State v. Holtcamp
| Decision Date | 22 December 1915 |
| Docket Number | No. 19007.,19007. |
| Parties | STATE ex rel. KNISELY v. HOLTCAMP, Probate Judge. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
In Banc. Mandamus by the State of Missouri, on the relation of Elizabeth C. Knisely, administratrix of the estate of Charles H. Knisely, deceased, against Charles W. Holtcamp, Judge of the Probate Court of the City of St. Louis. Writ issued.
This cause enters our portals as no stranger. Our acquaintance covers a period of years and extends to all of its ramifications. It has been here twice on appeal and several times on applications for original writs. It seems to possess one quality of Banquo's ghost. It came here first upon a demurrer to the petition, involving principally a question of limitation and the character of the instrument sued upon. Knisely v. Leathe, 256 Mo. 341, 166 S. W. 257. The cause was reversed and remanded, to be retried in accordance with the views there expressed. Upon retrial a verdict for the defendant was returned, and plaintiff again appealed. On that appeal (Knisely v. Leathe, 178 S. W. 453) this court reversed the judgment nisi and directed a judgment for plaintiff in the sum of $107,500, with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum from May 17, 1902; said interest being required to be calculated upon the day the circuit court entered the judgment, and be then added to the principal and made a part and parcel of such judgment. In compliance with this order, and on July 2, 1915, the circuit court entered judgment in favor of relator for the aggregate amount of $192,263.75, and this, in compliance with this court's direction, was certified to the probate court for classification, same being filed and presented in open court on the 14th day of July, 1915. There was also, attached to the certified copy of judgment and filed, an affidavit of relator stating that she had given credit to the estate involved for all payments and offsets to which it was entitled, and that the balance claimed on the annexed judgment was justly due and remained unpaid. Upon formal application to classify said judgment being made, respondent as judge of the probate court declined to classify the judgment or to take cognizance thereof, other than to determine that it had no jurisdiction and made the following order:
"Now, at this day, the matter of the application of Elizabeth C. Knisely, administratrix of the estate of Charles H. Knisely, deceased, asking for the classification of a certain judgment for $192,263.75 in her favor as said administratrix, and against Grace A. Leathe, executrix of the estate of Samuel H. Leathe, deceased, as a debt and claim against the estate of Samuel H. Leathe, deceased, coming on to be heard, and said Elizabeth C. Knisely, administratrix, presenting in court thereof certified copy of said judgment of the circuit court in the city of St. Louis, Mo., and a certified copy of the mandate of the Supreme Court of Missouri, directing the entry of said judgment for said above-mentioned sum in favor of said Elizabeth C. Knisely, administratrix of the estate of Charles H. Knisely, deceased, against Grace A. Leathe, executrix of the estate of Samuel H. Leathe, deceased, was begun on August 1, 1907, and service of process had on Grace A. Leathe executrix, on September 7, 1907, and the subsequent dismissal of said suit in the absence of counsel for plaintiff therein, and the institution of another suit by said Elizabeth C. Knisely, administratrix, against Grace A. Leathe, executrix of the estate of Samuel H. Leathe, deceased, and which said files last mentioned of said circuit court also show said cause was disposed of by demurrer and motion to strike out plaintiff's petition in the said circuit court in St. Louis, Mo., resulting in judgment for defendant, followed by appeal to the Supreme Court, and reversal by the Supreme Court, and a subsequent trial before a jury in the circuit court of St. Louis, Mo., resulting in judgment for defendant, followed by appeal to the Supreme Court, where judgment of the circuit court was reversed and the cause remanded, with directions to circuit court of city of St. Louis, Mo., to enter judgment for the plaintiff for the sum of $107,500, together with interest at 6 per cent. thereon from the 17th day of May, 1902, to the date of the entry of the judgment of circuit court, and said Elizabeth C. Knisely, administratrix, also offered in evidence of the support of said claim the record entries throughout all of the above proceedings in the circuit court of the city of St. Louis, Mo., as the same appear spread upon the record of the circuit court of said city, and Grace A. Leathe, appearing as distributee, by her counsel, objected to the court entertaining the application for the classification of the said judgment for the reason that on July 7, 1909, as shown by the records of the probate court of the city of St. Louis, Mo., final settlement of the estate of Samuel H. Leathe, deceased, was made and the executrix, Grace A. Leathe, was discharged, and therefore the probate court of the city of St. Louis had and has no jurisdiction to classify the said judgment and claim, and the court having duly considered said objection, does sustain the same, and refuses to entertain the application for the classification, and refuses to act in the matter because of no jurisdiction in the probate court on account of the said final settlement of the estate of Samuel H. Leathe having been heretofore made on the 7th day of July, 1909."
This immediate mandamus proceeding is to compel the probate court to classify the demand in accordance with the judgment and directions of this and the circuit court. Such other facts as are pertinent to the issues will be stated in the opinion.
E. P. Johnson, Edward C. Crow, and Morton Jourdan, all of St. Louis, for relator. Manton Davis, Geo. W. Lubke, Geo. W. Lubke, Jr., and Frank H. Sullivan, all of St. Louis, for respondent.
REVELLE, J. (after stating the facts as above).
I. Article 6, § 22, of our Constitution gives circuit courts exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil cases not otherwise provided for, and such concurrent jurisdiction with inferior courts as is or may be prescribed by law. Section 34, art. 6, of the Constitution provides for the establishment of probate courts and defines the bounds of their jurisdiction. The doctrine announced by Philips, P. J., in Richardson v. Palmer, 24 Mo. App. 480, that section 34, supra, did not vest in the probate court exclusive, but merely concurrent, jurisdiction, with other courts of record, to entertain suits against administrators for the establishment of demands against estates, has been uniformly approved and acted upon in this state. State ex rel. Ziegenhein v. Tittmann, 103 Mo. loc. cit. 566, 567, 15 S. W. 936; Wernse v. McPike, 100 Mo. loc. cit. 486, 13 S. W. 809; Matson et al. v. Pearson, 121 Mo. App. loc. cit. 134, 97 S. W. 983; Stephens v. Bernays, 119 Mo. loc. cit. 147, 24 S. W. 46; Knisely v. Leathe, 256 Mo. 341, 166 S. W. 257.
Section 197, R. S. 1909, valid by virtue of section 22, supra, of the Constitution, in terms certain, authorizes the establishment of such demands in circuit courts. Relator was therefore properly within her rights and proceeding in an orderly and legitimate way when she instituted suit in the circuit court to establish her demand against the Leathe estate, then in the process of administration. There is also no doubt that the suit was begun and summons served within one year after the granting of the first letters of administration, and that service was properly had on the person then duly authorized and acting as executrix of the estate. It has heretofore been adjudged by this court (Knisely v. Leathe, 256 Mo. 341, 166 S. W. 257), and is so written in the statute (section 193, R. S. 1909), that the service of this summons constituted, within the meaning of the statute, an exhibition of the demand sued upon. The record further establishes that, in obedience to the writ of summons, the executrix duly appeared and entered fully upon a defense in behalf of the estate, and after prolonged litigation a judgment for approximately $196,000 was rendered. It cannot be gainsaid that by these proceedings all statutory requirements for the establishment of the demand were met, and that the circuit court acquired jurisdiction of (1) the subject-matter, or the demand of relator; (2) the person of the legal representative of the estate; and (3) the estate, in so far as this demand and the right to have it determined were concerned.
What was the purpose of this suit, and the extent and effect of the jurisdiction thus acquired? The purpose of the suit was to finally establish the liability of the estate and relator's right to have it satisfied by the estate and while the estate was a legally existing thing, and the jurisdiction of the circuit was coextensive with this purpose and right. The estate of a deceased person is a distinct legal entity, and the statute prescribes that it shall remain in existence as such until its demise comes orderly, peacefully, and as the law ordains. No mystery surrounds its creation, existence, departure, or future. We know whence (and why) it cometh (and when) and whither it goeth. It comes primarily for the purpose of paying the debts of its former master and to remain until that is done, and when this mission is performed and these labors put to an end it is ready for dissolution and the law's decree as to the distribution of its dismembered parts. The estate and its legal representative being in the circuit court and within that court's lawful jurisdiction for the express purpose of having determined one of the very things upon which its right to exist or cease to exist depended, namely, whether it was in debt, by what means could it tear itself from that jurisdiction and abruptly end its existence? If justification there be for this unusual and peculiar course, it must be found in...
To continue reading
Request your trial