State v. Holt, 132

Decision Date29 August 2012
Docket NumberSept. Term, 2012.,No. 132,132
Citation206 Md.App. 539,51 A.3d 1
PartiesSTATE of Maryland v. Jamar HOLT a/k/a Jamal Holt.
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Carrie J. Williams & Thiruvendran Vignarajah (Douglas F. Gansler, Atty. Gen., on the brief) Baltimore, MD, for appellant.

Kenneth W. Ravenell (Milin Chun, Murphy & Falcon, PA, on the brief) Baltimore, MD, for appellee.

Panel: KRAUSER, C.J., WRIGHT, JAMES R. EYLER (Retired, specially assigned), JJ.

JAMES R. EYLER (Retired, specially assigned), J.

On January 13, 2012, Jamar Holt, appellee, was charged with assault, firearms violations, and drug conspiracy charges. Appellee filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the investigatory stop leading to these charges. After a hearing on March 2 and 5, 2012, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City granted in part and denied in part appellee's motion to suppress. The State filed a motion for reconsideration, which the circuit court denied on March 5, 2012. The State filed an interlocutory appeal that same day. On April 4, 2012, the circuit court filed a written order denying the motion for reconsideration. For the reasons set forth below, we shall reverse the circuit court's decision and remand for further proceedings.

Factual and Procedural Background

The charges in this case stem from an investigatory stop of appellee's vehicle on July 13, 2011. The stop was the result of an ongoing investigation of suspected drug dealer Daniel Blue. The following facts were related by Detectives Joseph Crystal and James McShane, members of the Violent Crime Impact Section of the Baltimore City Police Department, in written statements admitted into evidence and in testimony at the suppression hearing.

On June 29, 2011, Mr. Blue, who was “known [by law enforcement] for distributing raw heroin within Baltimore City,” delivered 50 grams of raw heroin to Keith Townsend on a street corner in East Baltimore. The entire transaction was captured on a City Watch, or Blue Light, camera. Police saw Mr. Blue scanning his surroundings as he “exited the vehicle, as he approached Mr. Townsend, while he spoke to Mr. Townsend, [and] when he left Mr. Townsend.” Mr. Blue then promptly returned to his vehicle and drove out of the area. Mr. Townsend was arrested as he walked away from the street corner, and the arrest team retrieved a plastic bag from Townsend's pocket that contained a piece of bread with 50 grams of raw heroin inside. Mr. Blue was not arrested that day.

On July 13, 2011, Detectives Crystal and McShane conducted surveillance of Mr. Blue when he appeared at the North Avenue courthouse. Prior to arriving at the courthouse, both detectives reviewed the video of the June 29th interaction between Mr. Blue and Mr. Townsend in order to familiarize themselves with Mr. Blue's mannerisms and actions. At the courthouse, Detective Crystal noted that Mr. Blue was not scanning his surroundings as he had during the drug transaction two weeks earlier. The detectives placed a GPS tracker on Mr. Blue's vehicle and followed him after he left the North Avenue courthouse. Mr. Blue drove to an apartment complex located in White Marsh, Baltimore County, where he entered the complex and returned moments later with a small Rubbermaid container. Mr. Blue then traveled back into Baltimore City, arriving at Lake Montebello in Northeast Baltimore City.1

At Lake Montebello, Mr. Blue parked on a single road encircling the lake, just before a workout station, and got out of his vehicle. Detectives Crystal and McShane both noticed that Mr. Blue was again scanning his surroundings and looking over both of his shoulders. Mr. Blue walked toward and through the workout station and met with a man later identified as appellee. Mr. Blue continued to scan his surroundings while briefly speaking with appellee. Appellee did not look around before or after seeing Mr. Blue.

The two men got into a Jeep Cherokee parked near the workout station. Appellee entered the driver's side and Mr. Blue entered the passenger's side. Appellee drove around the lake once before Mr. Blue got out of the car and walked back to his car. Appellee remained in the Jeep, turned left out of the park, and drove away.

The detectives followed appellee in the Jeep for several minutes. After appellee made a few turns, both detectives activated their emergency lights. 2 The Jeep came to a stop in the 1400 block of Filmore Street. Detectives McShane and Crystal positioned their vehicles in front and to the side of the Jeep, respectively, but did not block the Jeep. Both detectives exited their vehicles while announcing themselves as police. Detective McShane approached the Jeep from the front and repeatedly stated, “Police, let me see your hands.” Detective Crystal approached from the rear driver's side. According to his written statement, Detective Crystal initially saw appellee's hands on the steering wheel, but then appellee lowered his right hand out of sight and quickly raised it to point a handgun directly at Detective McShane. According to DetectiveMcShane's written statement, appellee then started driving the Jeep directly towards Detective McShane, who was able to move out of the vehicle's path. At some point during this melee, both detectives discharged their service weapons into the vehicle. Appellee left the scene, but later arrived at the University of Maryland Medical Hospital with gunshot wounds.

Appellee was indicted and charged with first and second degree assault, reckless endangerment, use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence, felon in possession of a firearm, and conspiracy to distribute narcotics. Prior to trial, appellee challenged the legality of the stop. The circuit court conducted a hearing on March 2 and 5, 2012. The court concluded that the stop violated appellee's constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment because “there was no reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop of Mr. Holt's vehicle.” The court stated the following, in part, orally on the record:

They wanted to stop it, they had a hunch, but I do not find that the purpose of that stop was for anything more than to find out who the driver of the vehicle was, and see if they couldn't search the vehicle to find drugs. That's what they wanted to do.

...

That there were a bunch of innocuous facts, some have absolutely nothing to do with Mr. Holt, even thought [sic] the police would like to pile it on and make it appear that it has something to do with Mr. Holt, it doesn't.

Had the packaging been similar, had there been a call from Mr. Holt, had there been an observation of an exchange, had there been some way that Mr. Holt was involved in this enterprise, some evidence of it before the meeting at Lake Montebello. But there are too many innocent, innocuous facts.

These innocent facts are going to Montebello where people work out. Taking your lunch with you, which is what is normally used. There's no evidence that drugs in Baltimore when it's in large quantities are contained in Rubbermaid containers. There's no evidence that the officers previously observed Mr. Blue to put all his drugs in blue top Rubbermaid containers. There's no evidence that there was a container taken out [of] Mr. Blue's car, and placed into Mr. Holt's car.

There's no connection between Mr. Holt and drug activities of Mr. Blue that go back, at least to June 29th, none at all. They don't exist. It's not in this case. And it's a figment of the State's imagination. And the detectives. They wanted that to be the case, but there was no evidence of it. Their instincts and hunches and the hairs on the back of their necks were raised, but that does not make reasonable suspicion. So there was none.

On March 5, 2012, the court heard arguments on the scope of the remedy for the illegal stop. The circuit court ultimately determined that any testimony of an assault based on appellee pointing a firearm at Detective McShane would be suppressed, but that testimony of an assault based on appellee driving his Jeep toward Detective McShane would not. The court stated in part, orally on the record:

As it turns out, the gun is so connected and intertwined with the actions of the officers that the statement “let me see your hands” was an officer's direction to the defendant. And that direction resulted in him doing something. He's being ordered by law enforcement to act, let me see your hands. And that is a direct flow from the initial stop, which was illegal.

So he's at places and at times ordering the defendant to do something for which his presence on and about the defendant is illegal, unlawful, and therefore the Court flows—finds that the gun, and the observation of the gun in the hand of the defendant, directly flows from the initial, illegal stop. Let me see your hands. Yeah, well, what you see is the gun. Suppressed.

But after that the decision of the defendant to then take certain actions of his own initiative, different crime, differentevent, the taint is attenuated by, I believe, a brief passage of time, but a different circumstance, and therefore the Court will allow the State to enter any evidence of an assault by the use of the vehicle, and any charges that flow from that interaction with the police.

The State filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied on March 5, 2012. The State filed an interlocutory appeal that same day. On April 4, 2012, the court filed a written order denying the State's motion for reconsideration, in which it further explained its reasons for finding that the detectives lacked reasonable suspicion for conducting the stop and for suppressing evidence of the firearm and any observations of the firearm. 3 When addressing the issue of reasonable suspicion, the court stated, in part:

The State did not provide evidence to say that they saw Mr. Blue exit his vehicle with a Rubbermaid container or that there was a noticeable bulge in Mr. Blue's clothing in which a Rubbermaid...

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