State v. Holt

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: MARIANNA BROWN BETTMAN and SUNDERMANN, JJ., concur
• Citation: State v. Holt, 132 Ohio App.3d 601, 725 N.E.2d 1155 (Ohio App. 1997)
• Decision Date: 12 September 1997
• Docket Number: No. C-960140.,C-960140.
• Parties: The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. HOLT, Appellant.

132 Ohio App.3d 601

725 NE 2d 1155

The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. HOLT, Appellant.^*

No. C-960140.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, First District, Hamilton County.

Decided September 12, 1997.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and L. Susan Laker, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Michael Paolucci, for appellant.

PAINTER, Presiding Judge.

We are asked to determine whether a person in custody for a separate offense may be questioned about other criminal conduct, which the police believe he has witnessed, without the necessity of Miranda advice. We hold that Miranda applies to any person in custody, and it matters not that the police believe that the person in custody is a witness or a suspect. See Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694.

I. Facts

On May 6, 1995, Phillip Haley, fourteen years of age, was shot and killed. At this time, the defendant-appellant, Rayshun Holt, a friend of Haley's, was a runaway from the Hillcrest Juvenile Home, where he was placed for violating a court order relating to a felony drug conviction. Holt was fifteen.

Holt called his sister and told her that he had witnessed the shooting. After seeing a local newscast reporting that an unknown black teenager had been killed, Holt's stepfather called the police and informed them that Holt had been missing for several days and may have witnessed the shooting.

Two days after the murder, on May 8, the police located Holt and arrested him for violating the court order and for his escape warrant. They first brought Holt to the Criminal Investigation Section ("CIS"), not the juvenile detention center, and questioned him about the murder. Holt was questioned for over three hours in a room used for interviewing witnesses and interrogating suspects. The room was the size of "a walk-in closet." At the time, the officers seemingly believed Holt to be only a witness to the killing; they did not give Holt any Miranda warnings. The officers did not lock Holt in the room, but at no time told him that he was free to end the questioning. The officers taped Holt's final statement. Following the questioning, Holt was returned to the juvenile detention center.

During the questioning, Holt first told police that he was walking up Dexter Avenue with Haley when three individuals wearing ski masks walked up behind them. Holt stated that he ran and heard a gunshot. A short time later, police began the interview again. This time, Holt explained that he and Haley were walking on Dexter when a two-door, white Ford Escort pulled up in front of them. Three men—one wearing a ski mask, one wearing a hood pulled up around his face, and one "bare-faced"—exited from the vehicle. The man wearing the ski mask placed the gun to Haley's head and demanded money. Holt said that he then ran and hid behind an apartment building. The police left Holt in the room, consulted, and, because of the discrepancies in his story, decided to record the next interview session. Still, Miranda advice was not forthcoming. Holt told a substantially similar story this time, but stated that the man who pointed a gun at Haley was wearing a black "alligator" mask.

On May 20, 1995, the police brought the victim's mother, who knew Holt, to the juvenile detention center to participate in another round of questioning. Holt was brought to a small room for the questioning, during which time the door remained closed. An officer, a representative from the juvenile center, and Haley's mother were present. Again, Holt was not given Miranda warnings during the "interview."

On June 19, 1995, after the police talked with additional witnesses, Holt's status suddenly changed from that of a witness to that of a suspect. After reading Holt his Miranda warnings, the police attempted to question Holt again about the murder. Holt told police that he did not want to answer any more questions.

Holt was then indicted for murder with a firearm specification. After a bindover hearing, the juvenile court relinquished jurisdiction and Holt was tried as an adult. The trial court denied Holt's motion to suppress the statements Holt made to police before the Miranda warnings. The trial court believed that because Holt was not a suspect at the time of the first two interviews, Miranda advice was not necessary. After a jury trial, Holt was convicted of murder with a firearm specification.

Holt asserts three assignments of error. In his first assignment, he contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We agree.¹

Reviewing a trial court's decision not to suppress evidence, an appellate court defers to the trier of fact on the issues of the credibility of the witnesses and the evaluation of the evidence. See State v. Mills (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 582 N.E.2d 972; State v. Fanning (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 1 OBR 57, 437 N.E.2d 583. But the application of law to the decision of whether to suppress evidence is reviewed de novo. See State v. Klein (1991), 73 Ohio App.3d 486, 597 N.E.2d 1141.

II. Miranda

Prior to questioning, Miranda advice must be given to those in custody, even if custody is for an offense unrelated to the offense that is being investigated. Put simply, the requirement of Miranda warnings protects a defendant's privilege against self-incrimination and his right to counsel. Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. A defendant, of course, may waive these rights if the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Miranda warnings are necessary to safeguard against the compelling pressures inherent in police custody that "work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely." Id. at 467, 86 S.Ct. at 1624, 16 L.Ed.2d at 719; see, also, Moran v. Burbine (1986), 475 U.S. 412, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410.

Miranda warnings are necessary only during custodial interrogation. Illinois v. Perkins (1990), 496 U.S. 292, 110 S.Ct. 2394, 110 L.Ed.2d 243; State v. Gumm (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 413, 653 N.E.2d 253, certiorari denied (1996), 516 U.S. 1177, 116 S.Ct. 1275, 134 L.Ed.2d 221. But Miranda warnings are necessary even if police are questioning a defendant about an offense different from that for which the defendant is in custody. Mathis v. United States (1968), 391 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1503, 20 L.Ed.2d 381; State v. Lawler (Feb. 21, 1997), Lucas App. No. L-96-223, unreported, 1997 WL 77511.

The state concedes that Holt was in custody for his juvenile warrant during the periods of questioning on May 8 and May 20. However, the state contends that because Holt was only a possible witness—and not a suspect—at the time, Miranda warnings were not necessary before questioning him about the homicide. We disagree. The state actually misreads Miranda itself, which defines custodial interrogation as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d at 706. Whether a person is a suspect or merely a witness goes only to the issue of whether the person is "in custody."

The holding in Mathis dictates that one in custody may not ever be questioned regarding a separate offense without being advised of the Miranda warnings.² Holt was in custody for an offense unrelated to the murder. Without doubt, Holt was questioned while in custody in contravention to the dictates of Mathis.

Thus, since Holt was in custody, the state is left to argue that the police questioning was not "interrogation." Interrogation occurs when the police use words or actions that are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the defendant. Rhode Island v. Innis (1980), 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297; State v. Knuckles (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 494, 605 N.E.2d 54, certiorari denied (1993), 508 U.S. 981, 113 S.Ct. 2986, 125 L.Ed.2d 682. We hold that when an individual is in custody for an unrelated matter, any form of police questioning about another crime is interrogation and requires the recitation of the Miranda warnings—regardless of whether the individual is a suspect or a witness.

The Colorado Supreme Court encountered facts nearly identical to those presented here in People v. Lee (Colo.1981), 630 P.2d 583, certiorari denied (1982), 454 U.S. 1162, 102 S.Ct. 1036, 71 L.Ed.2d 318. In Lee, the court held that the statements taken from the defendant, who had not received Miranda warnings, should have been suppressed. The court stated that "the critical inquiry in this case is not whether the police considered the defendant a suspect but, rather, whether the defendant, while in police custody, was exposed to a risk of self-incrimination by police interrogation." Id. at 589, citing Marchetti v. United States (1968), 390 U.S. 39, 88 S.Ct. 697, 19 L.Ed.2d 889, and Rogers v. United States (1951), 340 U.S. 367, 71 S.Ct. 438, 95 L.Ed. 344.

The analysis in Lee is borne out by a more recent decision of the United States Supreme Court, which does not address the identical issue, but supplies guidance for reaching the correct result. The court held that an officer's subjective view of whether an individual is a suspect or a witness is immaterial to what is to be an objective determination of whether the individual is in custody and deserving of Miranda warnings. Stansbury v. California (1994), 511 U.S. 318, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293. The court stated that "one cannot expect the person under interrogation to probe the officer's innermost thoughts. Save as they are communicated or otherwise manifested to the person being questioned, an officer's evolving but unarticulated suspicions do not affect the objective circumstances of an interrogation or interview, and thus cannot affect the Miranda custody inquiry. `The threat to a citizen's Fifth...