State v. Hoffman
| Decision Date | 19 February 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 02-021.,02-021. |
| Citation | 314 Mont. 155,64 P.3d 1013,2003 MT 26 |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Justin Michael HOFFMAN, Defendant and Appellant. |
R. Stan Peeler, Peeler Law Office, Bozeman, Montana, for Appellant.
Honorable Mike McGrath, Attorney General; Jennifer Anders, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana, Marty Lambert, County Attorney, Bozeman, Montana, for Respondent.
¶ 1 Justin Hoffman appeals from his conviction of aggravated assault in the Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Gallatin County. We affirm.
¶ 2 The following issues are raised on appeal:
¶ 3 (1) Whether the District Court erred when it denied Hoffman's Motion to Suppress Defendant's Statement;
¶ 4 (2) Whether the District Court erred when it denied the admission of opinion testimony regarding Hoffman's knowledge or purpose at the time of the charged offense;
¶ 5 (3) Whether the District Court erred when it denied Hoffman's request for a lesser included offense instruction regarding the offenses of criminal endangerment, negligent endangerment, and partner and family member assault; and
¶ 6 (4) Whether, in moving for a new trial, Hoffman may impeach the verdict with a juror affidavit.
¶ 7 On February 14, 2000, Logan Hoffman, the two and a half month old son of Justin and Crystal Hoffman, was admitted to the emergency room at Bozeman Deaconess Hospital. The baby was unresponsive, pale, and breathing irregularly. Doctors concluded that Logan had suffered a fractured skull and was bleeding inside his head and behind his retina. A CAT scan of the baby's intracranial contents revealed at least one area of bleeding in his skull, causing swelling in his brain — an injury often associated with accidental or non-accidental trauma. Logan was transferred to the Primary Children's Care Facility in Salt Lake City, Utah, where his condition eventually stabilized. Doctors further examined Logan's injuries, discovering that the blood in his skull was of two different ages, indicating that he had been injured on more than one occasion. This condition, in addition to secondary symptoms, such as hemorrhaging in Logan's right eye, led doctors to surmise that he was the victim of shaken impact baby syndrome.
¶ 8 Justin and Crystal were unable to provide a satisfactory explanation of the source of the injuries. They indicated that the hemorrhaging might have occurred when Logan was rocking in his swing, or when his head would knock against their chests as they picked him up. However, these suggestions were discounted in favor of the more plausible theory that Logan had been violently shaken by Justin or Crystal.
¶ 9 Thus, treating the situation as a possible child abuse case, Bozeman police began investigating. On February 15, 2001, Detective Mark Johnson interviewed Justin Hoffman, at which time, Hoffman also consented to a search of his apartment. There, police observed two holes in a sheetrock wall, positioned in such a way as to suggest that Hoffman had punched the holes with his fist. During the interview with Detective Johnson, Hoffman admitted to shaking his son on two occasions between February 3 and February 14, 2001. After receiving a Miranda warning and waiving his rights, Hoffman explained in detail how he had shaken Logan from side to side, causing the baby's head to flop back and forth. Hoffman explained to Detective Johnson that the first shaking incident occurred several weeks earlier and that Logan soon became irascible, vomiting uncontrollably. Hoffman admitted that he had shaken Logan out of aggravation.
¶ 10 Following the February 15 interview, Hoffman was taken into custody. The following day he requested to speak again with Detective Johnson, at which time he attempted to retract his confession of the previous day. Hoffman discounted the theory offered by doctors that Logan's injuries resulted from abuse, but he was unable to explain the severity of Logan's injuries, or why the baby became unconscious on February 14.
¶ 11 Hoffman was charged by information with aggravated assault, in violation of § 46-5-202, MCA, and was tried in Bozeman. Before the trial, Hoffman moved to suppress the statements he had made to Detective Johnson. The District Court considered Hoffman's request and the State's response, and concluded that Hoffman knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, and that the statements following the waiver were made voluntarily.
¶ 12 Subsequently, the State moved to exclude psychiatric evidence regarding Hoffman's mental state at the time he committed the charged offense. A month before the trial, Dr. Rich evaluated Hoffman at the request of Hoffman's attorney. Dr. Rich concluded, in his report of the evaluation, that Hoffman had suffered emotional inadequacies, and was of low, average intelligence. He also indicated that Hoffman had experienced an unconscious impulse when he shook Logan, and that he could not have developed the requisite mental state to support an aggravated assault charge. The defense was prepared to offer this testimony to counter the State's evidence that Hoffman acted with the requisite mental state. The District Court ruled on the State's motion, concluding that although Dr. Rich could testify about Hoffman's general psychological condition, he would not be permitted to testify about Hoffman's "knowledge" or "purpose," as the requisite mental states associated with aggravated assault.
¶ 13 During the settling of jury instructions, Hoffman proposed lesser included offense instructions on criminal endangerment, negligent endangerment, and partner and family member assault. The State objected to the instructions, and the court invited Hoffman to state his reasons for the request. In support of the instructions, Hoffman cited § 46-1-202(8)(a), MCA, and § 46-1-202(8)(c), MCA, as two separate definitions of an included offense. However, he proceeded to argue under only subsection (c), which states that an included offense is an offense that "[d]iffers from the offense charged only in respect that a less serious injury or risk to the same person, property, or public interest or a lesser kind of culpability suffices to establish its commission." The District Court concluded that criminal endangerment, negligent endangerment, and partner and family member assault are not lesser included offenses of aggravated assault under subsection (c), and denied Hoffman's proposed instructions.
¶ 14 Hoffman was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault, and was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment. Ten years of the sentence were suspended with conditions. Hoffman moved for a new trial following sentencing. The District Court denied the motion even though it had received a letter from a member of the jury, indicating that the jury would have convicted Hoffman of a lesser included offense if the court had provided a lesser included offense instruction. Hoffman now appeals his conviction.
¶ 15 We first address the issue of whether the District Court erred when it denied Hoffman's Motion to Suppress Defendant's Statement. Hoffman argues that his first statement to Detective Johnson was involuntary and, therefore, suppressible. He adds that any references to this statement in the second and third statements should also be suppressed. Hoffman contends that his first interview occurred while he was suffering from the effects of limited sleep and a recent marijuana-induced stupor, and that Detective Johnson took advantage of Hoffman's condition and forced the confession, which now stands as the subject of this appeal. Hoffman cites the transcript of the February 15 interview for examples of what he now characterizes as a sort of psychological coercion by the detective. In response, the State notes that Hoffman was advised of, and waived, his Miranda rights. The State also relies on the testimony of its expert witness that Hoffman's cognitive functioning was not dramatically impaired by marijuana or his lack of sleep. The State concludes that based on a review of the totality of the circumstances, the District Court appropriately determined that Hoffman's confession was voluntary.
¶ 16 A defendant may move to suppress an admission or confession on grounds that it was given involuntarily. See § 46-13-301(1), MCA. At trial, the prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession or admission was voluntary. See § 46-13-301(2), MCA. On appeal, we review a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress to determine whether the court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous, and whether those findings were correctly applied as a matter of law. State v. Hayworth, 1998 MT 158, ¶ 20, 289 Mont. 433, ¶ 20, 964 P.2d 1, ¶ 20.
¶ 17 A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is not supported by substantial evidence, if the trial court misapprehended the effect of the evidence, or if this Court has a definite or firm conviction that the trial court committed a mistake. State v. Loh (1996), 275 Mont. 460, 475, 914 P.2d 592, 601; State v. Hermes (1995), 273 Mont. 446, 449, 904 P.2d 587, 589; State v. Bower (1992), 254 Mont. 1, 7, 833 P.2d 1106, 1110. Substantial evidence requires "more than a mere scintilla of evidence, but may be less than a preponderance of the evidence." Gypsy Highview Gathering System, Inc. v. Stokes (1986), 221 Mont. 11, 15, 716 P.2d 620, 623. Where a determination of voluntariness depends upon the credibility of witnesses, this Court must defer to the trial court which is in a superior position to judge the credibility of those witnesses. State v. Beach (1985), 217 Mont. 132, 151-52, 705 P.2d 94, 106.
¶ 18 Use of an involuntary confession against a criminal defendant violates the guarantee against self-incrimination as well as the right to due process of law....
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