State v. Hocker
| Decision Date | 06 December 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 17145,17145 |
| Citation | 115 Idaho 137,765 P.2d 162 |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. John HOCKER, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Terry S. Ratliff, Mountain Home, for defendant-appellant.
Jim Jones, Atty. Gen. by David R. Minert, Deputy Atty. Gen., Boise, for plaintiff-respondent.
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the district court abused its discretion by refusing to allow a criminal defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. Holding that the defendant did not present a just reason to withdraw the plea, we uphold the court's decision and affirm the judgment of conviction.
The facts may be summarized briefly. John Hocker was charged with three counts of delivering a controlled substance, methamphetamine, in violation of I.C. § 37-2732. By negotiated agreement, he pled guilty to one count; the others were dismissed. When Hocker entered his guilty plea, the judge questioned him extensively to ascertain that the plea was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Later, on the day set for sentencing, Hocker moved to withdraw the plea. He presented two grounds for his motion. First, he expressed a desire to confront an informant who had told law enforcement officers about his drug activities. Second, he claimed that he had not admitted his guilt unconditionally. The motion was denied.
Motions to withdraw guilty pleas fall into three categories, depending upon the stage of the judicial process at which they are made. The least favored category consists of motions filed after sentencing. Defendants making these motions must demonstrate that manifest injustice will result if their pleas are not withdrawn. I.C.R. 33; State v. Freeman, 110 Idaho 117, 714 P.2d 86 (Ct.App.1986). At the other end of the spectrum, motions made before sentencing invoke the broad discretion of the court. State v. Henderson, 113 Idaho 411, 744 P.2d 795 (Ct.App.1987). The judge is encouraged to exercise his discretion liberally in these cases. State v. Freeman, supra. The defendant need only advance a just reason to withdraw his plea. State v. Ballard, 114 Idaho 799, 761 P.2d 1151 (1988). When such a reason is presented, relief will be granted absent a strong showing of prejudice by the state.
Finally, a third category represents a hybrid of the other two. It consists of motions made before sentencing but after the defendants have read presentence reports or otherwise have received information about their probable sentences. In this type of case the court will exercise broad discretion, but may temper its liberality by weighing the defendant's apparent motive. State v. Howell, 104 Idaho 393, 659 P.2d 147 (Ct.App.1983).
In this case, as noted, Hocker submitted his motion on the day of sentencing. The record suggests that he may have anticipated a substantial prison sentence, arguably bringing his motion into the third, hybrid category. 1 However, we need not resolve the categorization issue today, for we believe that Hocker has failed to establish a just reason for plea withdrawal which would entitle him to relief under even the most lenient standard.
In support of his motion, Hocker has argued that his desire to confront the informant was a sufficient ground, by itself, to withdraw his plea. We disagree. Hocker has not identified any questions he might have asked, or any other benefit his defense might have gained, if the informant had testified at trial. Indeed, Hocker voluntarily waived the right to confront the informant, or any other potential witness, when he entered his plea. Thus, Hocker's argument boils down to his bare desire to exercise a voluntarily waived right. We hold that, without more, this does not constitute a just reason to withdraw a valid, carefully entered plea. 2
Moreover, if Hocker's argument were accepted, it would enable a defendant, at any time before sentencing, to cancel a plea bargain unilaterally by expressing a wish to exercise rights which he relinquished in exchange for concessions by the state. In effect, the state would be the only party bound by the plea-bargain agreement. We acknowledge that the practice of plea bargaining is not universally favored; but...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Mayer
...the defendant's apparent motive. State v. Johnson, 120 Idaho 408, 411, 816 P.2d 364, 367 (Ct.App.1991); State v. Hocker, 115 Idaho 137, 139, 765 P.2d 162, 164 (Ct.App.1988). A defendant's failure to present and support a plausible reason will dictate against granting withdrawal, even absent......
-
State v. Hjelm
...is to exercise liberal discretion, and the defendant need only present a just reason to withdraw his plea. State v. Hocker, 115 Idaho 137, 139, 765 P.2d 162, 164 (Ct. App. 1988). When such a reason is presented, relief will be granted absent a strong showing of prejudice by the State. Id. 1......
-
State v. Akin, 28244.
...reason" to withdraw the plea. I.C.R. 33(c); State v. Ballard, 114 Idaho 799, 801, 761 P.2d 1151, 1153 (1988); State v. Hocker, 115 Idaho 137, 139, 765 P.2d 162, 164 (Ct.App.1988). A factor to be considered is whether the defendant's motion was made after having read the PSI and the sentenci......
-
State v. Walsh
...84 P.3d 579, 583 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Johnson, 120 Idaho 408, 411, 816 P.2d 364, 367 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Hocker, 115 Idaho 137, 139, 765 P.2d 162, 164 (Ct. App. 1988). This case presents an analogous situation. The plea agreement called for the State to recommend Walsh for partic......