State v. Holm
Decision Date | 10 August 2017 |
Docket Number | No. 20150623-CA.,20150623-CA. |
Citation | 402 P.3d 193 |
Parties | STATE of Utah, Appellee, v. Carl John HOLM, Appellant. |
Court | Utah Court of Appeals |
Richard G. Sorenson, Salt Lake City, Attorney for Appellant.
Simarjit S. Gill and Peter D. Leavitt, Attorneys for Appellee.
1
Opinion
¶ 1 During his early morning commute Carl John Holm drove through a red traffic light and collided with an oncoming vehicle, fatally injuring the vehicle's passenger (Victim). Following a jury trial Holm was convicted of negligent homicide. On appeal Holm asserts that, during voir dire, the trial court should have permitted follow-up questioning of jurors who indicated they or someone close to them had been involved in a serious car accident. We conclude that the trial court exceeded its discretion by precluding such questioning, and we therefore reverse Holm's conviction and remand for a new trial.
¶ 2 Holm was driving to work early one morning when he approached an intersection connecting Bangerter Highway with State Route 201. Holm failed to stop at a red traffic light, drove into oncoming traffic, and collided with a passing vehicle. Victim, who was a passenger in the vehicle, died at the scene. Holm was charged with negligent homicide, a class A misdemeanor. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-206 (LexisNexis 2012). He pleaded not guilty and elected to have the charge tried by a jury.
¶ 3 During voir dire, the trial judge asked the pool of approximately thirty jurors to indicate if they personally "ha[d] ever been involved in a serious car accident." About one-third responded affirmatively. Holm's counsel then requested that the trial court "ask [the jurors] if anyone close to [them] ha [d] been involved in a serious car accident." The court responded with the concern that "everybody" would answer affirmatively, and the prosecution suggested limiting individual questioning to those prospective jurors who felt the "experience [would] affect [their] ability to be fair and impartial." The court agreed to do so, although Holm's counsel reiterated that he "would like to talk to everybody."
¶ 4 The trial court then asked the jurors whether anyone close to them had been involved in a serious car accident. Again, about one-third responded affirmatively. The court then asked, "Those of you [who] have been or know somebody close to you [who] has been in a car accident, is there anything about that experience that makes you feel like you might be biased for one side or the other?" Four persons indicated they might feel such bias.
¶ 5 The court then began questioning jurors individually, primarily those who had indicated potential bias based on personal experience or the experience of someone close to them. Holm's counsel reiterated that he "would like to talk with every single person ... [who had been] involved in a serious car accident or [whose] close friend was involved in a serious car accident[,] just to know the circumstances." The court stated that such questioning would involve "every single person" in the jury pool and noted that those who had indicated potential bias were being pulled in for questioning. Holm's counsel responded, "I would like to talk to them, but I understand the [c]ourt's ruling." The trial court later stated, Holm's counsel replied, "[F]or the record, the Defense would like to talk to them."
¶ 6 Of the four jurors who indicated potential bias, two were struck for cause, one was excluded via Holm's peremptory challenge, and the last was sufficiently deep in the jury pool that individual questioning was unnecessary. But a majority of the jurors selected for Holm's trial had indicated personal involvement or the involvement of someone close to them in a serious car accident. Because those jurors had not affirmatively disclosed potential bias, none was individually questioned on that subject.
¶ 7 The jury found Holm guilty of negligent homicide, and he was sentenced to a one-year term of imprisonment. He appeals.
¶ 8 Holm contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying him "the opportunity to conduct individual voir dire on potential jurors who indicated they or a close friend had been involved in a serious car accident." "We review a judge's decision imposing limits on voir dire questioning for an abuse of discretion." State v. Reece , 2015 UT 45, ¶ 16, 349 P.3d 712.2
¶ 9 Holm asserts the trial court exceeded its discretion by declining his "request to speak to each juror individually who indicated they or someone close to them had been involved in a serious car accident." He contends "[r]easonable and detailed inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the jurors' ... experience with serious car accidents was necessary and imperative where it may have revealed a bias against someone who causes a car accident" and "would ... have given [him] more information when exercising his right to peremptory challenges."
¶ 10 The purpose of voir dire is to detect actual bias and to facilitate the informed exercise of peremptory challenges. Reece , 2015 UT 45, ¶ 45, 349 P.3d 712. In achieving that objective, trial courts generally "should be permissive in allowing voir dire questions and should exercise their discretion in favor of allowing counsel to elicit information from prospective jurors." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
¶ 11 A trial court's discretion in limiting voir dire varies with the subject area and its connection to the proceeding. See State v. Saunders , 1999 UT 59, ¶ 43, 992 P.2d 951. "[T]rial courts have no obligation to permit every question that might disclose some basis for counsel to favor or disfavor seating a particular juror," Reece , 2015 UT 45, ¶ 45, 349 P.3d 712 (emphasis, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted), and they have broad discretion when declining inquiries that "unduly intrude [ ] into the jurors' private lives," id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), or "have no apparent link to any potential bias," Saunders , 1999 UT 59, ¶ 43, 992 P.2d 951.
¶ 12 But as proposed questions draw closer to probing potential bias, the court's discretion narrows, and when requested Id. ; see also State v. Boyatt , 854 P.2d 550, 552 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (). While a trial court need not ask every question requested on a given topic nor ask proposed questions in a particular manner, a trial court must, "considering the totality of the questioning," afford counsel "an adequate opportunity to gain the information necessary to evaluate the jurors." Reece , 2015 UT 45, ¶ 45, 349 P.3d 712 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
¶ 13 Here, the case centered on whether Holm was criminally liable for causing a fatal car collision. Holm sought to ask follow-up questions of jurors who indicated they had personally experienced a serious car accident or were close to someone who had—an inquiry relevant to uncovering actual bias, which also would have probed potential bias and would likely have generated data essential to counsel's informed exercise of peremptory challenges. In this context, the jurors' responses raised sufficient questions regarding potential bias to require the trial court to permit further questioning along the lines Holm requested.3 See, e.g. , State v. King , 2008 UT 54, ¶¶ 8, 19, 190 P.3d 1283 ( ); State v. King , 2006 UT 3, ¶¶ 6, 24, 131 P.3d 202 ( ).
¶ 14 The trial court, however, merely inquired whether "anything about that experience" would lead the juror to "feel like [he or she] might be biased for one side or the other." None of the four persons who responded affirmatively served as a juror for Holm's trial. But a majority of the jurors ultimately seated had indicated personal involvement, or the involvement of someone close to them, in a serious car accident; none had been questioned in that regard; and despite Holm's request, no other questions were asked to elicit additional details in that respect.
¶ 15 "Ruling that a prospective juror is qualified to sit simply because he says he will be fair ignores the common-sense psychological and legal reality" that jurors may not independently recognize their biases and also know little about the case and thus "cannot anticipate how [they] will react when asked to decide a case once all the facts are known." State v. Saunders , 1999 UT 59, ¶ 35, 992 P.2d 951. Indeed, the State v. Ball , 685 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah 1984).
¶ 16 Thus, a juror's statement professing ability to fairly apply the law as "given by the trial court is not a sufficient basis for qualifying a juror to sit when the prospective juror's answers provide evidence of possible bias and the trial court does not allow further...
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