State v. Hill.

• Citation: 81 W.Va. 676
• Parties: State v. Hill.
• Decision Date: 05 February 1918
• Court: Supreme Court of West Virginia

81 W.Va. 676

State

v.Hill.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted January 29, 1918.

Decided February 5, 1918.

1. Criminal Law Plea of Guilty Acceptance.

A plea of guilty of a capital crime should be accepted cautiously and. not until the court has warned the prisoner and been satistied that he has acted freely and deliberately after being so admonished and with full knowledge, appreciation, and understanding of the nature and consequences of his confession, (p. 678).

2. Same Plea of Guilty Acceptance Presumption.

If the facts and circumstances attending the reception and recordation of such plea do not affirmatively appear from the record it will be presumed that the trial court discharged its full duty in the premises, (p. 678).

3. Same Plea of Guilty Withdrawal of Not Guilty.

If the trial court has not on receiving and recording a plea of guilty of a capital offense so admonished the accused, and after doing so been satisfied that the same has been made freely and deliberately and with full appreciation and understanding of the consequences of his confession, or if it is subsequently shown on motion of the accused before judgment that he was misled or deceived and did not act freely and understanding^ in making his confession, unless some good reason is shown for not doing so, the court should permit such plea to be withdrawn and the plea of not guilty to be interposed and put the prisoner upon his trial thereon, (p. 679).

4. Same Discretion of Court Denial of Motion to Withdraw Plea of Guilty Presumption.

But unless the record shows the fact to be otherwise this court will presume that the trial court discharged its full duty and did not abuse its judicial discretion in denying the prisoner's motion to withdraw his plea of guilty and substitute a plea of not guilty, and pronouncing judgment against him. (p. 679).

Error to Circuit Court, Cabell County.

John, alias "Gigger," Hill pleaded guilty as principal to murder in the first degree, and sentence was deferred, and, from the overruling of his motion for leave to withdraw or set aside his plea of guilty and to plead not guilty, he brings error.

Affirmed.

W. W. Higgins, for plaintiff in error.

E. T. England, Attorney General, and Henry A. Nolte, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.

Miller, Judge:

The several assignments of error substantially present but two questions: First, whether the trial court rightfully received the prisoner's plea of guilty of murder in the first degree; Second, whether the court erred in denying defendant's motion for leave to withdraw his plea of guilty and to plead, not guilty, and pronouncing the judgment of death against him.

Defendant was indicted as principal in the first degree along with George Martin, alias Red Martin, and Emory Harmon, as accessories before the fact for the murder of George Church on September 23, 1916. The indictment was returned at the June term, 1917, and the record shows that on June 25, following, the defendant Hill was arraigned and appearing in person and by counsel entered his plea of guilty of murder in the first degree as charged in the indictment, and that thereupon at the request of counsel sentence was deferred to a future date, anel the prisoner remanded to jail.

The record is silent as to the facts and circumstances attending the reception of said plea by the court, and as to whether the same was made by the prisoner freely and with full and perfect knowledge of the nature and conseeiuences thereof, and under the deep solemnities which is usual and which should always attend the reception of such plea, fraught as it is with such grave consequences to the accused. It was suggested by counsel for defendant in the argument here that the prisoner had been induced or misled into the confession by promises of clemency on the part of the judge, but nothing of that kind appears from the record. It does appear, however, that on June 28, 1917, three days after his plea, was received and recorded, when again brought into court, he immediately and before the judgment and sentence of death was pronounced against him moved the court for leave to withdraw or set aside his plea of guilty, and to plead not guilty, and for a trial by the jury thereon, which was overruled, and the bill of exception to this ruling of the court, signed, sealed and made a part of the record, shows that on this motion no evidence was heard either in support of or against the same. Nor does it appear from the record that before pronouncing judgment of death against the defendant the court took any evidence in the presence of the prisoner to advise it of the facts and circumstances attending the crime, so as to be advised as to what judgment should be pronounced on the plea, whether death or confinement in the penitentiary, as provided by statute.

On the first question, it was ancient law and is also settled by modern decisions, and in some states by statute, that a court should never in cases of capital crimes accept a plea of guilty without exercising caution and being satisfied by evidence that the confession is made by the accused freely and deliberately, and with full and perfect knowledge of the nature and consequences of the confession; otherwise the plea should not be received. It is the constitutional right of every one accused of crime to be tried by a jury of the country, and though this is a right which he may waive, he is not bound by his confession, except when it has been done deliberately and under the deepest solemnities. 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, section 216; 2 Hale's P. C. 225; 2 Hawkins' P. C. 466; 1 Chitty Cr. L. (1847) 428; 2 Bishop New Cr. Proe. (2nd ed.) ...