State v. Horst, A14–1464.

• Citation: 880 N.W.2d 24
• Decision Date: 18 May 2016
• Docket Number: No. A14–1464.,A14–1464.
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Heather Leann HORST, Appellant.
• Court: Supreme Court of Minnesota (US)

880 N.W.2d 24

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent,
v.
Heather Leann HORST, Appellant.

No. A14–1464.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

May 18, 2016.

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and John Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Kaarin Long, Assistant Ramsey County Attorney, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for respondent.

Deborah Ellis, Susan Johnson, Ellis Law Office, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant.

OPINION

STRAS, Justice.

The district court convicted Heather Horst of first-degree premeditated murder and sentenced her to life imprisonment without the possibility of release. In this direct appeal of her conviction, Horst challenges a number of decisions made by the

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district court, including several evidentiary rulings, the failure to give an accomplice-corroboration jury instruction, and the denial of her request to remove a juror for cause. Horst also argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict her of first-degree premeditated murder. We affirm Horst's conviction.

I.

The marriage between Horst and her husband, Brandon, was troubled. During the course of the marriage, both spouses were unfaithful to one another. Horst told multiple friends that Brandon had been verbally and physically abusive toward her and that his abuse had caused multiple miscarriages, although there was no evidence presented at trial to substantiate either claim.

In the summer of 2013, Brandon's stepsister, A.P.; A.P.'s then-fiancé, Aaron Allen; S.K.; and S.K.'s girlfriend were living together in an apartment in South St. Paul. A.P. and Horst were acquaintances from high school, but they became particularly close that summer and spent considerable time together at the apartment. One day, Horst “came storming in” to the apartment. Allen testified that Horst was angry and that the first thing she said when she arrived was “I want him dead,” referring to her husband, Brandon. Horst told Allen, A.P., and S.K. that, the night before, Brandon had punched her in the stomach, which caused her to miscarry. Upon hearing that Brandon had caused yet another miscarriage, Allen became “livid,” “ang[ry],” and “saw blood.”

Horst's statements led to a broader discussion among Horst, Allen, and S.K. about how Horst should deal with the alleged abuse. The discussion started with the suggestion that Horst should leave Brandon, but then quickly turned into a conversation about whether they should kill him. Horst suggested that the killing occur at night, that it resemble a burglary, and that Allen cut Brandon's throat. Horst promised to give a portion of the life-insurance proceeds from Brandon's death to Allen and S.K. Later that day, Allen's friend, K., became involved in the planning.

In preparation for the crime, Horst, Allen, S.K., and K. purchased various items from Kmart and Sam's Mini Mart, including shoes, gloves, and a shirt, each of which was to be used to avoid leaving evidence at the crime scene. Horst paid for the items at both stores. While traveling from one store to another, the group further refined their plan. At one point, at Horst's prompting, they discussed the possibility of using one of Horst's guns to kill Brandon.

S.K. and K. subsequently withdrew from the scheme. S.K. abandoned the group at Sam's Mini Mart when he saw an ex-girlfriend. Later, K. left the apartment while Allen was sleeping and took no further part in the scheme. Allen himself hesitated at one point. When Allen expressed doubt, however, Horst responded by saying, “we can do this” and “just think about the baby.”

Later that evening, Horst brought Allen to her home so that they could carry out the plan. Horst gave Allen a gun, showed him it was loaded, and told him to shoot Brandon two or three times to make sure he died. At Horst's direction, Allen waited in the basement for Brandon to return home and go to bed. Horst went to the basement after Brandon got home. While Horst and Allen were discussing the crime, Allen again expressed reservations, but Horst eventually convinced him to carry out the plan. During the conversation, Horst received a call from A.P., at which point she left the house, picked up A.P., and headed to Walgreens.

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After sending multiple text messages to Horst, Allen eventually left the basement and went upstairs to the bedroom where Brandon was sleeping. He opened the door, leaned into the bedroom, and shot Brandon once in the head. At trial, he testified that he could not shoot Brandon two or three times, as Horst had instructed, because “once was too much.” After shooting Brandon, Allen ran out of the house and sent a text to Horst stating that the job was “done.”

Allen then called A.P., which caused Horst and A.P. to leave Walgreens. As they drove toward Horst's house, they spotted Allen and picked him up. After retrieving Allen, Horst first drove to a dog park, where Allen threw the gun into a river. Horst next drove Allen to his South St. Paul apartment. At one point, Horst asked Allen, “how many rounds did you put in him?” to which he replied, “just one.” She also informed Allen that she had destroyed her SIM card.

After they dropped off Allen, Horst and A.P. returned to Horst's home, where Horst called 911 to report Brandon's death. Following an investigation of the crime scene, the officers took Horst and A.P. to the St. Paul Police Department Headquarters for questioning. The officers arrested Horst for Brandon's murder several days later.

The State indicted Horst on charges of first-degree premeditated murder, see Minn.Stat. § 609.185(a)(1) (2014) ; second-degree intentional murder, see Minn.Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2014) ; and conspiracy to commit first- and second-degree murder, see Minn.Stat. §§ 609.175, subd. 2(3), 609.185(a)(1), 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2014). The theory of the State's case on the two murder counts was that Horst aided and abetted Allen in killing Brandon. See Minn.Stat. § 609.05, subd. 1 (2014). A jury found her guilty of each of the charged offenses. The district court sentenced her to life imprisonment without the possibility of release on the first-degree premeditated murder count.

II.

The first question presented by this case is whether the district court erred when it denied Horst's motion to suppress statements from a police interview conducted shortly after Brandon's murder. Although the State did not play the recording of the interview for the jury, the district court permitted the investigator who had been present to testify at trial about the substance of the interview, including Horst's statements. Horst challenges the district court's conclusion that the statements were admissible.

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires police officers to provide a suspect with the warnings from Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), before conducting a custodial interrogation. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434–35, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000). In the absence of these warnings, which we commonly call “Miranda warnings,” any statements made by a suspect during a custodial interrogation are inadmissible at trial. See id. The critical question is whether Horst made the statements during the course of a custodial interrogation.

A “custodial interrogation” occurs when “questioning [is] initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his [or her] freedom of action in any significant way.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602. “An interrogation is custodial if, based on all the surrounding circumstances, a reasonable person under the circumstances would believe that he or

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she was in police custody of the degree associated with formal arrest.” State v. Vue, 797 N.W.2d 5, 10–11 (Minn.2011). In considering whether an interrogation is custodial, courts consider the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 11.

Deciding whether an interrogation is custodial is a mixed question of law and fact. See State v. Sterling, 834 N.W.2d 162, 167–68 (Minn.2013). It requires an appellate court to examine a district court's factual findings for clear error, but to review independently the legal conclusion regarding whether the interrogation was custodial. See id. If the district court applies the correct legal standard, we grant “considerable, but not unlimited, deference to the [district] court's fact-specific resolution” of whether the interrogation was custodial. Id. at 168 (internal quotation marks omitted). However, if the district court errs in its conclusion about the necessity of a Miranda warning, we will “award a new trial unless the error [was] harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 171.

To determine whether questioning has occurred in a custodial setting, we have identified a number of facts that are “indicative of custody.” Vue, 797 N.W.2d at 11. Such facts include:

(1) the police interviewing the suspect at the police station; (2) the suspect being told he or she is a prime suspect in a crime; (3) the police restraining the suspect[']s freedom of movement; (4) the suspect making a significantly incriminating statement; (5) the presence of multiple officers; and (6) a gun pointing at the suspect.

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