State v. Hollingsworth
| Decision Date | 15 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 46156,Docket No. 46836 |
| Parties | STATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. BRET DAVE HOLLINGSWORTH, Defendant-Appellant. BRET DAVE HOLLINGSWORTH, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE OF IDAHO, Respondent. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk
THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION AND SHALL NOT BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Michael J. Reardon, District Judge.
Judgment of conviction and sentence for aggravated battery, affirmed; order denying motion to withdraw guilty plea, affirmed; and judgment dismissing petition for post-conviction relief, affirmed.
John C. Lynn, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kale D. Gans, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
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Bret Dave Hollingsworth appeals from the trial court's judgment of conviction and sentence for aggravated battery and order denying motion to withdraw guilty plea, and from the district court's1 judgment dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
This appeal is the result of consolidated cases involving a direct appeal and the dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief. In 2016, the State charged Hollingsworth with aggravated battery with the use of a deadly weapon. Idaho Code §§ 18-907(a), 19-2520. Per counsel's advice, Hollingsworth waived his preliminary hearing and pled not guilty. Eventually, Hollingsworth agreed to plead guilty if the State would dismiss the deadly weapon enhancement. The agreement additionally noted the State would recommend a unified term of fifteen years with seven years determinate and Hollingsworth would be able to argue for less. Hollingsworth executed a guilty plea advisory form. During the plea colloquy with the trial court, Hollingsworth stated: "I believe I stabbed [the victim], Your Honor, and it was an unlawful act." The trial court sentenced Hollingsworth to a unified term of fifteen years with seven years determinate. No appeal was filed from this judgment.
A year later, Hollingsworth filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming his guilty plea was improperly accepted by the trial court and that it was not made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. He claimed he was not competent to waive his rights and enter a plea and that the district court improperly accepted his plea for a variety of reasons. Hollingsworth further alleged his trial counsel was ineffective for, among other things,2 failing to file an appeal and instructing him to waive his right to a preliminary hearing. The State moved for summary dismissal of all of Hollingsworth's claims except the claim regarding trial counsel's failure to file an appeal. On the appeal claim, the State asked the district court to grant relief.
Following a hearing on the State's summary dismissal motion, the district court entered an order which granted the State's motion in part and denied it in part. Specifically, the district court concluded Hollingsworth's plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary and was properlyaccepted by the trial court. With respect to the claims regarding ineffective assistance of counsel, the district court dismissed the claims, except the district court concluded the claim regarding counsel's advice to waive the preliminary hearing was a potential shortcoming requiring an evidentiary hearing. In addition, because the State agreed with Hollingsworth's claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to file an appeal, the district court stated it would refile Hollingsworth's judgment of conviction in the underlying criminal matter so Hollingsworth could file an appeal. The judgment was refiled in 2018 and shortly after Hollingsworth filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and reconsider his sentence. The trial court denied Hollingsworth's motion to withdraw his guilty plea and his motion to reconsider his sentence.
Hollingsworth then moved the district court to reconsider its prior order partially granting the State's motion for summary dismissal. The State filed another motion for summary dismissal. The district court denied both motions, stating Hollingsworth's declarations were sufficient to withstand a motion for summary dismissal and proceed to an evidentiary hearing on the remaining claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for waiving the preliminary hearing. Following a deposition of Hollingsworth's trial counsel, where she explained her reasoning for advising Hollingsworth to waive his preliminary hearing, the parties both filed motions for summary dismissal. The State asserted trial counsel's performance was not deficient and even if it was, Hollingsworth failed to establish he was prejudiced by that performance. Hollingsworth argued there was no reasonable strategy or tactic employed by his trial counsel that could explain her recommendation to waive the preliminary hearing. The district court granted the State's motion, holding the deposition demonstrated that trial counsel's tactics and strategy were reasonable.
The district court subsequently issued a judgment granting Hollingsworth relief on the claim that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to file a direct appeal, but denying relief on the other claims in the petition. Hollingsworth timely appeals.
Hollingsworth raises five issues in this consolidated appeal: (1) the trial court erred in accepting his guilty plea; (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea under Idaho Criminal Rule 33 and his claims for relief under I.C.R. 35; (3) the district court erred by summarily dismissing several of his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel; (4) the district court erred by denying his motion for reconsideration by declining to apply the doctrine ofcumulative error, and; (5) the district court erred by denying his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for waiving the preliminary hearing. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
Hollingsworth argues that the trial court abused its discretion by accepting his guilty plea. Specifically, Hollingsworth contends that because the trial court failed to advise him of the elements of the charge, including the elements of self-defense, and did not establish a factual basis for the charge, his plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The determination that a plea is entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily involves a three-part inquiry: (1) whether the defendant's plea was voluntary in the sense that he or she understood the nature of the charges and was not coerced; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived the right to a jury trial, to confront his or her accusers, and to refrain from self-incrimination; and (3) whether the defendant understood the consequences of pleading guilty. State v. Umphenour, 160 Idaho 503, 507, 376 P.3d 707, 711, (2016). On appeal, the voluntariness of the guilty plea must be reasonably inferred from the record as a whole. When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the lower court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of such discretion; (3) acted consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018).
In this case, the trial court engaged in numerous inquiries to ensure Hollingsworth understood his guilty plea. First, during the entry of plea hearing, the trial court confirmed Hollingsworth had read and understood the questions in the guilty plea advisory form and that the answers therein were true. Hollingsworth answered "yes" to the questions including: "Do you understand that by pleading guilty you waive or give up any defenses, both factual and legal, that you believe you may have in this case?"; "Do you understand that when you plead guilty, you are admitting the truth of each and every allegation contained in the charge(s) to which you plead guilty?"; do you understand "no one, including your attorney, can force you to plead guilty"; you are "pleading guilty freely and voluntarily"; and you are pleading guilty because you "committed the acts alleged in the information or indictment." Hollingsworth affirmed, under penalty of perjury, that the foregoing was correct.
Next, the trial court engaged in a colloquy with Hollingsworth to ensure that his guilty plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Hollingsworth affirmed that he wanted to plead guilty. Hollingsworth acknowledged that he had no questions regarding the plea advisory form. He also stated that he did not answer a question on the form that he did not understand. When asked what he understood the plea agreement to mean, Hollingsworth answered, "As it states there, admitting to an unlawful crime." Hollingsworth further assured the trial court that he had time to speak with his attorney, did not need more time to consider the decision, his attorney had sufficiently answered his questions, the decision to plead guilty was his alone, and his decision was voluntary.
Following Hollingsworth's affirmations, the trial court read the charging language and asked Hollingsworth how he wanted to plead to the charge, to which he responded, "Guilty, Your Honor." The trial court then gave Hollingsworth the opportunity to recite his version of the facts. At one point during the account, the following discussion took place:
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