective----' Thereupon the court interrupted to say: 'The Court does not recognize any such thing. You can ask the questions proper to ask. We recognize nobody as holding a prejudice against a person because of his color * * *.'

The foregoing exchanges between the court and counsel are typical of what occurred in the course of the examination of the other veniremen. Whenever counsel asked whether the prospective juror had any prejudice against a Negro so that it would require less evidence to convict him of the crime of rape than it would to convict a white man, or asked whether the juror would be less inclined to believe a Negro witness than a white witness simply because of the former's color, the court excluded the question. It appears from the remarks made by the court that its ruling was based upon the ground that in a court of justice no distinction should be made between Negroes and white persons and that, therefore, the very thought that it was possible for a juror to be so prejudiced against Negroes that he would be less apt to believe their testimony than that of white persons or require less evidence to convict them should be carefully kept from the minds of prospective jurors.

When this case was tried, § 7908 of the General Statutes was in effect. It provided: 'In any civil or criminal action tried before a jury, either party may examine each juror as to his qualifications to sit as a juror in such action * * *; and, if the judge before whom such examination shall be held shall be of the opinion from such examination that any juror would be unable to render a fair and impartial verdict, such juror shall be excused by the judge from any further service upon the panel, or in such action, as such judge may determine.'

Under this statute, any party to a jury case had an absolute right to examine prospective jurors on the voir dire. The information elicited by such an examination serves a twofold purpose. In the first place it permits the court to determine whether a venireman is qualified to act as a juror, and, in the second place, it aids each party in exercising his rights to peremptory challenges. Duffy v. Carroll, 137 Conn. 51, 56, 75 A.2d 33. It is true that the extent to which parties may go in such an examination rests largely in the discretion of the court, and the exercise of that discretion will not constitute reversible error unless the discretion has been clearly abused and one of the parties has been prejudiced thereby. Duffy v. Carroll, supra; Sherman v. William M. Ryan & Sons, Inc., 126 Conn. 574, 578, 13 A.2d 134; see State v. Mendill, 141 Conn. 360, 362, 106 A.2d 178. Nevertheless, in exercising its discretion, the court should grant such latitude as is reasonably necessary to fairly accomplish the purposes of the voir dire. Clearly, therefore, if there is any likelihood that some prejudice is in the juror's mind which will even subconsciously affect his decision of the case, the party who may be adversely affected should be permitted questions designed to uncover that prejudice. This is particularly true with reference to the defendant in a criminal case. Otherwise, the right of trial by an impartial jury guaranteed to him by article first, § 9, of the constitution of this state might well be impaired. See State v. Potter, 18 Conn. 166, 171; State v. Wilson, 38 Conn. 126,...