State v. Holliday

Decision Date05 February 1970
Citation268 A.2d 368,159 Conn. 169
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE of Connecticut v. Arthur HOLLIDAY. STATE of Connecticut v. Albert C. DANIELS.

Joel M. Ellis, Closter, with whom was Nathan Aaron, Hartford, for appellants (defendants) in each case.

George D. Stoughton, Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, was John D. LaBelle, State's Atty., for appellee (state) in each case.

Before KING, C.J., and ALCORN, HOUSE, THIM and RYAN, JJ.

HOUSE, Associate Justice.

The defendant Arthur Holliday was charged with assaulting Ira Cumby with intent to commit murder in violation of General Statutes § 53-12. The defendant Albert C. Daniels was charged as an accessory to that crime in violation of §§ 53-12 and 54-196. They were tried jointly before a jury. Holliday was found guilty of assault with intent to kill, and Daniels was found guilty of being an accessory to that crime. In each case a motion to set aside the verdict was denied, and, the sole issue on appeal being the same in each case, the court, on stipulation by both defendants, ordered a joint appeal.

At the trial Cumby testified that on August 13, 1967, he was with the two defendants in the apartment of Sandra Crouch and that, as he prepared to leave the apartment after a quarrel, Daniels gave to Holliday a .45-caliber pistol which Holliday fired at Cumby, the bullet creasing his forehead. Thereafter the jury were excused while the court held a preliminary hearing on whether to admit the details of a subsequent assault upon Cumby. On the ground that the evidence, if believed, disclosed conduct on the part of the defendants indicating a consciousness of guilt, the court ruled that evidence of this second assault was admissible despite the protests of the defendants. The defendants claimed that the risk of undue prejudice from admission of this 'other crime' evidence outweighed its probative value in proving their guilt of the specific crimes charged, that it would inflame the jury, and that counsel was unprepared to defend his clients with respect to this second episode. The correctness of this evidential ruling is the sole issue on this appeal, in which the defendants contend that the ruling was reversible error, in violation of the defendants' 'constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation' and served to 'deprive them of their liberty without due process of law.'

This evidence which he court admitted for the consideration of the jury may be briefly summarized. Cumby testified that in April, 1968, shortly before the trial was scheduled to commence, two men whom he had seen moments earlier riding with the two defendants in Daniels' car threw the liquid contents of a cup at his face just after he emerged from an outside telephone booth, that a policeman took him to the hospital, and that the liquid burned him, leaving scars on the left side of his face and head. Another witness, Melvin L. Franklin, testified that in April, 1968, Holliday and Daniels had walked up to him and asked if he had seen Cumby, that they told him not to tell Cumby that they were looking for him, that he saw Cumby and told him anyway, and that he saw Cumby a day and a half later and noticed that there was gauze and a scar on the left side of his face.

' As a general rule, evidence of guilt of other crimes is inadmissible to prove that a defendant is guilty of the crime charged against him. State v. Harris, 147 Conn. 589, 599, 164 A.2d 399, 83 A.L.R.2d 783.' State v. Fredericks, 149 Conn. 121, 124, 176 A.2d 581, 582. The reason for the rule is that in the setting of a jury trial the danger of prejudice from evidence that the accused is a person of bad character and thus more likely to have committed the crime charged is deemed to outweigh the probative value of such evidence and may have no direct tendency to prove the crime charged. State v. Gilligan, 92 Conn. 526, 103 A. 649; McCormick, Evidence § 157, pp. 326-27. However, '(t) hat evidence tends to prove the commission of other crimes by the accused does not render it inadmissible if it is otherwise relevant and material.' State v. Simborski, 120 Conn. 624, 631, 182 A. 221, 224; State v. Palko, 122 Conn. 529, 536, 191 A. 320, 113 A.L.R. 628, aff'd, 302 U.S. 319, 58 S.Ct. 149, 82 L.Ed. 288; State v. Harris, supra, 147 Conn. 600, 164 A.2d 399, 83 A.L.R.2d 783; see also State v. Jenkins, 158 Conn. 149, 157, 256 A.2d 223. 'Indeed, it has been said that there are so many exceptions to the rule that it is difficult to determine which is more extensive-the rule or its acknowledged exceptions.' 29 Am.Jur.2d 369, Evidence, § 321.

One of the generally acknowledged exceptions is evidence of criminal acts constituting admissions by conduct which are intended to obstruct justice or avoid punishment for the crime presently charged. McCormick, op. cit. § 157, pp. 327-28, 330. 'As might be expected, wrongdoing by the party in connection with his case, amounting to an obstruction of justice may likewise be proven against him as an admission by conduct. By resorting to wrongful devices he gives ground for believing that he thinks his case is weak and not to be won by fair means. Accordingly, a party's * * * undue pressure, by bribery or intimidation or other means, to influence a witness to testify for him or to avoid...

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  • State v. Moynahan
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Connecticut
    • April 5, 1973
    ...an accused. United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076, 1081 (9th Cir.); Harrell v. United States, 220 F.2d 516 (5th Cir.); State v. Holliday, 159 Conn. 169, 268 A.2d 398; State v. Leopold, 110 Conn. 55, 66-67, 147 A. 118; In re Durant, 80 Conn. 140, 151, 67 A. 497; State v. Caliendo, 136 Me.......
  • State v. Nardini
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Connecticut
    • July 13, 1982
    ...of the defendant to outweigh its prejudicial tendency. State v. Brown, 169 Conn. 692, 701, 364 A.2d 186 (1975); State v. Holliday, 159 Conn. 169, 173, 268 A.2d 368 (1970). The defendant appears to recognize that the testimony of his attempts to induce others to start fires at the George Str......
  • State v. Moye
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    • Supreme Court of Connecticut
    • October 9, 1979
    ...of other crimes by the accused does not render it inadmissible if it is otherwise relevant and material. See State v. Holliday, 159 Conn. 169, 172, 268 A.2d 368. . . . See State v. Harris, 159 Conn. 521, 531, 271 A.2d 74. It is enough to say that the trial judge is the arbiter of the many c......
  • State v. Ouellette
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Connecticut
    • May 10, 1983
    ...... State v. Gilligan, 92 Conn. 526, 530, 103 A. 649 [1918]. "As a general rule, evidence of guilt of other crimes is inadmissible to prove that a . Page 1011 . defendant is guilty of the crime charged against him." State v. Holliday, 159 Conn. 169, 172, 268 A.2d 368 [1970], quoting from State v. Harris, 147 Conn. 589, 599, 164 A.2d 399 [1960]. Such evidence is admissible for a variety of other purposes, however, such as "when it is particularly probative in showing such things as intent, an element in the crime, identity, ......
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