State v. Holland
| Decision Date | 21 June 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 870410,870410 |
| Citation | 777 P.2d 1019 |
| Parties | STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. James Louis HOLLAND, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
David L. Wilkinson, Sandra L. Sjogren, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee.
Elliott Levine, Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant.
This is an automatic appeal from a conviction of capital homicide pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1)(h) (Supp.1988) and a sentence of death imposed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-206(1) (1978).
James Louis Holland met the victim, Sandy Patt, at a truck stop in Idaho, July 5 or 6, 1986. The victim offered the defendant a ride to Beaumont, Texas, if the defendant would share the driving. On leaving Ogden, Utah, the victim was driving and Holland was in the passenger seat. Near Echo Junction, Utah, on Interstate 84, Patt stopped the car and without explanation ordered the defendant out. It was cold and raining at the time. The defendant pulled a gun from his waistband, laid it across his lap, and directed Patt to continue driving. Patt grabbed for the gun with one hand while simultaneously scratching the defendant about the face with the other. While wrestling with Patt, the defendant shot five rounds. One round hit Patt in the head behind the right ear. The other shots were scattered about the automobile. Holland left the victim's body just off the shoulder of the road and drove on in the victim's automobile. About a year later, the defendant was apprehended in Florida. On the trip back to Utah, the defendant confessed in some detail to the shooting that resulted in Mr. Patt's death.
On September 1, 1987, the defendant pleaded guilty to a charge of first degree murder, and on September 17, 1987, the trial court held a sentencing hearing to determine whether the sentence should be life imprisonment or death.
The defendant waived a jury for the penalty phase, and the matter was heard by the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson. The evidence shows that the defendant has an extensive record of criminal activity, including a 1966 conviction for second degree murder in Iowa. In addition, the defendant shot and killed another person at the Juniper Truck Stop in Idaho.
Shortly before the penalty phase was to commence, the defendant consented to an interview with Dr. Michael D. DeCaria, a psychologist. On the day scheduled for the penalty hearing, Dr. DeCaria indicated that he needed more time to evaluate certain unspecified information that had recently come into his possession. Although the defendant initially agreed with Dr. DeCaria's and counsel's request for more time, and although the trial court was willing to grant a continuance, the defendant changed his mind, notwithstanding the efforts of his attorney to persuade him otherwise, and insisted that the penalty hearing proceed. After a forty-five-minute recess, during which the defendant and his counsel conferred about the matter, the defendant again insisted, on the record, that the penalty phase proceed. Dr. DeCaria then testified that the defendant was not competent to proceed with the penalty hearing because he was extremely depressed. At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge imposed the death penalty.
On this appeal, the defendant contends that (1) Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1)(h), that part of the capital homicide statute under which defendant was charged, violates the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy under both the Utah and the federal Constitution; (2) the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty in light of "uncontroverted evidence that there were doubts as to the defendant's competency to proceed with the penalty phase" and that he suffers from a psychological disorder; (3) the Utah death penalty statute is unconstitutional because it allows too much discretion in the sentencing authority; (4) failure of this Court to review the death sentence for proportionality results in an arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty; (5) the capital homicide statute is unconstitutional because the death penalty is imposed without a specification of the reasons relied on by the sentencing authority and hence there can be no effective and meaningful appellate review; and (6) the death penalty is unconstitutional because prosecutorial discretion in charging and trying capital cases results in arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty.
The State has declined to file a brief that is responsive to the brief filed by the defendant's counsel on the ground that the defendant has expressed his desire not to appeal his death sentence. According to the State, this Court should only review the record for manifest, prejudicial error, see State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551-53 (Utah 1987), and therefore the State need not respond to the defendant's points on appeal. To quote the State's brief:
The more appropriate approach would be to conduct a hearing in which this Court could determine whether defendant's attempts to waive his right to an appeal are knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.... The fact that the automatic review statute exists, does not preclude a defendant from waiving his right to submit briefs to the Court raising issues he has no desire to raise.
The State takes its position even though the governing statute, § 77-35-26(10) (Supp.1988), provides that "[i]n capital cases where the sentence of death has been imposed, and the defendant has chosen not to pursue his own appeal, the case shall be automatically reviewed by the Supreme Court...." Thus, our duty to review the case, at least for plain error, is clear even when the defendant fails to file a brief. In this case, we specifically ordered defense counsel to file a brief to assist this Court in discharging its responsibility, yet the State has declined to respond to defense counsel's brief because, as the State's brief declares, "the order is contrary to defendant's wishes...."
The Attorney General's office has institutional and professional obligations in criminal cases, irrespective of what the defendant does. That office has a special responsibility in criminal cases to ensure that justice is done, and that is especially the case when the defendant defaults in presenting his case. The comment to Rule 3.8 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct states: "A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate." The automatic appeal statute was designed to serve institutional ends of great importance. First, the State should always be concerned about the legal effect of a defendant's waiver of further judicial proceedings when a death sentence has been imposed. No matter how much a defendant may wish to be put to death, it is not the duty, and certainly not the right, of the State to effectuate that wish. The State does not have the authority to execute a person unless that person merits that sanction under the applicable provisions of the criminal law.
We are aware that a sane defendant may, at one point or another in the judicial process, wish to waive further judicial protections, and that appears to be so in this case; however, we intimate no conclusion on the point. Nevertheless, the integrity of the law as an institution must be sustained, notwithstanding the desire of an individual defendant. While Utah law does not compel a defendant sentenced to death to go through every procedure that a defendant might voluntarily invoke, the law does require one automatic appeal even when "the defendant has chosen not to pursue his own appeal...." § 77-35-26(10) (Supp.1988). Imposition of a death sentence is carried out in the name of the people of the state of Utah through their duly authorized governmental institutions, and they are authorized to act only in conformity with the law of the land. Execution of a criminal defendant may not occur, therefore, until this Court determines at least that the sentence is in accord with lawful process. In making that determination, the assistance of the Attorney General's office is appropriate and necessary.
Defense counsel asserts that the statute under which Holland was charged and pleaded guilty violates his constitutional guarantees against double jeopardy. 1 Holland was charged with and pleaded guilty to one count of murder in the first degree under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1)(h) (Supp.1988), which states:
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the first degree if the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another under any of the following circumstances:
(h) The actor was previously convicted of first or second degree murder or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to a person. For the purpose of this paragraph an offense committed in another jurisdiction, which if committed in Utah would be punishable as first or second degree murder, is deemed first or second degree murder.
Holland was previously convicted of second degree homicide in Iowa and sentenced in October, 1964, to a term of imprisonment in the Iowa state penitentiary. 2 Holland contends that by elevating what otherwise would be a second degree homicide to a capital offense see State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 259 (Utah 1988) solely because of the previous offense in Iowa, the statutory provision imposes a second punishment for the Iowa crime.
In our two previous cases dealing with this subsection, we have not had to address this constitutional contention. State v. Gardner, 101 Utah Adv.Rep. 3, (January 31, 1989) (rehearing pending); State v. James, 767 P.2d 549 (Utah 1989). Before addressing the issue, we make one observation--that ordinarily a plea of guilty constitutes a waiver of procedural irregularities. However, a plea of guilty does not by itself constitute a waiver of a double jeopardy claim. See Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 96 S.Ct....
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Gardner
...it comports with the procedural requirements of Furman. See, e.g., State v. Carter, 888 P.2d 629, 657-58 (Utah 1995); State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 1019, 1024-25 (Utah 1989); Pierre, 572 P.2d at 1348. All capital offenses in Utah, including aggravated assault by a prisoner, are subject to sect......
-
State v. Carter, 920110
...and guidelines to channel the sentencing authority's exercise of discretion and to avoid capricious death penalties." State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 1019, 1025 (Utah 1989). We add another guideline today and hold that victim impact evidence is inadmissible under subsection 76-3-207(2) of the Ut......
-
State v. Wood
...a proper result, notwithstanding strongly held views or beliefs pertaining to the death penalty. As we made clear in State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 1019, 1026-27 (Utah 1989), weighing mitigating and aggravating circumstances is only part of the analysis that a juror must make. It is not enough ......
-
State v. Young
...it is a judgment that, like a credibility determination, belongs uniquely to the trier of fact. As we explained in State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1989), capital sentencing factors "are not, in truth, weighable.... These factors have largely subjective value and therefore vary in thei......
-
Choosing a "primacy" approach: Chief Justice Christine M. Durham advocating states rights in our federalist system.
...was unfounded in light of statutory changes made subsequent to the sentencing that would have negated the sentence); State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 1019, 1028 (Utah 1989) (finding the state death penalty statute constitutional but vacating the death sentence in the case because the sentence was......