State v. Hirschfelder

Decision Date13 January 2009
Docket NumberNo. 36804-8-II.,36804-8-II.
CourtWashington Court of Appeals
PartiesSTATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Matthew J. HIRSCHFELDER, Appellant.

Robert Martin Morgan Hill, Morgan Hill PC, Olympia, WA, for Appellant.

Megan M. Valentine, Grays Harbor Prosecutor's Office, Montesano, WA, for Respondent.

Harriet Kay Strasberg, Attorney at Law, Olympia, WA, Amicus Curiae on behalf of Washington Education Association.

David Allen, Ariela Lirite Wagonfeld, Allen Hansen & Maybrown PS, Susan F. Wilk, Washington Appellate Project, Seattle, WA, Amicus Curiae on behalf of Washington Assoc. of Criminal Defense Lawyers.

VAN DEREN, C.J.

¶ 1 Matthew Hirschfelder appeals the trial court's denial of his motion under State v. Knapstad, 107 Wash.2d 346, 729 P.2d 48 (1986) to dismiss the charge of first degree sexual misconduct with a minor, contrary to RCW 9A.44.093(1)(b). He contends that the trial court erred because the facts as alleged do not constitute a crime under RCW 9A.44.093(1)(b); alternatively, he argues that if the statute criminalizes sexual contact with an 18-year-old student, it (1) is unconstitutionally vague and/or ambiguous and (2) violates his right to equal protection under the constitution.1 We hold that the statute is ambiguous but legislative history indicates that the legislature intended to only criminalize sexual contact between school employees and students aged 16 and 17 in RCW 9A.44.093(1)(b); therefore, we reverse and remand for dismissal.

FACTS

¶ 2 The abbreviated facts in the record on appeal indicate that, on the night of a book signing at Hoquiam High School, Hirschfelder, a high school choir teacher, allegedly had sexual intercourse with AMT,2 an 18-year-old member of the high school choir. Hirschfelder was more than 60 months older than AMT. This incident occurred shortly before AMT graduated from high school.

¶ 3 The State charged Hirschfelder with one count of first degree sexual misconduct with a minor, under RCW 9A.44.093(1)(b). Hirschfelder filed a motion to dismiss under Knapstad and a second motion to declare RCW 9A.44.093(1)(b) unconstitutional and to dismiss.

¶ 4 The trial court denied Hirschfelder's motions, but certified "that [its] order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for a difference of opinion and that immediate review of the order may materially advance the ultimate determination of the litigation." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 117. We granted Hirschfelder's subsequent petition for discretionary review.

ANALYSIS

¶ 5 Hirschfelder asserts that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion for dismissal under Knapstad. On appeal, he first argues that he did not commit a crime under the plain language of RCW 9A.44.093(1)(b) because it implicitly limits the age of the victims to 16- and 17-year-olds. Alternatively, he argues that RCW 9A.44.093(1)(b) is unconstitutionally vague and/or ambiguous and, if the statute proscribes sexual contact between school employees and students who are 18 or older, it violates his right to equal protection under the law. We agree with Hirschfelder and hold that the legislature intended to criminalize sexual misconduct between registered students who are 16- and 17-years-old and school employees who are at least 60 months older than these students. Therefore, the trial court erred when it did not grant Hirschfelder's motion to dismiss under Knapstad. Because we resolve the argument using principles of statutory construction, we do not address the constitutional challenges to RCW 9A.44.093(1)(b) and reverse and remand for dismissal of the charge against Hirschfelder.

I. Knapstad Motion

¶ 6 Here, as the trial court recognized, its decision on Hirschfelder's Knapstad motion is determinative of the matter. To prevail on a Knapstad motion, the defendant must establish that "there are no material disputed facts and the undisputed facts do not establish a prima facie case of guilt." 107 Wash.2d at 356, 729 P.2d 48. We review a trial court's denial of a Knapstad motion de novo. See State v. O'Meara, 143 Wash.App. 638, 642, 180 P.3d 196 (2008).

¶ 7 RCW 9A.44.093 states that a "person is guilty of sexual misconduct with a minor in the first degree" in three situations. Under RCW 9A.44.093(1)(b),3 which applies here, a school employee is guilty of sexual misconduct with a minor if he or she has sexual intercourse with a student who is (1) at least 16-years-old, (2) at least 60 months younger than the employee, and (3) not married to the employee. The parties dispute whether RCW 9A.44.093(1)(b) prohibits sexual intercourse with minor students aged 16 and 17 only or with all students 16 and older.

¶ 8 For purposes of the Knapstad motion, Hirschfelder conceded the truth of the alleged facts, (1) he had sexual intercourse with the student AMT when she was 18-years-old, (2) he is more than 60 months older than AMT, and (3) he was not married to AMT at the time. Since there are no material facts in dispute, the only issue is whether the undisputed facts satisfy the elements of sexual misconduct with a minor; in other words, whether RCW 9A.44.093(1)(b) prohibited Hirschfelder from having sexual intercourse with an 18-year-old student.

II. Statutory Ambiguity

¶ 9 Hirschfelder first argues that under RCW 9A.44.093(1)(b), "minor" means a "person under the age of eighteen" because that is both its common and legal definition. Moreover, he asserts that the statute as a whole implicitly establishes the victim's maximum age as 17 when subsection (b) is read in the context of (a) and (c). Subsection (a) explicitly establishes the victim's age as either 16 or 17. Subsection (c) deals with sexual misconduct with a "foster child who is at least sixteen," RCW 9A.44.093(1)(c), and thus implicitly applies to victims who are 16 and 17 because a foster child is statutorily defined as "a person less than eighteen years of age."4 RCW 74.13.020(5). Finally, Hirschfelder argues that subsection (b) is ambiguous if it is interpreted differently from subsections (a) and (c) to proscribe sexual contact with persons who are not minors, because it leaves persons of common intelligence to guess at its meaning and disagree about its applicability. Furthermore, he argues that this ambiguity is enhanced by the phrase prohibiting a school employee from causing "another person under the age of eighteen" to engage in sexual intercourse with the victim.5 Br. of Appellant at 21 (quoting RCW 9A.44.093 (1)(b)).

¶ 10 The State counters that the legislature's failure to define "minor" in RCW 9A.44.093 or anywhere in chapter 9A.44 RCW does not mean that the legislature intended to restrict the definition of "minor" to a person under the age of majority. The State also argues that subsections (a) and (c) of RCW 9A.44.093(1) do not control the definition of "minor" in subsection (b) because subsections (a) and (c) either explicitly or implicitly limit the victims to 16- and 17-year-olds. Instead, the State argues that the legislature's use of the phrase "`a registered student of the school who is at least sixteen years old'" refers to students who are less than 21 years of age, based on the Basic Education Act's statement that "`[e]ach school district's kindergarten through twelfth grade basic educational program shall be accessible to all students who are five years of age ... and less than twenty-one years of age.'" Br. of Resp't at 10 (quoting RCW 9A.44.093(1)(b); RCW 28A.150.220(3)). Thus, the State concludes that the phrase "at least sixteen years old" can be reasonably interpreted to include someone who is 18.

A. Rules of Statutory Construction

¶ 11 For the purposes of this appeal, we must first determine whether the plain language of RCW 9A.44.093(1)(b) establishes the age of victims and, if not, we then review the legislative history and relevant case law to ascertain the statute's meaning. See Christensen v. Ellsworth, 162 Wash.2d 365, 372-73, 173 P.3d 228 (2007). "`[I]f the statute's meaning is plain on its face, then [we] must give effect to that plain meaning.'" Christensen, 162 Wash.2d at 372, 173 P.3d 228 (quoting Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, L.L.C., 146 Wash.2d 1, 9, 43 P.3d 4 (2002)). "In the absence of [ ]specific statutory definition[s]," we give words their common legal or ordinary meaning. State v. Chester, 133 Wash.2d 15, 22, 940 P.2d 1374 (1997). We give non-technical words their dictionary definition. Chester, 133 Wash.2d at 22, 940 P.2d 1374.

¶ 12 We also discern plain meaning from the context of the statute containing the provision, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole. Christensen, 162 Wash.2d at 373, 173 P.3d 228. We interpret and construe statutes "`so that all the language used is given effect, with no portion rendered meaningless or superfluous.'" State v. Roggenkamp, 153 Wash.2d 614, 624, 106 P.3d 196 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. J.P., 149 Wash.2d 444, 450, 69 P.3d 318 (2003)). When interpreting a criminal statute, "we give it a literal and strict interpretation." State v. Delgado, 148 Wash.2d 723, 727, 63 P.3d 792 (2003).

¶ 13 If a plain meaning analysis fails to resolve the matter, we next turn to legislative history and relevant case law to discern the legislature's intent regarding the age of victims under RCW 9A.44.093(1)(b). See Christensen, 162 Wash.2d at 373, 173 P.3d 228. "The court's purpose in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent and purpose of the Legislature." State v. Van Woerden, 93 Wash.App. 110, 116, 967 P.2d 14 (1998). Finally, if we cannot resolve an ambiguity through these steps, we apply the rule of lenity in favor of the accused. State v. Stratton, 130 Wash.App. 760, 764-65, 124 P.3d 660 (2005).

B. Plain Language of RCW 9A.44.093(1)(b)

¶ 14 RCW 9A.44.093(1)(b) uses the terms "minor" and "student" and the phrase "another student under the age of eighteen." The...

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5 cases
  • State v. Hirschfelder
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • November 18, 2010
    ...legislature intended to criminalize only sexual misconduct between school employees and students aged 16 and 17. State v. Hirschfelder, 148 Wash.App. 328, 199 P.3d 1017 (2009).1 ¶ 4 The State filed a motion for review, challenging the Court of Appeals decision and arguing that the statute c......
  • State v. Erwin, No. 37024-7-II (Wash. App. 5/5/2009)
    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • May 5, 2009
    ...can be decided on nonconstitutional grounds, however, we should decline to consider the constitutional issues. State v. Hirschfelder, ___ Wn. App. ___, 199 P.3d 1017, 1028 (2009). As such, we do not address the unconstitutionality of the community custody condition because we can resolve th......
  • State v. Garcia, No. 27293-1-III (Wash. App. 6/25/2009)
    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • June 25, 2009
    ...imprisonment for a child less than 16 years old. We review a trial court's denial of a Knapstad motion de novo. State v. Hirschfelder, 148 Wn. App. 328, 333, 199 P.3d 1017 (2009), petition for review filed, No. 82744-3 (Wash. Feb. 20, 2009). And the question presented is strictly a question......
  • State v. Edington, No. 36848-0-II (Wash. App. 5/12/2009)
    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • May 12, 2009
    ...can be decided on nonconstitutional grounds, however, we should decline to consider the constitutional issues. State v. Hirschfelder, 148 Wn. App. 328, 333, 199 P.3d 1017 (2009). As such, we do not address the unconstitutionality of the community custody condition because we can resolve the......
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