State v. Hill

Decision Date04 May 1994
Citation444 S.E.2d 255,314 S.C. 330
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE of South Carolina, Appellant, v. Aaron E. HILL and Titus L. Huggins, Respondents.
ORDER

This is a capital murder case. The State has appealed orders setting bail for each respondent in the amount of $50,000. The State now asks this Court to issue a writ of supersedeas to stay enforcement of these orders or, in the alternative, to issue a common law writ vacating the bail orders. Respondents oppose the State's petition and move to dismiss the State's appeal.

The State may appeal a pretrial order if the order is appealable under S.C.Code Ann. § 14-3-330 (1976 & Supp.1993). See State v. McKnight, 287 S.C. 167, 337 S.E.2d 208 (1985) (the State may appeal a pretrial order granting the suppression of evidence which significantly impairs the prosecution of a criminal case). The orders admitting respondents to bail do not involve the merits, nor do the orders affect a substantial right which determines or discontinues the action. See Mid-State Distributors, Inc. v. Century Importers, Inc., --- S.C. ----, 426 S.E.2d 777 (1993); Ex parte Johnson, 63 S.C. 205, 41 S.E. 308 (1902). Therefore, the orders are not appealable under § 14-3-330. 1 Accordingly, we grant respondents' motion and dismiss the State's appeal. This renders moot the State's request for a writ of supersedeas since a writ of supersedeas is only available where there is an appealable order. 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 413 (1993).

As an alternative to a writ of supersedeas, the State asks this Court to issue one of the common law remedial writs pursuant to S.C. Const. art. V, § 5. In support of its petition, the State contends that a defendant charged with a capital offense is not entitled to bail and, therefore, the judge erred as a matter of law in admitting respondents to bail. The State's argument is without merit.

South Carolina Const. art. I, § 15 provides, in part, as follows: "All persons shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, but bail may be denied to persons charged with capital offenses or offenses punishable by life imprisonment, giving due weight to the evidence and to the nature and circumstances of the event...." (emphasis added). "The words of the Constitution are presumed to be used in their ordinary and popular meaning." State v. Broad River Power Co., 177 S.C. 240, 265, 181 S.E. 41, 52 (1935). The word "may" ordinarily "signifies permission and generally means the action spoken of is optional or discretionary." Robertson v. State, 276 S.C. 356, 358, 278 S.E.2d 770, 771 (1981). Consequently, we hold that the Constitution gives a circuit court judge the discretion to grant bail to a capital defendant. 2

By treating bail in capital cases differently from bail in other cases, art. I, § 15 of our Constitution recognizes the risks inherent in admitting capital defendants to bail. First, the risk that a defendant may flee in order to avoid prosecution is generally greater in a capital case than in a non-capital case. Second, because of the heinous nature of the offense usually alleged to have been committed in a capital case, the danger posed to the community by the release of a capital defendant is normally substantial. As a result of these risks, the discretion to admit a capital defendant to bail should be exercised with utmost caution, State v. Holmes, 34 S.C.L. (3 Strob.) 272 (1848), and in practice, capital defendants are rarely admitted to bail pending trial. 3

Further, in our opinion, the Constitution's language "giving due weight to the evidence and to the nature and circumstances of the event" requires a judge admitting a capital defendant to bail to make specific findings in the order explaining both the decision to grant bail and the amount of bond or other security required. In addition to addressing the evidence, nature and circumstances of the alleged crime, the order should address both the "risk of flight" and "danger to community" aspects of granting bail.

In the present case, the circuit judge did not make any specific findings of fact supporting his release of these capital defendants. This was an error of law. Accordingly, we grant a writ of certiorari and reverse the orders admitting respondents to bail, and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this order.

Finally, because it may be critical to determining whether the respondents will be admitted to bail, we find it appropriate to address the issue of who bears the burden of persuasion whether a capital defendant should be released on bail prior to trial. In light of the presumption of innocence which is applicable to all criminal defendants prior to conviction, we hold the State bears the burden of persuasion to convince the court not to release a capital defendant on bail. As recently stated by the Supreme Court of Georgia in discussing a statute which makes bail discretionary for defendants charged with murder:

To protect this presumption of innocence, we hold that the [S]tate has the burden of persuasion in convincing the ... court that a defendant is not entitled to pretrial release. This requirement means the [S]tate has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the trial court should deny bail either to secure the defendant's appearance in court or to protect the community.

Ayala v. State, 262 Ga. 704, 706, 425 S.E.2d 282, 285 (1993). Based on the risks associated with the release of a capital defendant, however, a rebuttable presumption arises that the defendant is not entitled to bail. This presumption, while it does not shift the burden of persuasion, places on the defendant the burden of producing evidence that he or she is not a flight risk and is not a danger to the community. Even when the defendant meets this burden of production, the presumption against bail does not disappear, but...

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7 cases
  • Simpson v. Owens
    • United States
    • Arizona Court of Appeals
    • 26 Febrero 2004
    ...In re Haigler, 15 Ariz. 150, 153, 137 P. 423, 425 (1913); see Kirkland v. Fortune, 661 So.2d 395, 397 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1995); Hill, 444 S.E.2d at 257 (Because of the presumption of innocence, "the State bears the burden of persuasion to convince the court not to release a capital defendant ......
  • Joseph v. S.C. Dep't of Labor
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • 14 Septiembre 2016
    ...of words such as ‘shall’ or ‘must’ indicates the legislature's intent to enact a mandatory requirement.”), with State v. Hill , 314 S.C. 330, 332, 444 S.E.2d 255, 256 (1994) (“The word ‘may’ ordinarily signifies permission and generally means the action spoken of is optional or discretionar......
  • State v. Bray
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • 31 Julio 2000
    ...to set forth case-specific findings mandated by Murrell, the matter must be reversed and remanded for a new trial. See State v. Hill, 314 S.C. 330, 444 S.E.2d 255 (1994) (trial court's failure to make case specific findings of fact supporting a decision constitutes an error of Finally, the ......
  • Blue Ridge Envtl. Def. League v. S.C. Dep't of Health
    • United States
    • South Carolina Administrative Law Court Decisions
    • 24 Julio 2023
    ... ... coverage under Nationwide Permit 12, Oil or Natural Gas ... Pipeline Activities (NWP 12). [ 2 ],[ 3 ] The Certification provides state-level ... authorization for Dominion's proposed River Neck to ... Kingsburg 16-inch Gas Main (Project), and it includes sixteen ... assessment like well testing before processing or assessing a ... project. See State v. Hill , 314 S.C. 330, 332, 444 ... S.E.2d 255, 256 (1994) ("The word 'may' ... ordinarily 'signifies permission and generally means the ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • Windsor beyond marriage: due process, equality & undocumented immigration.
    • United States
    • William and Mary Law Review Vol. 55 No. 6, June - June 2014
    • 1 Junio 2014
    ...15; OKLA. CONST. art. II, [section] 8; S.C. CONST. art. I, [section] 15; WIS. CONST. art. I, [section] 8; see also State v. Hill, 444 S.E.2d 255, 256 (S.C. 1994) (interpreting the South Carolina Constitution as giving courts discretion to grant bail in capital cases); Ex parte Howell, 245 P......

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