State v. Hintz

• Decision Date: 04 May 1940
• Docket Number: 6759
• Citation: 102 P.2d 639,61 Idaho 411
• Parties: STATE, Respondent, v. O. A. HINTZ, Appellant
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

102 P.2d 639

61 Idaho 411

STATE, Respondent, v. O. A. HINTZ, Appellant

No. 6759

Supreme Court of Idaho

May 4, 1940

INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER-STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION-CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE.

1. The statute prohibiting parking a vehicle on a highway was inapplicable to the driver of a truck which developed engine trouble and which driver was unable to get started before it was struck by automobile, in determining whether driver was guilty of involuntary manslaughter because of automobile occupant's death. (I. C. A., sec. 48-524.)

2. The codal provision defining involuntary manslaughter as the unlawful killing of a human being without malice, in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, or without due caution, must be read and construed with codal provision that in every crime there must exist a union or joint operation of act and intent or criminal negligence. (I. C. A., secs. 17-114, 17-1106.)

3. "Criminal negligence" within statute providing that in every crime there must exist a union, or joint operation of act and intent or "criminal negligence," does not mean merely the failure to exercise ordinary care or that degree of care which an ordinarily prudent person would exercise under like circumstances but means gross negligence amounting to a reckless disregard of consequences and of the rights of others. (I. C. A., sec. 17-114.)

4. Where accused was traveling in truck at night along highway when engine failed to function and truck stopped, and he did everything in his power to start it and, failing in the effort, sought to remove truck from pavement, accused was not guilty of "criminal negligence" which would warrant conviction of involuntary manslaughter when automobile crashed into truck resulting in death of one of the occupants. (I. C. A., secs. 17-114, 17-1106.)

The foregoing syllabus is by West Publishing Company, that following is by author of opinion.

I. The provision of the code forbidding persons to park, or leave standing, any vehicle on a highway does not apply to the driver of a vehicle which is disabled in such manner and to such extent that it is impossible to avoid stopping and temporarily leaving it.

II. I C. A., sec. 17-1106, which defines involuntary manslaughter as "the unlawful killing of a human being, without malice.... in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and circumspection," must be read and construed together with sec. 17-114, which provides: "In every crime or public offense there must exist a union, or joint operation of act and intent, or criminal negligence."

III. The term "criminal negligence," as used in that section, does not mean the failure to exercise ordinary care or that degree of care which an ordinarily prudent person would exercise under like circumstances. It means gross negligence. It is such negligence as amounts to a reckless disregard of consequences and of the rights of others.

APPEAL from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, for Bannock County. Hon. Isaac McDougall, Judge.

Appeal from conviction of involuntary manslaughter. Reversed.

Judgment reversed with direction.

Black & Black, for Appellant.

The word "impossible" as used in section 48-524, subdivision C, means that the car must be disabled to the extent that it is not reasonably practical to move it. (Geisen v. Luce, 185 Minn. 479, 242 N.W. 8-10.)

J. W. Taylor, Attorney General, R. W. Beckwith, E. G. Elliott, Lawrence B. Quinn and D. W. Thomas, Assistant Attorneys General, for Respondent.

In charging crime of involuntary manslaughter, the information need not contain all of the elements set forth in any particular statute constituting a violation of our motor vehicle code. All that is necessary is to allege the manner and means by which the unlawful killing occurred, in ordinary and concise language and in such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended. (Secs. 17-1106, 19-1309, 19-1318, 19-1319, I. C. A.; State v. Goldizen, 58 Idaho 532, 76 P.2d 278; State v. McMahan, 57 Idaho 240, 65 P.2d 156; State v. Mickey, 27 Idaho 626, 150 P. 39.)

MORGAN, J. Ailshie, C. J., and Budge, Givens and Holden, JJ., concur.

OPINION

MORGAN, J.

The charging part of the information in this case is as follows:

"That the said O. A. Hintz, on or about the 15th day of January, 1939, and before the filing of this information at Pocatello, in the County of Bannock, State of Idaho, at a point on Highway No. 30 about three and one-half miles south of Pocatello, Bannock County, Idaho, then and there being, did then and there knowingly, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, at a point about three and one-half miles south of the city of Pocatello in the county of Bannock, in the State of Idaho, and at a point about two hundred and fifty feet north of the Owl Club on the 15th day of January, 1939, at about 3:15 A. M. of said day, and did then and there while engaged and occupied in running a motor vehicle, to-wit: A one and one-half ton Chevrolet truck, on the public highway of the State of Idaho, County of Bannock, and particularly on U.S. Highway No. 30 at the point above described, did unlawfully and feloniously park and cause to be parked said Chevrolet truck upon said highway at the point above described upon the pavement and main lane of traffic and without any lights thereon, and did then and there unlawfully and negligently and carelessly and without due caution by then and there failing to drive said motor vehicle off to the side of the road and left the same parked in such a manner and without lights as to endanger the lives and limbs of persons traveling upon and along said highway. That by reason of said negligent acts aforementioned and the lack of due caution of said defendant, O. A. Hintz, the said defendant did then and there by reason of leaving said truck parked upon the highway and without lights cause a collision with a car driven by R. E. Hopkins in which Margaret Louise Gates was a passenger and that by reason of said negligent parking of said truck upon said highway as aforesaid, said Margaret Louise Gates received mortal wounds from the effects of which she, the said Margaret Louise Gates, died within a few hours after the collision, on said 15th day of January, 1939, and that by reason of said acts as aforesaid the said O. A. Hintz, the defendant, did, in the manner and form aforesaid unlawfully and feloniously and without malice, kill the said Margaret Louise Gates and commit the crime of involuntary manslaughter."

Appellant demurred to the information. The demurrer was overruled and he plead not guilty. Trial resulted in verdict and judgment of conviction of guilty of involuntary manslaughter. He moved in arrest of judgment and his motion was overruled. He moved for a new trial, which was denied. He appealed from the judgment of conviction and from the order denying a new trial.

Appellant assigns as error the orders overruling his demurrer to the information, overruling his motion in arrest of judgment, and denying him a new trial. He also contends the evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdict and judgment. The conclusion we have reached with respect to the last mentioned contention makes a discussion of the other assignments unnecessary.

The evidence shows, without dispute, that appellant was employed by Kewanee Coal Company, in Pocatello, to deliver coal to its customers; that he owned the truck, involved in the accident here under consideration, and used it in the course of his employment; that he roomed at the home of Mrs. Mattie Hawkins; that Saturday night, January 14, 1939, after his day's work was done, he and Mrs. Hawkins took a ride in the truck, from Pocatello toward Inkom; that when they got near Inkom, about thirteen or fourteen miles from Pocatello they turned back along the highway and stopped at the Owl Club; that they reached the Owl Club and parked the truck in front of it at about twelve o'clock, midnight; that they remained at the Owl Club until near three o'clock A. M., when he and Mrs. Hawkins got into the truck and...