State v. Holliday

• Decision Date: 11 August 1971
• Docket Number: Nos. 1062-M,s. 1062-M
• Citation: 109 R.I. 93,280 A.2d 333
• Parties: STATE v. Frederick HOLLIDAY et al. STATE v. Angelo MARINOSCI. P., 1148-M.P.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 333

280 A.2d 333

109 R.I. 93

STATE v. Frederick HOLLIDAY et al.

STATE v. Angelo MARINOSCI.

Nos. 1062-M.P., 1148-M.P.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Aug. 11, 1971.

Richard J. Israel, Atty. Gen., Donald P. Ryan, Asst. Atty. Gen., for plaintiff.

Cary J. Coen, Rhode Island Legal Services, Inc., Providence, Stanley A. Bass, New York City, for Frederick Holliday and Shirlee Rich.

Adler, Pollock & Sheehan, Peter Lawson Kennedy, Providence, for Angelo Marinosci.

Salvatore L. Virgadamo, Peter O. Grimes, Newport, Ira L. Schreiber, Milton Stanzler, Henry M. Swan, Anthony Grilli, Jr., William P. Thornton, Jr., Providence, amici curiae.

OPINION

ROBERTS, Chief Justice.

We have before us for review certain decisions of the District Court denying motions made by four defendants charged with various misdemeanors for the appointment of counsel to represent them as indigents in the District Court trials and motions for trial by jury in that court.

In the first case, Frederick Holliday was charged with operating a motor vehicle on a public highway on June 4, 1969, while under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of G.L.1956 (1968 Reenactment) § 31-27-2. Holliday was arraigned on June 5, 1969, and pleaded not guilty. In the second case, Shirlee Rich was charged with carring a concealed weapon, to wit, a knife in violation of § 11-47-2 (1969 Reenactment). Rich was arraigned on October 30, 1969, and pleaded not guilty.

In the third case, Pasco A. Corsi was charged with operating a motor vehicle on February 13, 1970, after his license to operate a motor vehicle had been suspended in violation of § 31-11-18. He was arraigned on February 20, 1970, and pleaded not guilty. In the fourth case, Angelo Marinosci was charged with operating an automobile at a highway intersection in the city of Warwick and entering that intersection when the signal light was set red against him in violation of § 31-13-6(c)(1). He was arraigned on July 14, 1970, and pleaded not guilty.

Thereafter, Holliday, Rich, and Corsi moved that the court, because of their indigence, appoint counsel to represent them at the trial in the District Court and to grant each of the three a trial by jury in the District Court. The court found each of the defendants to be an indigent but denied each of the motions and ordered them to appear for a trial on a subsequent date with or without counsel. Subsequently, all three sought a review of the decisions of the District Court in this court, and on July 23, 1970, we issued certiorari in each case.

Marionsci filed only a motion for a jury trial in the District Court, and this motion was denied. Thereafter, Marinosci sought a review of the decision of the District Court denying his motion for a trial by jury, and on September 3, 1970, we granted certiorari and ordered all four cases to be consolidated for hearing before this court. In each of these cases the offense charged is a misdemeanor, and upon conviction therefor each of the defendants could be subject to the imposition of the penalty of imprisonment for not more than one year or a fine of not more than $500 or both. This, in our opinion, distinguishes these offenses from petty offenses, a matter to which we will refer later in this opinion.

RIGHT TO COUNSEL

We shall consider first whether the denial by the District Court of the Holliday, Rich, and Corsi motions for the assistance of court-appointed counsel as indigents charged with a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment not in excess of one year was in violation of their constitutional rights under the sixth amendment to the Constitution of the United States and article I, sec. 10, of the constitution of Rhode Island. Basically, at least, defendants are arguing that the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment require that court-appointed counsel be furnished to assist an indigent defendant in any criminal prosecution that would result in a loss of liberty.

A leading case propounding the view that one accused of a criminal offense must under the sixth amendment be provided with counsel by the state if indigent is Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799. There the defendant, Gideon, had been charged with the commission of a felony and had requested that the court appoint counsel to assist him at his trial, he being unable to pay for such legal service. The trial court refused to appoint counsel, holding that under a local statute that right was afforded only to those charged with capital crimes. The Supreme Court overruled the trial court, holding that the sixth amendment guarantee to the assistance of counsel is a fundamental right and is essential to a fair trial under the due process requirements of the fourteenth amendment.

It is beyond question that Gideon made applicable to the states, by way of the fourteenth amendment, the sixth amendment right to the assistance of counsel in felony cases and that, where the defendant was indigent, the assistance of counsel must be furnished by the court. This decision makes it clear that the states are bound by the provisions of the sixth amendment to the Constitution of the United States as construed in Gideon and must thereunder provide counsel for indigent defendants who are charged with the commission of a felony.

We are of the opinion, and defendants appear to concede in their brief, that a state indigent misdemeanant's right to counsel provided by the state has not as yet received explicit constitutional recognition by the United States Supreme Court. We are confronted, then, with a situation in which misdemeanants charged with serious misdemeanors are seeking the appointment by the court of counsel to assist them in their defense against such prosecution. We reiterate that there has been no express requirement by the United States Supreme Court making applicable the assistance of counsel provisions of the sixth amendment to the states where prosecutions for misdemeanors are involved. The precise question before us, then, is whether the provisions of sec. 10 of art. I of the constitution of this state guarantee an indigent misdemeanant the assistance of state-appointed counsel in his defense against such a charge.

The pertinent provisions of the sixth amendment provide that 'In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public * * * and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.' In art. I, sec. 10, of the state constitution the language is practically identical, reading: 'In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial * * * to have the assistance of counsel in his defense, and shall be at liberty to speak for himself * * *.'

We do not perceive that the requirements of the constitutional provisions set out in the sixth amendment are any more rigorous than those set out in the constitution of this state or that our constitutional provision does not require us to provide the assistance of court-appointed counsel in the case of indigents charged with the commission of a felony. The mandate of art. I, Sec. 10, is as clear and imperative as is the mandate of the sixth amendment. Section 10 has clearly required all that is set out in Gideon as being required by the sixth amendment, and we now extend the guarantee of art. I, sec. 10, to indigent misdemeanants. They are entitled, in our opinion, to court-appointed counsel in such cases unless it is expressly and intelligently waived. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466.

In so doing, it is sufficient for us to say that we agree fully with and accept the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Gideon. There the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Black, pointed out that reason requires a recognition that in our adversary system of criminal justice any person who is brought into court to be tried on a criminal charge who is too poor to hire a lawyer cannot be assured of a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. Mr. Justice Black said, 372 U.S. at 344, 83 S.Ct. at 796, 9 L.Ed.2d at 805: 'The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours. From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before the law. This noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him.' There is, in our opinion, no sound reason why this view should not be applied to indigents charged with serious misdemeanors as well as those charged with felonies.

Both state and federal courts in many cases have stated in lucid terms sound reasons for an extension of the principle set forth in Gideon to require providing the assistance of counsel by the state to cases involving indigent misdemeanants. See Newell v. State (Me.), 277 A.2d 731. This court can add little to the persuasive force of the statements of these courts, and we freely state our agreement with the principle. We will not extend this opinion unnecessarily by quoting at length from these many sound and well-reasoned opinions.

We want to emphasize, however, that we are not here deciding to extend the guarantee of sec. 10 of art. I to indigents charged with the commission of petty offenses. For the purposes of clarity we consider a petty offense to be one in which the accused could not be subject to the imposition of a penalty in excess of six months' imprisonment. In Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69, 90 S.Ct. 1886, 1888, 26 L.Ed.2d 437, 440, the Court, in considering the right of petty offenders to be afforded a trial by jury, said: '* * * we have concluded that no offense can be deemed 'petty' for purposes of the right to trial by jury ...