State v. Holland, No. 25429.

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Idaho
• Writing for the Court: TROUT, Chief Justice.
• Citation: 135 Idaho 159,15 P.3d 1167
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Lerleyna L. HOLLAND, Defendant-Appellant.
• Docket Number: No. 25429.
• Decision Date: 29 December 2000

15 P.3d 1167
135 Idaho 159

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
Lerleyna L. HOLLAND, Defendant-Appellant

No. 25429.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, November 2000, Term.

December 29, 2000.

15 P.3d 1168

Ronaldo A. Coulter, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Sara B. Thomas argued

Hon. Alan G. Lance, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Deputy Attorney General Karen A. Hudelson argued.

TROUT, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from an order denying the appellant's, Lerleyna Holland's (Holland), motion to suppress evidence.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On August 28, 1998, Lerleyna Holland (Holland) was the passenger in a vehicle pulled over for having a cracked windshield in violation of I.C. § 49-943(1). Section 49-943(1) states, "[No] person shall drive any motor vehicle with any sign, poster, or other nontransparent material upon the front windshield ... which obstructs the driver's clear view of the highway or any intersecting highway." During the stop, Deputy Sherar ("Sherar") discovered the driver of the vehicle had an outstanding warrant for his arrest. Sherar removed the driver from the car, arrested him, and placed him in the back seat of the patrol car. Since the vehicle belonged to a relative of the driver, Sherar needed to impound the car.

Sherar returned to the vehicle and asked Holland to exit the car so it could be impounded. Sherar patted Holland down for weapons. Either while she was exiting the car, or shortly thereafter, Holland requested a leather jacket and a purse belonging to her which were still in the car. Sherar told Holland she could have the items, but he would first have to check them for weapons. Inside Holland's purse, Sherar found a pencil box. In the pencil box he found a silver dollar sized, red plastic container with a semi-transparent lid. Through the lid he could see a powdery substance he "recognized as possibly being methamphetamine." After removing the lid for a better look, he arrested Holland. Sherar asked her if there was anything else in the purse and Holland replied, "I think you've already found it." A further search of the bag turned up a glass pipe. A search of the car revealed another glass pipe on the seat where Holland had been sitting.

Later that night, Holland waived her rights and spoke with Sherar. She admitted the powder was methamphetamine, the pipes were hers, and that other items in the pencil box were for using methamphetamine.

Holland was charged with possession of methamphetamine. Prior to trial she filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the illegal search of her personal property. The only supporting documentation was a memorandum stating that (1) warrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless proven by the state to be within a warrant exception, (2) no exception was applicable and (3) the evidence should be suppressed.

A hearing on the Motion to Suppress was held on December 16, 1998. At the hearing on the motion, Holland's counsel attempted to rely completely on the State's burden of proving the validity of the search. He asked the court to take judicial notice of the lack of a warrant and then waited for the State to prove its case. Upon being pressed by the

15 P.3d 1169

judge to more clearly identify what the issues were, Holland's counsel noted it was their position that Holland had standing to require the State to justify her initial detention. The State then called Sherar as a witness. After Sherar's testimony the State rested. When the court asked Holland's counsel to present argument first, her counsel again insisted that since the State had the burden of proof, the State was to argue first. Upon the judge's demand that he present an issue or have the motion denied, Holland's counsel asked the court to consider whether the pat down was justified

The district judge, relying on State v. Newsom as decided by the Court of Appeals prior to this Court's review of the case, see State v. Newsom, 132 Idaho 698, 979 P.2d 100 (1998) cert. denied sub nom Idaho v. Newsom, 526 U.S. 1158, 119 S.Ct. 2048, 144 L.Ed.2d 215 (1999), denied the motion.

On December 21, 1998, the district judge issued his Order denying the Motion to Suppress, but noted that in light of this Court's decision on December 17, 1998, in Newsom, the parties might want to present additional argument. The parties presented additional arguments on January 9, 1999, and the district judge again denied the motion. Reserving the right to appeal the ruling on the suppression motion, Holland entered a conditional guilty plea to a charge of possession of methamphetamine. This appeal followed.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. We accept the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely review the application of constitutional principals to the facts as found. See State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct.App.1996).

III.

DISCUSSION

A. The Issue Of The Deputy's Justification For Stopping The Car Is Not Properly Before This Court.

On appeal, Holland contends her motion to suppress should have been granted because Sherar lacked probable cause¹...