State v. Hill

• Decision Date: 20 May 1929
• Docket Number: 29801
• Citation: 168 La. 761,123 So. 317
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. HILL

123 So. 317

168 La. 761

STATE v. HILL

No. 29801

Supreme Court of Louisiana

May 20, 1929

Rehearing Denied June 17, 1929

Appeal from Second District Court, Parish of Bienville; Jno. S Richardson, Judge.

J. M Hill was charged with violations of Act No. 7 of Extra Session 1928, regulating the business of making loans. From judgment sustaining a motion to quash and discharging the defendant, the State appeals.

Judgment annulled and reversed, motion to quash overruled, and cases remanded.

Percy Saint, Atty. Gen., E. R. Schowalter, Asst. Atty. Gen., W. D. Goff, Dist. Atty., of Arcadia, P. M. Milner and William A. Porteous, Jr., Sp. Asst. Attys. Gen., and Spencer, Gidiere, Phelps & Dunbar and Chas. E. Dunbar, Jr., all of New Orleans (John P. Sullivan and David Sessler, both of New Orleans, of counsel), for the State.

Barnette & Roberts, of Shreveport (Fred R. Wright, of Milwaukee, Wis., of counsel), for appellee.

THOMPSON, J.BRUNOT, J., recused. O'NIELL, C. J., absent, takes no part.

OPINION

THOMPSON, J.

The defendant was charged in three separate informations filed in the district court of Bienville parish, with four separate violations of Act No. 7 passed at the Extra Session of the Legislature in 1928.

In the first bill he is charged in the first count with loaning one Robert Iverson $ 15 for three weeks, for which he charged $ 1.50 interest; and in the second count with having discounted a note of Sidney Stewart for $ 10 due in 60 days, deducting $ 2 as discount.

In the second bill he is charged with having made a loan to A. B. Rogers for $ 50 for six months, charging $ 5 interest thereon.

The third bill charges that defendant made a loan of $ 12 to Will Mosely for 30 days, charging $ 3.

All of which loans, it is alleged, were made by defendant while engaged in the making of loans of money in sums of $ 300 or less, charging a rate of interest greater than 8 per cent. per annum without having qualified to engage in such business, as required by said Act No. 7 of 1928, Extra Session.

A motion to quash was filed by the defendant on the ground that the statute under which the prosecutions were had was unconstitutional for the several reasons set out in the motion. It was agreed that the motion should apply to all three of the cases, and they were consolidated for the trial of that motion.

The judge sustained the motion to quash, held the statute to be unconstitutional on practically all of the grounds alleged, and discharged the defendant without day.

The state has appealed.

The motion to quash is quite lengthy, covering some eight typewritten pages and setting up substantially every ground of unconstitutionality that could be leveled at a legislative enactment.

In their briefs counsel on both sides have discussed the objections to the statute very ably and exhaustively.

In their zeal however counsel on the one side have charged that the statute is vicious legislation, in that while under the guise and pretense of the police power the statute in reality is a proposed purchase, by those who are financially able and are willing to pay the license, of immunity from the usury statutes of the state and an effort to sell and barter for a price the police power of the state.

On the other hand, it is argued that the statute is humanitarian in purpose, and that the exorbitant and oppressive interest rates exacted of the small borrowers by the loan sharks had created such a deplorable situation in this state as not only justified, but demanded, legislation of the character of the statute in question.

We are not presently concerned with the motives which prompted the lawmakers to pass the act, nor with the question as to whether the law is a good or bad law, a wise or an unwise law. The principle is so well settled that the Legislature is the sole judge of the wisdom and expediency of a statute, as well as the necessity for its passage, that it scarcely calls for citation of authority.

The question and the only question the court is called on to determine is whether the law was enacted in the manner required by the state Constitution and whether, if so enacted, it violates any of the provisions of the state and federal Constitutions.

In order to avoid repetition as far as possible, we shall consider the various objections to the statute as we state them and as near as possible in the order in which they are made in the motion to quash.

The first objection is that the title of the act, as well as the body of the act, violates section 16, article 3 of the Constitution, which provides that every law enacted by the Legislature shall embrace but one object, and shall have a title indicative of such object.

The title of the act is as follows:

1. To provide for the licensing and regulation of the business of making loans in sums of $ 300 or less, secured or unsecured, at a greater rate of interest than 8 per centum per annum.

2. Prescribing the maximum rate of interest and the maximum charges therefor.

3. Regulating the assignment of wages and salaries, earned or to be earned, when given to a licensee thereunder as security for any such loan and providing that any such assignment, whether partial or otherwise, shall be valid and binding upon the employer without the consent of such employer.

4. Declaring certain sales of salary and wages to be loans within the provisions of said act.

5. Excluding from said act certain persons, copartnerships, and corporations.

6. Providing penalties for the violation of the act.

7. Repealing all laws and parts of laws in conflict or inconsistent therewith.

The contention in this connection is that the business of making of small loans under $ 300 and fixing the rate of interest thereon is a separate and distinct object from the one regulating the assignment of salaries and wages earned and to be earned and the sale of credits, goods, and things.

There might be some force in the argument if the provision relating to assignment and sale of salaries and wages, etc., could be separated from and considered independently of the general intendment of the statute and its title.

It goes without saying that there can be a business of money lending and an independent business of buying up salaries and wages. But it is quite clear that, when the language of the title and of the act is considered as a whole, the two subjects, if they can be regarded as such, are directly related the one to the other, and that the provision relating to wages refers directly to such sales and assignments as are made in connection with or as security for the loan of money.

For instance, in section 16 it is provided that the payment of $ 300 or less in money, credit, goods, or things in action as a consideration for any sale, assignment, or order for the payment of wages, salary, commissions, or other compensation for services, whether earned or to be earned, shall be deemed a loan within the provisions of the act secured by such assignment.

And in section 17 it is provided that no assignment of or order for the payment of any salary, wages, etc., earned or to be earned, given to secure any such loan, shall be valid unless the amount of such loan is paid to the borrower simultaneously with its execution, and such assignment, when it shall be in favor of a license as herein provided for, shall be valid and binding upon any employer, etc.

We can perceive of no legal reason why transactions relating to purchasing and discounting wages and salaries should not be included in an act regulating the business of loaning money, especially when such sales of salaries and wages are made in connection with the business attempted to be regulated by the statute under attack.

It is argued also under the objection we are considering that section 18, which provides that no person, partnership, or corporation, except as authorized by the act, shall directly or indirectly charge, contract for, or receive any interest, discount, or consideration greater than 8 per cent. per annum upon the loan, use, or forbearance of money, goods, or things in action, is not indicated in the title which also renders the said act null and void.

The section quoted is within the purpose of the act, as declared in the title, to prohibit a greater rate of interest than 8 per cent. unless compliance is made with the act, whether it be for the loan of money or for extension or forbearance of such loan. The words "good or things in action," evidently refer to such goods or things as may be given in connection with or as security for the loan, and to cases where the lender pretends to purchase property from his borrower, but in reality takes the property as security and permits the latter to retain possession.

But be that as it may, the section referred to could be read out of the act, and the act would still be enforceable if otherwise constitutional.

Moreover the defendant is not charged with committing any act that would come under section 18; hence he is without interest to question the validity of said section.

Our conclusion is that neither the title nor the act is amenable to the objection of containing more than one object, and that the title sufficiently indicates the one and only purpose of the act.

What has been said is we think sufficient to meet the argument and objection made under paragraphs 1, 2, and 3, of defendant's original brief.

Objections that the act violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States are presented in different phases in paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 of defendant's brief and may be considered together.

It may be said in this connection that the first section of Act No 7 of the Extra Session of 1928 is general in its terms and applies...