State v. Holdorf
| Decision Date | 07 August 2014 |
| Docket Number | SC S060766).,CA A144719,(CC 09061153 |
| Citation | 355 Or. 812,333 P.3d 982 |
| Parties | STATE of Oregon, Petitioner on Review, v. John Leonard HOLDORF, Jr., Respondent on Review. |
| Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
On review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.*
Leigh A. Salmon, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for petitioner on review. With her on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Anna M. Joyce, Solicitor General.
Alice Newlin–Cushing, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review. With her on the brief was Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender, Office of Public Defense Services.
Defendant was convicted of possession of marijuana, ORS 475.864(3), and possession of methamphetamine, ORS 475.894, after police officers stopped him and discovered those controlled substances on him. The trial court concluded that the officer who stopped defendant had a reasonable suspicion that defendant was involved in criminal drug activity and denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence of the drugs. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the officer did not have a reasonable suspicion of drug activity. State v. Holdorf, 250 Or.App. 509, 280 P.3d 404 (2012).
We allowed review to determine whether, at the time of the stop, the officer had a reasonable suspicion that defendant was involved in criminal drug activity and, in particular, (1) whether the officer who stopped defendant could rely on factual information provided to him by other officers to establish “reasonable suspicion,” and (2) whether the officer's observation that defendant appeared to be under the influence of methamphetamine, based on the officer's training and experience, was sufficient to establish “reasonable suspicion” that defendant had committed the crime of possession of methamphetamine when considered under the totality of the circumstances. We answer those questions in the affirmative, reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
In reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress, we are bound by the trial court's findings of historical fact that are supported by evidence in the record. State v. Stevens, 311 Or. 119, 126, 806 P.2d 92 (1991). If the trial court “[does] not make findings on all pertinent historical facts and there is evidence from which those facts could be decided more than one way, we will presume that the trial court found facts in a manner consistent with its ultimate conclusion.” Id. at 127, 806 P.2d 92 (citing Ball v. Gladden, 250 Or. 485, 487, 443 P.2d 621 (1968)). On review, our role is to decide whether the trial court correctly applied the law to those historical facts. State v. Peller, 287 Or. 255, 260, 598 P.2d 684 (1979); see also State v. Ehly, 317 Or. 66, 80, 854 P.2d 421 (1993) ().
Albany Police Detective Davis was on duty when he observed a blue SUV occupied by Watts, who was driving, and defendant, a passenger. Davis recognized Watts, but he did not recognize defendant. Davis was familiar with Watts as a suspect through Davis's ongoing investigation of a local methamphetamine distribution ring. Davis also had received reports about Watts from Officer Fandrem, who had observed an occupant of the same SUV engage in an apparent drug deal two weeks earlier. On a separate occasion after that observation, Fandrem had attempted to stop Watts in the SUV, but Watts eluded capture after a highspeed chase. Davis also knew that Watts had been convicted of a felony and had an outstanding warrant for violating parole.
Davis put out a call to alert other officers in the area about Watts. Albany Police Officer Salang responded to that call. Davis gave Salang a description of the vehicle and told Salang that Watts was a criminal suspect in an ongoing drug investigation. Salang knew Watts from prior encounters and knew that Watts was a convicted felon with an outstanding warrant.
Shortly thereafter, Salang spotted Watts driving the SUV. Salang followed the SUV until he observed Watts commit a traffic infraction. He then activated his overhead lights and stopped the SUV. Salang called for backup before he approached the vehicle.
While Salang was talking to Watts, he observed that defendant “appear [ed] very nervous” and “very fidgety,” and was “making minimal eye contact” with him. To Salang, defendant appeared to be “tweaking,” meaning that he appeared to be under the influence of methamphetamine. Salang requested defendant's name and date of birth, which defendant provided.
Salang then ran warrant checks on Watts and defendant. Dispatch confirmed that Watts had a warrant for his arrest. Defendant, however, was “clear” of any warrant. Defendant asked if he could leave, and Salang told him that he could not leave at that time. At that point, Salang was still waiting for backup officers to arrive. After backup arrived, the officers removed Watts from the SUV and secured him in a patrol car.
Salang then returned to the SUV, where defendant was still seated in the passenger seat. At that time, Salang was preparing to perform an inventory of the vehicle for a nuisance tow. He asked defendant if there were any weapons or contraband in the vehicle. Defendant responded that there was a knife between the seat and the door. Defendant opened the passenger door and Salang saw the knife slide down between the seat and door jam. Defendant stepped out of the vehicle and Salang conducted a “pat down” search of defendant. He found a second knife and three small metal containers in defendant's pockets. Quantities of marijuana and methamphetamine were subsequently found inside the containers.
Defendant was arrested and charged with one count each of unlawful possession of marijuana, ORS 475.864(3), and unlawful possession of methamphetamine, ORS 475.894. Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the warrantless search and seizure of his person.1 At the hearing on defendant's motion, Detective Davis and Officer Salang testified. Davis testified to his training and experience investigating narcotic crimes, and explained the information that he gave to Salang about Watts. Salang testified that, during his law enforcement career, he had regular contact with people who possess or are under the influence of methamphetamine, and that he was familiar with common practices relating to the use of methamphetamine.
After considering the evidence, the trial court denied defendant's motion. The trial court concluded that Salang had a reasonable suspicion to stop defendant for suspected drug crimes and that Salang's safety concerns justified keeping defendant at the scene when he requested to leave. Defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea pursuant to ORS 135.335(3) and reserved his right to challenge on appeal the trial court's denial of his pretrial motion to suppress.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that the specific and articulable facts in this case did not support a reasonable suspicion that defendant was involved in criminal activity when he was stopped. It noted that the only fact cited by Salang that directly related to defendant, as opposed to the SUV or Watts, was defendant's nervous, fidgety demeanor. It reasoned that, even if those characteristics could, in some circumstances, be an indicator of present methamphetamine possession, defendant's demeanor, although consistent with methamphetamine use, could be caused by other non-incriminating factors. Holdorf, 250 Or.App. at 514, 280 P.3d 404. The court further concluded that defendant's seizure was not justified by officer safety concerns because all danger had dissipated by the time backup officers had arrived and Watts was arrested.2Id. at 515, 280 P.3d 404.
Defendant based his motion to suppress on ORS 131.615(1) and Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution.3 We therefore first examine the statute establishing the standard that police officers are required to follow when making an investigatory stop of a person. ORS 131.615(1) provides:
“A peace officer who reasonably suspects that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime may stop the person and, after informing the person that the peace officer is a peace officer, make a reasonable inquiry.”
An officer “reasonably suspects” criminal conduct when the officer
“holds a belief that is reasonable under the totality of the circumstances existing at the time and place the peace officer acts * * *.”
ORS 131.605(6).
As previously mentioned, this dispute is limited to whether Officer Salang reasonably suspected that defendant had committed or was about to commit a crime when he stopped defendant to investigate. Other provisions of the statutory framework relating to the permissible scope of the stop and frisk of persons, ORS 131.605 to 131.625, are not at issue in this case.
As this court has observed, ORS 131.615 was a legislative effort to codify state and federal case law permitting the temporary and limited restraint on liberty interests by police officers incident to investigatory stops. State v. Valdez, 277 Or. 621, 625, 561 P.2d 1006 (1977). Specifically, the legislation was intended as
“ ‘a codification of the peace officer's ability to stop a person as close to the Terry [ v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)] and [State v. Cloman, 254 Or. 1, 456 P.2d 67 (1969)] rationale as possible while giving the courts leeway to interpret the protean situations that arise and giving the officer limited “stopping” powers.’ ”
Valdez, 277 Or. at 625, 561 P.2d 1006 () (footnotes omitted). The codification contemplated
“ ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Miller
...a reasonable inference that the defendant has committed or is about to commit the crime that the officer suspects. State v. Holdorf , 355 Or. 812, 822-23, 333 P.3d 982 (2014). "Reasonable suspicion does not require that the facts as observed by the officer conclusively indicate illegal acti......
-
State v. Bonilla
...unreasonable—render the search unlawful under Article I, section 9.That principle was decisive, the state argues, in State v. Holdorf, 355 Or. 812, 333 P.3d 982 (2014), where this court held that, under Article I, section 9, a police officer lawfully could stop a person based on "reasonable......
-
State v. T. T. (In re T. T.)
...Although requiring less than probable cause, reasonable suspicion must be based on more than mere speculation. See State v. Holdorf , 355 Or. 812, 822-23, 333 P.3d 982 (2014) (articulating standard). That is, the state "need not prove that the articulated facts give rise to a conclusion wit......
-
State v. Bailey
...806 P.2d 92. On review, our role is to decide whether the court correctly applied the law to those historical facts. State v. Holdorf, 355 Or. 812, 814, 333 P.3d 982 (2014). The factual record in this case is largely uncontested for purposes of our review. We set out the pertinent facts as ......