State v. Hightower

• Decision Date: 12 December 1980
• Docket Number: No. 12282,12282
• Citation: 101 Idaho 749,620 P.2d 783
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Michael HIGHTOWER, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 783

620 P.2d 783

101 Idaho 749

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Michael HIGHTOWER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 12282.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

Dec. 12, 1980.

Ellison M. Matthews of Matthews, Lee & Wilson, Robert C. Montgomery, Boise, for defendant-appellant.

David H. Leroy, Atty. Gen., Lynn E. Thomas, Deputy Atty. Gen., Boise, for plaintiff-respondent.

BISTLINE, Justice.

At a jury trial defendant-appellant Michael Hightower was convicted of rape and second degree kidnapping; he was sentenced to a term of confinement not exceeding 25 years.

On December 20, 1973, Hightower, who was then in the custody of the mental health unit of the Idaho State Penitentiary, escaped and allegedly kidnapped and raped a Boise State University coed. Captured in another state, he was returned to Boise where, almost 3 years later, he was tried and convicted. A full understanding of this case requires a detailed examination of the unique circumstances and procedures leading to the convictions challenged on appeal.

I.

An information was filed on November 20, 1972, charging Hightower with two counts of rape. (Not to be confused with the rape and kidnapping of which he was convicted.) Dr. F. LaMarr Heyrend, a psychiatrist, examined Hightower, reporting to the court that Hightower was competent to stand trial, but that at the time of the alleged criminal conduct he lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. Based on this report, Hightower notified the court of his intent to move for a judgment of acquittal on the grounds of mental disease or defect pursuant to I.C. § 18-213. ¹

The State did not oppose the motion or challenge the procedure followed. The motion was granted, and on April 24, 1973, judgment of acquittal was entered on the grounds of mental disease or defect excluding criminal responsibility. Finding that Hightower was a dangerously mentally ill person, the court committed him to the mental health facility and program at the Idaho State Penitentiary.

On December 20, 1973, Hightower escaped and allegedly committed the crimes for which he would be later convicted. An information charging him with rape and second degree kidnapping was filed on April 18, 1974, to which Hightower pleaded not guilty, again filing a notice of intent to rely upon the defense of mental disease or defect, pursuant to I.C. § 18-209. The court, as directed by I.C. § 18-211, again ordered psychiatric evaluation. ² Dr. Heyrend examined Hightower extensively at least four times between May and September of 1974, submitting his report in early October, 1974. Again he concluded that Hightower at the time of the alleged 1973 crimes suffered from a mental disease or defect which substantially impaired his capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law, and again a motion for acquittal was made. Again the State did not resist the motion. The court found that at the time of the 1973 offenses Hightower was suffering from mental disease or defect which substantially impaired his capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. The court further found that Hightower presented a substantial risk of physical harm to himself and others and was dangerous to such a degree that a more secure custodial facility was required than that appropriate for most involuntarily committed mentally ill persons. The court entered a judgment of acquittal on grounds of mental disease or defect and ordered Hightower committed to the mental health facility at the Idaho State Penitentiary as a dangerously ill person.

In April, 1975, Hightower filed an application, pursuant to I.C. § 18-214, ³ for conditional release from the mental health facility at the Idaho State Penitentiary to a less structured environment. The district court ordered Hightower to undergo psychiatric evaluation by two psychiatrists, as required by subsection (2) of I.C. § 18-214, and Drs. Cornell and Estess were appointed by the court. Hearing was held on July 11, 1975; the psychiatrists and Hightower were examined. On August 29, 1975, the court issued a memorandum decision in which it found, based on the evaluations of the defendant presented to it at the July 11 hearing, that Hightower was not then suffering from mental disease or defect and, additionally, that he probably never had suffered from mental disease or defect. The court added therein its opinion that Hightower probably should not ever have been relieved of criminal liability for the crimes alleged to have been committed by him. The court also stated that if the State were to allege fraud or collusion or newly discovered evidence, before the statute of limitations expired, the court would consider whether the judgment of acquittal of the 1973 crime should be reopened. Finding that Hightower still represented a threat to the safety of the public, the court refused to order Hightower's release until Hightower presented to the court a specific plan for continued treatment under circumstances which would reasonably guarantee the public's safety.

Accepting the court's suggestion, the State moved to set aside the judgment of acquittal by reason of mental disease or defect entered October 22, 1974, and sought to reopen criminal proceedings.

The grounds providing the basis for the State's motion are best observed by considering the full text of the motion:

"(1) Two psychiatrists, Dr. Cornell and Dr. Estes, testified on July 9, 1975, that the defendant, Michael Hightower was not mentally ill, but suffered from a personality disorder causing him to repeatedly be in conflict with the norms of society;

"(2) Both psychiatrists further testified that in their opinion, Michael Hightower was not mentally ill or suffering mental disease or defect at the time of the occurrence of the above entitled matter;

"(3) Both psychiatrists disagreed with the original diagnosis of Dr. F. Lamar Heyrund (upon which the Court's commitment was based) and expressed their opinion that Mr. Hightower's personality trait was one including manipulation and use of the psychiatric and psychological professions in an attempt to escape responsibility for criminal conduct;

"(4) The latest proceedings raised by the defendant for release or modification of his treatment program arise out of his original commitment based on Dr. Heyrund's report and are part of post-commitment proceedings allowed by the Idaho Code;

"(5) The interests of justice will have been abused if a person is able to escape responsibility for criminal conduct by feigning mental illness or manipulating the psychiatric profession to his own advantage;

"(6) This proceeding would provide the court and all parties the necessary forum to:

(a) test specific issues of double jeopardy and speedy trial arising over defendant's commitment on this charge, and

(b) a conclusive determination of defendant's mental state, now and at the time of the commission of the above entitled matter.

"(7) This motion is brought in the interests of justice within two years after a judgment of acquittal upon the ground of mental disease or defect was entered and the recently exposed error in psychiatric diagnosis, together with the testimony of Doctors Estess and Cornell, constitute newly discovered evidence."

A supporting brief sought to raise issues of constitutionality and newly discovered evidence:

"Idaho Code section 18-213(1) is unconstitutional and in direct violation of the Idaho Constitution, Article 1, section 7 as applied here in that section 18-213(1) allows a court to determine a factual issue which would otherwise be solely the province of the jury, and therefore, this code section and paragraph deprives the State and the defendant of a jury trial on a felony matter. The State is aware of no decision allowing either the State or the defendant to waive a jury trial on a felony in Idaho on an issue which is to be determined solely by the jury (i. e. jury verdict of not guilty, not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, or guilty). The issue of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect is a mixed question of fact and law solely for the determination of the jury. The Idaho legislature may not amend the Idaho Constitution by legislative action alone. Since a jury trial may only be waived by the prosecution and the defense in cases other than a felony, Idaho Code section 18-213(1) violates the Idaho Constitution Article 1, section 7 in any application that allows the court to determine a jury issue in a pre-trial proceeding. In effect, the defendant is granted a court trial on the issue of mental disease or defect. The jury is the only entity constitutionally allowed to make such a determination and that can only be done at the time of trial and not by a pre-trial proceeding.

"Therefore, the State would respectfully urge the court to allow the State to reopen the criminal proceedings and the issue of the judgment of acquittal based on mental disease or defect due to the recent appearance of newly discovered evidence in the form of the testimony of Doctors Estess and Cornell, and the points and authorities referred to by the State in this brief."

Hightower's counsel, in their brief in opposition to the motion, urged:

"The primary question, it would therefore appear, is not whether the Court has the authority to enter a judgment of acquittal under Section 18-213 of the Idaho Code, but whether such action by the Court can at this late date, be tested. It is respectfully submitted that if the prosecution disagreed with the action of the Court in October of 1974, or with the opinion of Dr. Heyrend, upon which the Court acted, that the state had the authority to petition the Court under Section 18-211 of the Idaho Code, to appoint other psychiatrists to examine the defendant. Thereafter, the State would have had the right to subpoena such...