State v. Hosey
Decision Date | 21 September 2000 |
Docket Number | No. 25243.,25243. |
Citation | 11 P.3d 1101,134 Idaho 883 |
Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Michael E. HOSEY, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Edwin Wagner, Idaho Falls, argued for appellant.
Hon. Alan G. Lance, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Deputy Attorney General Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.
Michael E. Hosey appeals from the denial of his motions to withdraw his guilty plea, to participate in the Idaho Rule of Evidence (I.R.E.) 509 hearing, to obtain a transcript of the I.R.E. 509 hearing, and to suppress evidence. On appeal, Hosey argues the trial court erred in refusing to allow Hosey to withdraw his conditional guilty plea because Hosey "prevailed" on the prior appeal. Hosey also argues the trial judge should have allowed Hosey (through counsel) to participate in the I.R.E. 509 hearing, or, alternatively, have provided Hosey with a redacted transcript of the hearing. Finally, Hosey argues the trial judge erred in affirming the denial of Hosey's original motion to suppress.
In State v. Hosey, 132 Idaho 117, 968 P.2d 212 (1998) (Hosey I), we summarized the factual and procedural background of this case as follows:
Id. at 117-18, 968 P.2d at 212-13.
On appeal, this Court set aside the order denying the motion to suppress. We held the trial judge erred in failing to conduct an in camera I.R.E. 509 hearing concerning the credibility and veracity of the confidential informant. Because we found the trial judge should have held the I.R.E. 509 hearing, we vacated the order and held the "suppression issue must be reconsidered with proper application by the district court of the provisions of I.R.E. 509." Id. at 120, 968 P.2d at 215. We then remanded the case for further proceedings.
On remand, Hosey filed motions to withdraw his guilty plea, for leave to amend his motion to suppress, and for reconsideration of the motion to suppress. On November 4, 1998, the district judge held the I.R.E. 509 hearing. The judge received evidence in camera and determined the State's claim of privilege applied, and therefore the State was not required to divulge the identity of the informant. Following the I.R.E. 509 hearing, the district judge then denied Hosey's motion to withdraw his guilty plea and reaffirmed the denial of Hosey's motion to suppress. Hosey then filed a motion to obtain a redacted transcript of the I.R.E. 509 hearing. The district judge denied this motion, determining the transcript would reveal the identity of the informer from context alone. This appeal then followed.
On appeal, Hosey states the issues as: (1) whether the trial court erred in refusing to allow Hosey to withdraw his guilty plea; (2) whether the trial court erred in refusing to allow Hosey (through counsel) to participate in the I.R.E. 509 hearing; (3) whether the trial court erred in refusing to provide Hosey with a redacted transcript of the I.R.E. 509 hearing; and (4) whether the trial court's affirmation of the earlier denial of Hosey's motion to suppress was a denial of due process. We will address each issue in turn.
The question of whether Hosey should have been allowed to withdraw his plea requires this Court to interpret the plea agreement between Hosey and the State. A plea agreement is contractual in nature and must be measured by contract law standards. See, e.g., United States v. Sutton, 794 F.2d 1415, 1423 (9th Cir.1986); State v. Claxton, 128 Idaho 782, 785, 918 P.2d 1227, 1230 (Ct. App.1996). The interpretation of a contract's meaning and legal effect are questions of law to be decided by the Court if the terms of the contract are clear and unambiguous. State v. Barnett, 133 Idaho 231, 234, 985 P.2d 111, 114 (1999). The meaning of an unambiguous contract must be determined from the plain meaning of the contract's own words. Id. Where a contract is determined to be ambiguous, interpretation of the contract is a question of fact that focuses on the intent of the parties. Id. Whether the facts establish a violation of the contract is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review. Id.
Before moving to the substantive discussion, the State argues the trial judge lacked jurisdiction to even consider Hosey's motion to withdraw his guilty plea because such action would be outside the scope of action directed by this Court's opinion in Hosey I. The State argues because the remand in this case was for the limited purpose of receiving in camera evidence related to the informer privilege and reconsideration of the motion to suppress in light of that evidence, the trial judge lacked jurisdiction to do anything else on remand. The general rule is that, on remand, a trial court has authority to take actions it is specifically directed to take, or those which are subsidiary to the actions directed by the appellate court. Walters v. Industrial Indem. Co., 130 Idaho 836, 838, 949 P.2d 223, 225 (1997). In this case, we believe the issue of the effect of our opinion in Hosey I on the terms of the plea agreement was within the trial court's jurisdiction on remand. There is no question that had we reversed the denial of the motion to suppress, yet remained silent about the withdrawal of the plea, the trial court would have had jurisdiction to allow Hosey to withdraw the guilty plea, if such an action complied with the terms of the plea agreement, because the withdrawal of the plea would clearly be a subsidiary action to the Court's reversal of the denial of the motion to suppress. This case is no different. Hosey's motion to withdraw his plea was within the trial court's jurisdiction on remand because ruling on the effect of an appellate court's decision under the terms of a plea agreement is necessarily subsidiary to any other directive on remand where a defendant has entered a conditional guilty plea. This is not a case where Hosey's motion to withdraw his plea was based on some other alleged defect in the plea unrelated to our opinion. Rather, this motion was simply an attempt by Hosey to enforce the terms of the plea agreement. Thus, we hold the trial judge had jurisdiction to consider this motion.
Having determined the trial court had jurisdiction to consider the motion, the next question is whether our opinion in Hosey I was sufficient, under the terms of the plea agreement, to allow Hosey to withdraw his plea. According to the plea agreement, Hosey agreed to plead guilty to the charge of Trafficking in Methamphetamine conditioned on the right to appeal the trial court's order denying his motion to suppress. The plea agreement specifically states: "[s]hould the court be reversed on appeal, the Defendant shall retain his right to withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to I.C.R. 11(a)(2)." Idaho Criminal Rule 11(a)(2) states:
Conditional Pleas. With the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecuting attorney, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty reserving in writing the right, on appeal from the judgment, to review any specified adverse ruling. If the defendant prevails on appeal, the defendant shall be allowed to withdraw defendant's plea.
Idaho Criminal Rule 11(a)(2). Hosey argues the language of the Rule controls and he should be allowed to withdraw his plea because he prevailed on appeal. In contrast, ...
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