State v. Horn

Decision Date26 September 2013
Docket NumberNo. 12–0534.,12–0534.
Citation232 W.Va. 32,750 S.E.2d 248
PartiesSTATE of West Virginia, Plaintiff Below, Respondent v. Joseph Frederick HORN, Defendant Below, Petitioner.
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court

232 W.Va. 32
750 S.E.2d 248

STATE of West Virginia, Plaintiff Below, Respondent
v.
Joseph Frederick HORN, Defendant Below, Petitioner.

No. 12–0534.

Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia.

Submitted Sept. 11, 2013.
Decided Sept. 26, 2013.


[750 S.E.2d 251]



Syllabus by the Court

1. “In reviewing challenges to findings and rulings made by a circuit court, we apply a two-pronged deferential standard of review. We review the rulings of the circuit court concerning a new trial and its conclusion as to the existence of reversible error under an abuse of discretion standard, and we review the circuit court's underlying factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard. Questions of law are subject to a de novo review.” Syllabus point 3, State v. Vance, 207 W.Va. 640, 535 S.E.2d 484 (2000).

2. “When a criminal defendant undertakes a sufficiency challenge, all the evidence, direct and circumstantial, must be viewed from the prosecutor's coign of vantage, and the viewer must accept all reasonable inferences from it that are consistent with the verdict. This rule requires the trial court judge to resolve all evidentiary conflicts and credibility questions in the prosecution's favor; moreover, as among competing inferences of which two or more are plausible, the judge must choose the inference that best fits the prosecution's theory of guilt.” Syllabus point 2, State v. LaRock, 196 W.Va. 294, 470 S.E.2d 613 (1996).

3. “The function of an appellate court when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, is sufficient to convince a reasonable person of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Syllabus point 1, State v. Guthrie, 194 W.Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d 163 (1995).

4. “A criminal defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction takes on a heavy burden. An appellate court must review all the evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, in the light most favorable to the prosecution and must credit all inferences and credibility assessments that the jury might have drawn in favor of the prosecution. The evidence need

[750 S.E.2d 252]

not be inconsistent with every conclusion save that of guilt so long as the jury can find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Credibility determinations are for a jury and not an appellate court. Finally, a jury verdict should be set aside only when the record contains no evidence, regardless of how it is weighed, from which the jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. To the extent that our prior cases are inconsistent, they are expressly overruled.” Syllabus point 3, State v. Guthrie, 194 W.Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d 163 (1995).

5. “Although premeditation and deliberation are not measured by any particular period of time, there must be some period between the formation of the intent to kill and the actual killing, which indicates the killing is by prior calculation and design. This means there must be an opportunity for some reflection on the intention to kill after it is formed.” Syllabus point 5, State v. Guthrie, 194 W.Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d 163 (1995).

6. “In considering the constitutionality of a legislative enactment, courts must exercise due restraint, in recognition of the principle of the separation of powers in government among the judicial, legislative and executive branches. Every reasonable construction must be resorted to by the courts in order to sustain constitutionality, and any reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the legislative enactment in question. Courts are not concerned with questions relating to legislative policy. The general powers of the legislature, within constitutional limits, are almost plenary. In considering the constitutionality of an act of the legislature, the negation of legislative power must appear beyond reasonable doubt.” Syllabus point 1, State ex rel. Appalachian Power Co. v. Gainer, 149 W.Va. 740, 143 S.E.2d 351 (1965).

7. “ ‘A criminal statute must be set out with sufficient definiteness to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is prohibited by statute and to provide adequate standards for adjudication.’ Syllabus Point 1, State v. Flinn, 158 W.Va. 111, 208 S.E.2d 538 (1974).” Syllabus point 1, State v. Bull, 204 W.Va. 255, 512 S.E.2d 177 (1998).

8. “W. Va.Code § 61–2–1 (1991) enumerates three broad categories of homicide constituting first degree murder: (1) murder by poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving; (2) by any wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing; and (3) in the commission of, or attempt to commit, inter alia, arson, sexual assault, robbery or burglary.” Syllabus point 6, State v. Davis, 205 W.Va. 569, 519 S.E.2d 852 (1999).

9. “[Q]uestions of law and interpretations of statutes and rules are subject to a de novo review.” Syllabus point 1, in part, State v. Duke, 200 W.Va. 356, 489 S.E.2d 738 (1997).

10. The second category of first degree murder described in W. Va.Code § 61–2–1 (1991) (Repl.Vol.2010) as “[m]urder ... by any willful, deliberate and premeditated killing” is not unconstitutionally vague and does not violate United States Constitution Amendment XIV, Section 1, or West Virginia Constitution Article III, Section 10.

11. “When reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, an appellate court should construe all facts in the light most favorable to the State, as it was the prevailing party below. Because of the highly fact-specific nature of a motion to suppress, particular deference is given to the findings of the circuit court because it had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and to hear testimony on the issues. Therefore, the circuit court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error.” Syllabus point 1, State v. Lacy, 196 W.Va. 104, 468 S.E.2d 719 (1996).

12. “The action of a trial court in admitting or excluding evidence in the exercise of its discretion will not be disturbed by the appellate court unless it appears that such action amounts to an abuse of discretion.” Syllabus point 1, State v. Calloway, 207 W.Va. 43, 528 S.E.2d 490 (1999).

13. “A law enforcement officer acting outside of his or her territorial jurisdiction has the same authority to arrest as does a private citizen and may make an extraterritorial arrest under those circumstances in which a private citizen would be authorized to make an arrest.” Syllabus point 2,

[750 S.E.2d 253]

State ex rel. State v. Gustke, 205 W.Va. 72, 516 S.E.2d 283 (1999).

14. Under the common law, a private citizen is authorized to arrest another person who the private citizen believes has committed a felony.

15. A police officer acting beyond his or her territorial jurisdiction retains power as a private citizen to make an arrest when a felony has been committed and the officer has reasonable grounds to believe the person arrested has committed the crime.


Thomas H. Evans, III, Thomas Hanna Evans, PLLC, Oceana, WV, Attorney for the Petitioner.

Patrick Morrisey, Attorney General, Scott Johnson, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Charleston, WV, Attorneys for the Respondent.


DAVIS, Justice:

The petitioner herein and defendant below, Joseph Frederick Horn (hereinafter “Mr. Horn”), by the circuit court's order dated February 21, 2012, was sentenced following his jury convictions for the offenses of “Murder in the First Degree” and “Arson in the First Degree.” 1 Before this Court, Mr. Horn appeals the circuit court's denial of his post-trial motions. In his argument, Mr. Horn assigns four errors: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the jury verdict; (2) W. Va.Code § 61–2–1 (1991) (Repl.Vol.2010) 2 is unconstitutionally vague; (3) the trial court failed to suppress the introduction of illegally obtained evidence; and (4) the trial court erred when it denied his post-trial motions. Based upon the parties' written briefs and oral arguments, the appendix record designated for our consideration, and the pertinent authorities, we affirm.

I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 15, 2009, Michael Rife (hereinafter “decedent”) was murdered in his home in McDowell County, West Virginia. When decedent's body was found, a small fire was burning under his bed. The fire burned out without causing any harm, and the cause of death was multiple stab wounds.

The location of decedent's home was on the border between the Virginia and West Virginia boundary. When decedent's body was found, a call was placed to 911. The call was dispatched through Virginia. When the Virginia police arrived at decedent's home, they realized they were in West Virginia and, therefore, notified the West Virginia police. The Virginia officers left the scene when the West Virginia police arrived at the decedent's home and began their investigation.

During their work at the crime scene, the West Virginia officers learned that Mr. Horn had been with decedent earlier that evening. The officers sought to question Mr. Horn and located him nearby at decedent's neighbor's house. When the West Virginia officers asked to speak to Mr. Horn, he came out of the home. The West Virginia officers saw that Mr. Horn had dried blood in his ear, which led to their observation that there also was blood on Mr. Horn's waistband and on his boots. Upon looking through the window of Mr. Horn's truck, they also observed blood on the steering wheel of Mr. Horn's vehicle.

When Mr. Horn was asked about the blood in his ear, he immediately attempted to wipe it away. Additionally, Mr. Horn was scuffing the top of his boots with the heel of the opposite foot, leading the officers to believe he was trying to destroy the evidence of blood on the boots. The West Virginia officers...

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  • Peters v. Commonwealth
    • United States
    • Virginia Court of Appeals
    • August 4, 2020
    ...is not required to actually say the word "arrest" to communicate to an individual that he is under arrest. See e.g., State v. Horn, 232 W.Va. 32, 750 S.E.2d 248, 261 (2013) ; State v. Ashbaugh, 256 Or.App. 739, 301 P.3d 972, 975 (2013) ; State v. Barker, 227 Ariz. 89, 253 P.3d 286, 287-88 (......
  • State v. Skeens
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    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • April 10, 2014
    ...underlying factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard. Questions of law are subject to a de novo review.Accord syl. pt. 1, State v. Horn, supra. Additional standards of review directly relating to the two assignments of error raised by Skeens are set forth below.V. DiscussionA.Inst......
  • State v. Payne, 15-0582
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    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • November 21, 2016
    ...proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Syllabus point 1, State v. Guthrie, 194 W.Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d 163 (1995).Syl. Pt. 3, State v. Horn, 232 W.Va. 32, 750 S.E.2d 248 (2013). Specifically, petitioner argues that the evidence established that he did not commit murder because he acted in self-de......
  • State v. Murray
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    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • May 22, 2015
    ...lack of evidence establishing two necessary elements to prove first degree murder—premeditation and malice. See State v. Horn, 232 W.Va. 32, 39, 750 S.E.2d 248, 255 (2013) (“To sustain a conviction for this category of first degree murder, it is essential that ‘the State produce [ ] evidenc......
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