State v. Hirschfelder
| Decision Date | 18 November 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 82744-3.,82744-3. |
| Citation | 170 Wash.2d 536,242 P.3d 876 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Petitioner, v. Matthew J. HIRSCHFELDER, Respondent. |
Megan M. Valentine, Grays Harbor Prosecutor's Office, Grays Harbor Co. Prosecutor's Office, Attorney at Law, Montesano, WA, for Petitioner.
Robert Martin Morgan Hill, Samuel Tye Menser, Morgan Hill PC, Olympia, WA, for Respondent.
Harriet Kay Strasberg, Attorney at Law, Olympia, WA, amicus counsel for Washington Education Association.
David Allen, Allen Hansen & Maybrown PS, Susan F. Wilk, Washington Appellate Project, Ariella Lirite Wagonfeld, Attorney at Law, Seattle, WA, amicus counsel for Washington Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.
¶ 1 This case requires us to interpret the statutory language prohibiting sexual relations between a student and a school employee, former RCW 9A.44.093(1)(b) (2005). At issue is whether, under the statute, the term "minor" includes students between the ages of 18 and 21, or just those under 18. Also at issue is whether the statute is unconstitutionally vague or violates the defendant's right to equal protection. We reverse the Court of Appeals and hold that the statute at issue criminalizes sexual misconduct between school employees and full time registered students 16 or older. We further hold that the statute is neither unconstitutionally vague nor violative of the defendant's equal protection rights.
¶ 2 Matthew Hirschfelder was employed as a choir teacher at Hoquiam High School. He had sexual intercourse in his office with a member of the high school choir, A.N.T., several days prior to her graduation in 2006. At the time, Hirschfelder was 33 and A.N.T. was 18. Hirschfelder was charged with sexual misconduct with a minor in the first degree under former RCW 9A.44.093(1)(b). That statute provided in relevant part:
A person is guilty of sexual misconduct with a minor in the first degree when: ... the person is a school employee who has, or knowingly causes another person under the age of eighteen to have, sexual intercourse with a registered student of the school who is at least sixteen years old and not married to the employee, if the employee is at least sixty months older than the student.
Former RCW 9A.44.093(1)(b).
¶ 3 Hirschfelder filed a motion to dismiss the charge pursuant to State v. Knapstad, 107 Wash.2d 346, 729 P.2d 48 (1986), arguing that because the statute criminalized sexual intercourse with "minors," he committed no crime when he had sexual intercourse with an 18-year-old adult. Alternatively, he argued that the former statute was unconstitutionally vague and violated his right to equal protection. The trial judge denied the motion but certified the case for immediate review by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the statute was ambiguous but that legislative history indicated that the legislature intended to criminalize only sexual misconduct between school employees and students aged 16 and 17. State v. Hirschfelder, 148 Wash.App. 328, 199 P.3d 1017 (2009).1
¶ 4 The State filed a motion for review, challenging the Court of Appeals decision and arguing that the statute criminalized sexual intercourse with any registered studentwho is at least 16 years old. We granted review. State v. Hirschfelder, 166 Wash.2d 1011, 210 P.3d 1018 (2009). Amici Washington Education Association and Washington Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (WACDL) filed briefs in support of Hirschfelder.
¶ 5 "The meaning of a statute is a question of law reviewed de novo."Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wash.2d 1, 9, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). Former RCW 9A.44.093 provided:
¶ 6 Hirschfelder argues that the former statute, entitled "[s]exual misconduct with a minor in the first degree," was not intended to criminalize sexual intercourse between school employees and registered students age 18 or older because of the statute's use of the term "minor." Alternatively, Hirschfelder argues that the term "minor" is ambiguous and that we should apply the rule of lenity to resolve the ambiguity in his favor. The Court of Appeals agreed with Hirschfelder, concluding "that for the purposes of RCW 9A.44.093(1)(b), the common and legal definitions of 'students' conflict with those of 'minor' because the two words refer to groups who may be of differing age ranges (between18 and 21 and under 18, respectively)." Hirschfelder, 148 Wash.App. at 341, 199 P.3d 1017. The Court of Appeals turned to the former statute's legislative history and concluded that the legislature intended that former RCW 9A.44.093(1)(b) criminalize only the behavior of school employees who have sexual intercourse with registered students who are 16 or 17 years old.
¶ 7 In any question of statutory construction, we look to ascertain the intention of the legislature by first examining a statute's plain meaning. Campbell, 146 Wash.2d at 9-10, 43 P.3d 4. " ' "Statutes must be interpreted and construed so that all the language used is given effect, with no portion rendered meaningless or superfluous." ' " State v. J.P., 149 Wash.2d 444, 450, 69 P.3d 318 (2003) (quoting Davis v. Dep't of Licensing, 137 Wash.2d 957, 963, 977 P.2d 554 (1999) (quoting Whatcom County v. City of Bellingham, 128 Wash.2d 537, 546, 909 P.2d 1303 (1996))). "[I]f the statute's meaning is plain on its face, then the court must give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent." Campbell, 146 Wash.2d at 9-10, 43 P.3d 4. Christensen v. Ellsworth, 162 Wash.2d 365, 373, 173 P.3d 228 (2007) (citations omitted).
¶ 8 Focusing as we must on the plain language of the statute, we conclude that former RCW 9A.44.093(1)(b) prohibits sexual relations between school employees and registered students. The word "minor" is self-defined by the specific descriptions of the victims in each of the alternative scenarios under the statute's sections. Under the subsection at issue, a minor is a registered student of the school who is at least 16 years old. Former RCW 9A.44.093(1)(b). At the time of the incident with A.N.T., a registered student included an individual up to 21 years of age.RCW 28A.150.220(5) (1993); former RCW 28A.155.020 (1995).2 Thus, "minor" as used in former RCW 9A.44.093(1)(b) includes registered students between the ages of 16 and 21. Reading "minor" as Hirschfelder urges-to exclude those students 18 or older-renders the words "registered student" in the statute meaningless.
¶ 9 Hirschfelder argues that "minor" as it is used in the provision at issue must exclude students 18 or older because a separate statute, RCW 26.28.010, provides that a person has reached the age of majority, and is therefore no longer a minor according to dictionary definition, at age 18 unless otherwise specified by law. Pet'r's Opening Br. at 6-7 (quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1439 (1976) and RCW 26.28.010). This argument is unpersuasive. A registered student is a minor for the purposes of former RCW 9A.44.093(1)(b), and a registered student is specified by law to include persons up to the age of 21. By its terms, RCW 26.28.010's definition of "minor" does not apply to former RCW 9A.44.093(1)(b).
¶ 10 The dissent's sole reason for rejecting our plain reading of the statute rests on a separate provision not raised by the parties, RCW 9A.44.030(3)(d). Dissent at 884-85. This provision sets out a defense to a charge under former RCW 9A.44.093 if the defendant can show he reasonably believed "the victim was at least eighteen, or was less than sixty months younger than the defendant." RCW 9A.44.030(3)(d). This provision is not "determinative" of the proper interpretation of former RCW 9A.44.093(1)(b) as the dissent believes. Dissent at 884-85. First, the defensewas not written to apply to the portion of former RCW 9A.44.093 at issue today. RCW 9A.44.030(3)(d) was enacted in 1988 in conjunction with former RCW 9A.44.093(1), which criminalized first degree sexual misconduct with a minor when the person has "sexual intercourse with another person who is at least sixteen years old but less than eighteen years old and not married to the...
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