State v. Hobbs
| Decision Date | 05 October 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 32,838.,32,838. |
| Citation | 363 P.3d 1259 |
| Parties | STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Gregory M. HOBBS, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General, Paula E. Ganz, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee.
Jorge A. Alvarado, Chief Public Defender, Tania Shahani, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant.
{1} Defendant Gregory Marvin Hobbs appeals his conviction for voluntary manslaughter with a firearm enhancement, contrary to NMSA 1978, § 30–2–3(A) (1994), and NMSA 1978, § 31–18–16(A) (1993). Defendant raises three issues, which we have reorganized and address as follows: (1) whether Defendant's right to a public trial was violated when the district court partially closed the courtroom during the testimony of one of his witnesses, (2) whether Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel, and (3) whether the district court erred in denying Defendant's request for a new trial. We affirm.
{2} It is undisputed that Defendant shot and killed Ruben Archuleta, Jr. (Ruben Jr.) and Ruben Archuleta, Sr., also known as Hammer (Victim), during an altercation that occurred on June 15, 2012. The State did not prosecute Defendant for Ruben Jr.'s death because it determined that the killing of Ruben Jr. was legally justified. Defendant was, however, charged with and convicted for voluntary manslaughter for causing Victim's death. Defendant appeals his conviction and raises three independent issues. The facts relevant to each issue will be discussed below.
{3} Britini S., a minor, witnessed the struggle between Defendant and Victim. She testified at Defendant's preliminary hearing and was later subpoenaed by Defendant to testify at his trial. Defendant considered Britini's testimony to be crucial to his theory of self-defense.
{4} Britini failed to appear on the first day of trial, so the district court issued a bench warrant for her arrest. After her father called the judge's chambers to express concern for his daughter's safety, the judge held a conference regarding the conditions under which Britini would testify. The judge and counsel for the State and Defendant interviewed Britini in the presence of Defendant and Britini's mother.
{5} Britini, who was six and one-half months pregnant at the time of trial, explained that she was not comfortable testifying in front of an audience because she feared retaliation from Victim's family. She stated that approximately two weeks after she testified at the preliminary hearing she was physically assaulted by a girl whom she did not know, but who was with two of Victim's sons. Britini informed the court that she was afraid that she would not be able to defend herself if she were attacked again due to her pregnancy, and she felt like she had to watch her back. Likewise, Britini's mother expressed concern for Britini's safety and the safety of her unborn grandchild.
{6} Defense counsel proposed that Britini be deemed unavailable and suggested that Britini's testimony from the preliminary hearing be admitted in lieu of testimony at the trial. The State agreed that Britini's fear of retaliation was reasonable because her attacker had been in the company of Victim's sons. However, the State opposed using Britini's testimony from the preliminary hearing and argued that the situation did not rise to the level of deeming Britini unavailable. The judge also expressed his concern for Britini's safety but stated that he did not think that he had the authority to exclude the public from the proceedings. In response, defense counsel asked the judge, "[n]ot even upon stipulation of the parties[,] your honor?" Counsel then stated that "the defense would be happy to stipulate for the purpose of her testimony that the court could be cleared ... of everyone but the bailiffs [and] parties[.]" The State also agreed to the stipulation.
{7} The judge and counsel for the State and Defendant discussed Defendant's rights, Victim's rights, the public's rights, and how these rights could be affected if the district court agreed to partially close the courtroom during Britini's testimony. After careful consideration, and based upon the parties' stipulation to a partial closure of the courtroom, the district court decided to exclude members of Victim's and Defendant's families from the courtroom while Britini testified. The judge explained to Britini that he would exclude Victim's and Defendant's families while she testified but that he could not seal the courtroom. The judge further said that if someone from the newspaper was in the audience, the attorneys could ask that person "[t]o give some consideration so that [her] name [was not published] in the newspaper." The following day, Britini testified on behalf of Defendant. Her testimony and the partial courtroom closure lasted less than twenty minutes.
{8} On appeal, Defendant argues that the partial courtroom closure during Britini's testimony violated his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial, despite the fact that his defense counsel stipulated to the closure. He claims that the unconstitutional closure constitutes structural error requiring a new trial. He further argues that structural errors are subject to a relaxed preservation requirement and that they are not subject to a harmless error analysis. The State, on the other hand, asserts that Defendant did not preserve this issue for appellate review, that Defendant stipulated to the closure, and that Defendant's stipulation has the effect of a waiver of this issue on appeal.
{9} "In a criminal trial, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial." State v. Turrietta, 2013–NMSC–036, ¶ 1, 308 P.3d 964 . The right to a public trial, however, "is not absolute and may give way in certain cases to other rights or interests." Id. Whether Defendant's constitutional rights were violated is a question of law and, therefore, our review is de novo. Id. ¶ 14.
{10} As an initial matter, Defendant appears to concede that he did not preserve this issue for appellate review, and we agree. See Rule 12–216(A) NMRA (); see also State v. Vandenberg, 2003–NMSC–030, ¶ 52, 134 N.M. 566, 81 P.3d 19 (); State v. Jacobs, 2000–NMSC–026, ¶ 12, 129 N.M. 448, 10 P.3d 127 (). Despite Defendant's failure to preserve his Sixth Amendment claim, however, we address his assertion that the alleged unconstitutional closure violates his right to a public trial and constitutes a structural error requiring a new trial. See Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984).
{11} "A structural error is a defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself." State v. Nguyen, 2008–NMCA–073, ¶ 9, 144 N.M. 197, 185 P.3d 368 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "If a hearing is closed in violation of the Constitution, the denial of the right to a public trial is a structural error; thus, it is not subject to a harmless error analysis." State v. Hood, 2014–NMCA–034, ¶ 6, 320 P.3d 522. Therefore, if Defendant's right to a public trial was violated, such error would be a structural error.
{12} When determining the constitutionality of a courtroom closure, our Supreme Court in Turrietta adopted the "overriding interest" standard, discussed by the United States Supreme Court in Waller, 467 U.S. 39, 104 S.Ct. 2210, and Press–Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, 464 U.S. 501, 104 S.Ct. 819, 78 L.Ed.2d 629 (1984). See Turrietta, 2013–NMSC–036, ¶¶ 17, 19, 308 P.3d 964. In Waller, the United States Supreme Court held that a closure "over the objections of the accused" must meet the following "overriding interest" four-pronged test:
[1] the party seeking to close the hearing must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, [2] the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest, [3] the [district] court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and [4] it must make findings adequate to support the closure.
Waller, 467 U.S. at 47–48, 104 S.Ct. 2210.
{13} Defendant asserts that none of these prongs were satisfied. Specifically, he argues that: (1) neither party demonstrated an overriding interest for the closure; (2) the closure was overly broad; (3) the district court failed to adequately assess possible alternatives to closure; and (4) the district court failed to make adequate findings to support closure. Conversely, the State contends that the four prongs were met in this case. It contends that: (1) Britini's safety and the safety of her unborn child were the overriding interests for the closure; (2) the partial closure was not overly broad in scope or duration; (3) the district court considered alternatives and determined that the partial closure was the best option; and (4) the district court interviewed Britini and her mother in the presence of counsel for Defendant and the State and made sufficient factual findings to support the closure. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that Defendant waived his right to a public trial when his attorney expressly consented to the partial courtroom closure during Britini's testimony. Therefore, his structural error argument fails and consideration of the "overriding interest" standard is not required. We explain.
{14} "Fundamental rights, including constitutional rights, can be waived." State v....
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Barela
...that there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different." State v. Hobbs , 2016-NMCA-006, ¶ 21, 363 P.3d 1259 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Our Supreme Court has expressed a preference for bringing ineffective assistance claims thro......
-
State v. Martinez
...that there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different." State v. Hobbs, 2016-NMCA-006, ¶ 21, 363 P.3d 1259 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The burden is on the defendant to show both incompetence and prejudice. State v. Grogan, 2007......
-
State v. Jackson
...the findings of fact of the district court if substantial evidence supports the court's findings." State v. Hobbs, 2016-NMCA-006, ¶ 18, 363 P.3d 1259 (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted).{16} Defendant argues that defense counsel was ineffective in failing to pursue......
-
State v. Etcitty, A-1-CA-35671
...hold that Defendant has not shown that he was prejudiced by any failure to call witnesses. See State v. Hobbs, 2016-NMCA-006, ¶ 21, 363 P.3d 1259 (rejecting the defendant's argument that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to call a witness where there was no ......