State v. Hill

• Decision Date: 08 May 2006
• Docket Number: No. 26145.,26145.
• Citation: 630 S.E.2d 274
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: The STATE of South Carolina, Petitioner, v. Gary Thomas HILL, Respondent.

630 S.E.2d 274

The STATE of South Carolina, Petitioner, v. Gary Thomas HILL, Respondent.

No. 26145.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard March 22, 2006.

Decided May 8, 2006.

Deputy Director for Legal Services Teresa A. Knox, Assistant Chief Legal Counsel J. Benjamin Aplin, and Legal Counsel Tommy Evans, Jr., all of South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole & Pardon Services, of Columbia, for Petitioner.

J. Stephen Welch and Adam M. Cain, both of The Welch Law Firm, of Greenwood, for Respondent.

Chief Justice TOAL:

The trial court revoked Respondent's probation after he committed several probation violations. The court of appeals reversed in part, holding that Rule 5, SCRCrimP (titled "Disclosure in Criminal Cases") and the disclosure rule announced in Brady v. Maryland¹ applied to probation revocation proceedings. The State appealed and we now reverse.

FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Respondent received a twenty year prison sentence for convictions of second degree arson, second degree burglary, malicious injury to personal property, driving under the influence—fourth offense, and criminal domestic violence—third offense. The trial court suspended the sentence to ten years imprisonment and five years probation. Respondent began his probation in 1997.

Approximately five months before Respondent's probation was scheduled to end, Respondent's probation agent received a call from the Department of Social Services alleging that Respondent was in possession of a firearm and had been pointing the weapon at his son. The probation agent contacted Respondent and ordered him to report to the probation office.

While meeting with his probation agent at the probation office, Respondent admitted a.22 caliber rifle was in his home. Respondent alleged the rifle was his son's and that the son sometimes kept the gun in the house. At the time, Respondent's son was 11 or 12 years old. The probation agent informed Respondent that he and Respondent would be accompanying some additional probation agents to Respondent's house, that the agents were going to search the house, and that Respondent would be arrested for violating his probation if the agents discovered any weapons. At that point, Respondent asked to go into the hallway and get a drink of water. The probation agent granted Respondent's request, and after reaching the water fountain, Respondent ran down the hallway and out of the building. Seeing Respondent's attempt to escape, the probation agent ordered Respondent to stop.

As the probation agent pursued Respondent, three other agents joined in the pursuit. After exiting the building, Respondent locked himself in his vehicle and attempted to leave the probation office parking lot. The four agents surrounded Respondent's vehicle, drew their firearms, and ordered Respondent to get out of his vehicle. Respondent, however, started his vehicle and attempted to drive away from the premises. Although at least one agent attempted to prevent Respondent from leaving by standing in front of his vehicle, Respondent continued to drive forward. The agent obstructing Respondent's exit was able to avoid being struck by Respondent's vehicle, and at this point, one of the agents began firing his weapon into Respondent's car. Although Respondent received three gunshot wounds, he managed to drive out of the parking lot and escape. Respondent was arrested later at the emergency room.

The State charged Respondent with violating his probation by possessing a firearm, failing to obey his probation agent's commands, and failing to avoid injurious habits by attempting to run over a probation agent with his car. Prior to Respondent's revocation proceeding, Respondent served his probation agent with a request for disclosure of information pursuant to Rule 5 and Brady.² At some point, Respondent filed a motion to continue the revocation proceeding because his probation agent refused to comply with the disclosure requests.

At the hearing on Respondent's motion for a continuance, the court addressed Respondent's Brady and Rule 5 requests. In a reference to S.C.Code Ann. § 24-21-290 (Supp.2005)³ (titled "Information received by probation agents privileged"), the court advised that a statute provided for the confidentiality of the department of probation's records unless they are ordered disclosed by the court. The court instructed Respondent to bring a motion under § 24-21-290 if he was indeed seeking the probation agent's file. Respondent, however, filed no additional motions or requests. The trial court held Respondent's probation revocation proceeding approximately one month later, and at the conclusion of the proceeding, the court revoked Respondent's probation and sentenced him to seven years imprisonment.

Respondent moved for reconsideration, arguing that the police report covering his escape from the probation office was unfinished at the time of his probation revocation proceeding and that the final police report contained mitigating evidence.⁴ During the hearing on Respondent's motion for reconsideration, Respondent alleged he did not intend to harm any of the probation agents and that the probation agents were not in any danger of sustaining serious injury during his escape attempt.⁵ After hearing Respondent's offered evidence, including testimony from Respondent himself, the court denied Respondent's motion. Respondent appealed.

The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision on two issues not related to this appeal,⁶ but the court reversed the revocation of Respondent's probation. The court of appeals held that Brady and Rule 5 applied to probation revocation proceedings because South Carolina courts had extended these rules "beyond criminal trial proceedings" and because a probation revocation proceeding involves a determination of guilt. Hill, 359 S.C. at 312-3, 597 S.E.2d at 828-29.

The State argued that even if Brady and Rule 5 applied, Respondent's due process rights were not violated because Respondent eventually received the requested information, presented the information at his motion for a new trial, and the trial court affirmed its decision. Disagreeing, the court of appeals stated "[h]aving already found [Respondent] violated his probation . . . we believe it would have been difficult for the court to be completely objective during the subsequent proceeding. Thus we find the information was material and the failure to disclose it deprived [Respondent] of a fair hearing." Id. at 314-15, 597 S.E.2d at 829-30. The State appealed.

This Court granted certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision and the State raises the following issues for review:

I. Did the court of appeals err in extending Brady and Rule 5 to probation revocation proceedings?

II. If Brady and Rule 5 apply to probation revocation proceedings, did the State violate either rule?

LAW/ANALYSIS

I. Brady and Rule 5's Applicability to Probation Revocation

The issues of whether the specific requirements of Brady and Rule 5 apply to probation revocation proceedings are novel questions in South Carolina. The State argues that the court of appeals erred in applying both rules to these proceedings, and we agree.

A. Brady

Brady provides that a criminal defendant is denied due process when the prosecution suppresses evidence that is favorable to him. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). In Brady, an appeal from a state court murder conviction, the prosecution failed to disclose that a co-defendant previously admitted to the killing. Id. at 84, 83 S.Ct. 1194. The Maryland court of appeals held that the failure to disclose this evidence constituted a denial of due process, and the United States Supreme Court agreed. Id. at 86, 83 S.Ct. 1194. Though the court addressed the due process violation in dicta, see id. at 92, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (White, J., concurring), the rule requiring the disclosure of evidence favorable to the accused is commonly known as the Brady rule.

Although Brady provides a bright-line rule for the disclosure requirements necessary to guarantee that a criminal defendant receives due process, it is equally fundamental that due process requirements are not rigid and inflexible. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). Instead, due process only calls for such protections as the particular situation demands. Id. In the specific areas of probation and parole revocation, both this Court and the United States Supreme Court have provided guidance as to what due process requires.

In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 474, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972), a parolee alleged that minimal due process required that he be given a pre-revocation hearing. The court recognized that although both criminal trials and parole revocations involve potential deprivations of liberty, revocation "deprives an individual, not of the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only of the conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special parole restrictions." Id. at 480, 92 S.Ct. 2593. Similarly, the court recognized the state's "overwhelming interest" in being able to return the parolee to prison without the burden of a new criminal trial. Id. at 483, 92 S.Ct. 2593. The court qualified this statement, however, by noting that the state had "no interest in revoking parole without some informal procedural guarantees." Id. at 483-84, 92 S.Ct. 2593. Ultimately, the court held that fundamental justice required a parolee be given a reasonable opportunity to explain an alleged violation. Id.

Importantly, the court in Morrissey left the states with the responsibility of determining the exact procedures to be followed. Id. at 488-89, 92 S.Ct. 2593. Instead of detailing specific procedures, the court limited its declaration to describing the minimum requirements of due process. Id. The court listed these requirements as (a) written notice of the alleged...