State v. Hill
| Decision Date | 20 April 2016 |
| Docket Number | A147778.,CR100274 |
| Citation | 277 Or.App. 751,373 P.3d 162 |
| Parties | STATE of Oregon, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Christian John Fletcher HILL, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender, and Erin Snyder, Deputy Public Defender, Office of Public Defense Services filed the brief for appellant.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Anna M. Joyce, Solicitor General, and Paul L. Smith, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before ARMSTRONG, Presiding Judge, and EGAN, Judge, and NAKAMOTO, Judge pro tempore.
, J. pro tempore.
Defendant was convicted of second-degree disorderly conduct, ORS 166.025
, and fourth-degree assault, ORS 163.160, as a result of an incident at a casino owned and operated by the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation. In the trial court, defendant moved for dismissal of the case, arguing that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal, he again asserts that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, but he offers a new rationale for his position: because the incident occurred in Indian country,1 (1) the state bore the burden, but failed, to present evidence regarding his non-Indian status, which was necessary for the court to determine its subject matter jurisdiction, and (2) even though he did not alert the court that his non-Indian status was required for the court's jurisdiction, the court was required to dismiss the case. The state responds that, properly understood, defendant's challenge is to personal jurisdiction over him and not the court's subject matter jurisdiction over the crimes charged and that, therefore, his current jurisdictional argument cannot be considered because it is unpreserved.
Contrary to the state's position, we conclude that defendant raises a challenge to the court's subject matter jurisdiction as circumscribed under federal law and that defendant correctly asserts that his non-Indian status was the determining factor in whether the trial court had jurisdiction over the charged crimes. However, although the record is silent regarding defendant's non-Indian status, we reject defendant's contention that the proper disposition is an outright reversal. Rather, we decide, as a matter of first impression in Oregon, that the better course is to vacate the judgment and remand to permit defendant an opportunity to provide the trial court with evidence sufficient to permit a conclusion that he is Indian. If defendant meets his burden of production, the trial court must then determine, with the state bearing the burden of persuasion, the jurisdictional fact of defendant's non-Indian status. If defendant does not meet his burden of production, or if the trial court determines defendant's status as non-Indian, then the trial court shall reinstate the judgment.
Because defendant was convicted after a jury trial, we set out the facts in the light most favorable to the state. State v. Johnson, 342 Or. 596, 598, 157 P.3d 198 (2007)
, cert. den., 552 U.S. 1113, 128 S.Ct. 906, 169 L.Ed.2d 753 (2008). Defendant attended a poker tournament at the Confederated Tribes' Wildhorse Resort and Casino, located on the Umatilla Indian Reservation. During a meal break, casino staff consolidated several of the poker tables and moved defendant's chips to a place at a different table. Maddern, the assistant poker director, told defendant where his chips had been moved. Defendant became angry and said that he would shoot Maddern if his chips were moved again.
After defendant sat down and started to play, Maddern heard defendant cursing and told defendant that, if he continued to be disruptive, he would incur a penalty. Defendant cursed again, Maddern issued the penalty, and defendant became more verbally abusive. Maddern walked away to call security, but defendant pursued him, continuing to cause a disturbance. Several security personnel arrived, and Maddern asked them to escort defendant off the premises, telling defendant that he was disqualified from the tournament. As Maddern walked away, several security guards, including Norris, attempted to get defendant to go into the hallway with them. Defendant refused, and, after Norris grabbed his arm, defendant broke away and pursued Maddern. Norris caught up with defendant and grabbed the back of defendant's shirt. Defendant grappled with Norris, and they fell to the ground, with defendant holding Norris by the neck. Other employees eventually pulled defendant off Norris, who suffered injuries to his neck. Defendant was arrested by tribal police.
The state charged defendant with multiple misdemeanor counts: fourth-degree assault, ORS 163.160
, for injury to Norris; three counts of attempted fourth-degree assault of the other men, ORS 163.160 and ORS 161.405 ; menacing, ORS 163.190, for conduct directed against one of the other men; and second-degree disorderly conduct, ORS 166.025. The trial court dismissed the attempted fourth-degree assaults on the state's motion.
At the close of the state's case-in-chief, defendant asserted that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and sought dismissal of the case. Specifically, defense counsel argued that, because the offenses had occurred on a tribal reservation, the court lacked jurisdiction:
.
The trial court rejected defendant's motion on a different ground: that the record included evidence that the victim was not an enrolled tribal member. The trial court observed that there was evidence, “at one point, that the victim was not enrolled” as a tribal member. Although defendant then argued that, for purposes of subject matter jurisdiction, it did not matter whether the victim was or was not a tribal member, the court adhered to its ruling.
The state did not adduce evidence at trial regarding defendant's status as an Indian or non-Indian. Nor did defendant argue, as he does on appeal, that the absence of such evidence was significant to his jurisdictional motion.
The jury acquitted defendant of menacing, but convicted him of fourth-degree assault and second-degree disorderly conduct. On appeal, defendant's sole assignment of error is that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
(Emphasis in original.) Defendant further contends that he sufficiently preserved his challenge but that, even if he did not, he may contest subject matter jurisdiction at any time. Finally, defendant explains, the record is insufficient to support the court's subject matter jurisdiction.
The state initially responds that defendant failed to preserve his contention for appeal. In part, the state asserts that defendant makes a late personal-jurisdiction argument that is different from the argument he made at trial and unsupported by the case law he cites. The state argues that “a claim that a court does not have jurisdiction over a particular offender, because of personal or historic facts associated with that individual, is a matter of personal jurisdiction, not subject matter jurisdiction.” The state relies solely on this sentence from State v. Terry, 333 Or. 163, 186 n. 14, 37 P.3d 157 (2001)
, cert. den., 536 U.S. 910, 122 S.Ct. 2368, 153 L.Ed.2d 189 (2002) : “Subject matter jurisdiction differs from personal jurisdiction, which governs the assertion over the person of the accused.” The state concludes with its observation that a challenge to personal jurisdiction may be waived.
While asserting that defendant challenges only personal jurisdiction, the state does not directly refute defendant's contentions concerning (1) the limits of the state's subject matter jurisdiction over criminal offenses committed at the casino and on the Umatilla Indian Reservation and (2) the nature of the jurisdiction addressed in section 5 of the compact. Indeed, although the state makes assertions about some laws governing when a federal court has subject matter jurisdiction over offenses committed at the casino, the state never directly...
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