State v. Hoskins, 41663

• Decision Date: 07 January 1972
• Docket Number: No. 41663,41663
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. David Lewis HOSKINS, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 802

193 N.W.2d 802

292 Minn. 111

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. David Lewis HOSKINS, Appellant.

No. 41663.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Jan. 7, 1972.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Whether a defendant may waive a jury trial is generally left to the discretion of the trial court. A defendant's right to waive a jury trial is a statutory right, and in the case at bar defendant never properly sought a waiver of a jury trial in compliance with the provisions of Minn.St. 631.01.

2. Minn.St. 542.16 requires that in criminal cases an affidavit of prejudice shall be made and filed with the clerk of court by defendant or his counsel not less than 2 days before the expiration of the time allowed him by law to prepare for trial. The time allowed a defendant by law to prepare for trial means the period preceding the date set for trial. Where the affidavit of prejudice was not filed in a timely manner, the trial court's refusal to give it automatic effect was not error.

3. The granting of a new trial for misconduct of officers of the court rests almost wholly in the discretion of the trial court, especially when, as in the instant case, the motion is decided on conflicting affidavits. The trial court's action will not be reversed on appeal except for a clear abuse of discretion.

Where the issue of misconduct of an officer of the court was not properly raised before the trial court, an appellate court cannot consider the issue.

4. A jury's deliberations must remain inviolate, and its verdict may not be reviewed or set aside on the basis of affidavits or testimony concerning that which transpired in the course of the jury's deliberations. Unless predominance of a juror over other members of the jury is obtained by overt actions which are coercive in nature and effect and are within the consciousness of all jurors, postverdict impeachment by a juror is not allowed.

5. A juror's claim of disagreement with the verdict and his intention to denounce it when polled are matters which inhere in the verdict and are insufficient to impeach it.

6. There was no violation of the substantive and procedural rights afforded defendant by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), where the trial court admitted into evidence an oral exculpatory statement given by defendant to an investigating officer while defendant was confined in a hospital under police protection but where he was not in the compelling atmosphere of an incustody interrogation.

7. The determination of defendant's competency to waive his constitutional rights is a function of the trial court. The state carried its burden of establishing a voluntary waiver by defendant of his rights when he gave an inculpatory statement after being advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, Supra. The fact that an inadmissible exculpatory statement was given by defendant immediately prior to the giving of the inculpatory statement did not prejudicially taint the latter or a subsequently given confession.

8. The placement on the defendant of the burden of proof of alleged insanity at the time of a crime does not offend any constitutional provision. If any change in this rule is deemed necessary or desirable, resort must be had to the legislature and not to the courts.

9. The keys to a valid pretrial, state-conducted psychiatric examination are the consent of the defendant and care that his Fifth Amendment rights are protected. Once the sanity of a defendant is put in issue, the state is entitled to obtain rebuttal information either by way of a trial recess, during which a psychiatric examination may be conducted, or by way of a pretrial examination to which the defendant consents.

10. Whether a person charged with a crime was legally insane at the time of the act involves a fact question, the determination of which should be left to the jury. As in any other process of fact determination, the jury is not bound to accept the testimony of any witnesses as credible, and C. Paul Jones, Public Defender, Ronald L. Haskvitz, Asst. Public Defender, Minneapolis, for appellant.

in evaluating the testimony of experts, the same standards should be applied as are used to gauge the credibility of lay witnesses. Therefore, it would be erroneous to conclude that the mere introduction of unrebutted expert testimony as to defendant's insanity necessarily satisfies his burden of proof.

Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., James M. Kelley, Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, Paul J. Doerner, County Atty., St. Cloud, for respondent.

Heard and considered en banc.

OPINION

NELSON, Justice.

Appeal from a judgment of conviction and from an order denying a new trial after a jury trial before the Ramsey County District Court, following a change of venue from Stearns County to Ramsey County. Defendant was convicted of one count of murder in the second degree, Minn.St. 609.19, and four counts of murder in the third degree, § 609.195. He was sentenced to 40 years on the conviction of second-degree murder and to 25 years on each conviction of third-degree murder. All sentences were ordered to be served concurrently.

The facts are generally undisputed and, in relevant part, are as follows:

On August 17, 1967, the day of the homicides, defendant, together with his wife, Loretta, their three minor girls, and their infant boy, had been at defendant's father's farm near Kimball, Minnesota. Defendant had been baling straw that day and had worked quite late. Apparently, nothing of any particular significance had happened during the day. In the morning defendant had gone to the bank to deposit a check and to pay a bank loan, and in the afternoon his wife had gone to town to a church ladies' aid meeting.

That evening, defendant and his family ate a late supper around 9 p.m. at his parents' home. While eating, they began to watch a television movie, 'Barrabas.' At approximately 10 p.m., defendnat's wife asked him to take the three older children home and to give them baths and put them to bed, since they appeared to be getting tired. Mrs. Hoskins remained to help with the dishes, keeping the baby with her.

When he arrived home, defendant turned on the television and, together with his At approximately 10 p.m., defendant's they had started to watch at his parents' home. After the movie was over, the two older girls took showers and defendant gave the youngest girl a bath. He sent the two older girls to bed and was rocking the youngest girl to sleep when his wife arrived home with the baby. While defendant put the youngest daughter in bed, Mrs. Hoskins prepared the baby for bed and began to nurse it. She and the baby apparently began to fall asleep, so defendant took the baby from his mother's arms and placed him in his crib. By this time defendant's wife was sleeping fairly soundly, and defendant remembers reflecting to himself how peaceful and calm she looked as she slept.

Defendant apparently then obtained his .22-caliber rifle, and the next thing he remembered was standing in the bedroom doorway, the rifle in his hands at shoulder level and blood on the side of his wife's head. He then ran outside of the house and sat down on a lawn chair in the yard, contemplating his deed. His particular thought processes at this juncture are not revealed to us, except to the extent that he attempted to determine a way to cover up his act so that nobody would know what had happened to his wife. Striking upon an arson scheme, defendant obtained some gasoline and splashed it around the house in the first floor bedroom, the dining room, and the living room. Although he did not remember exactly when, he subsequently ignited the gasoline.

By this time defendant had decided it was necessary to be 'hurt' himself in order to give credence to his planned story that someone else had shot his wife and burned his home. He went to his garage where he tied the rifle to a stove with a cord attached to the rifle, to trigger it from a remote position, in order to shoot himself. After firing at least one test shot, defendant shot himself twice, once in the shoulder and once in the side. Apparently, he was not trying to kill himself at this point, and took pains to make certain no powder burns were left on his body. He did this in the manner described '(j) ust to make it look like somebody else had done it to me.' He then removed the rifle from the garage, carried it to the porch of his house, and threw it into the already burning building. After standing and watching the house burn for an undisclosed length of time, defendant devised a plan to tie himself up some way 'so it wouldn't look like (he) had done the rest of it.'

Before tying himself up, defendant set fire to the garage to cover up the blood which had dripped from his two wounds. Then, taking a rope from a nearby tree, defendant managed to tie himself to one of two clothesline supports located in the yard. He also put a towel over his head to serve as a blindfold with the 'idea of not being able to see anybody that came around. Just part of the story that I made up about somebody being there, and not knowing who they were.'

Within a short time, the flames from defendant's house were noticed by several people in the vicinity. Some of them stopped, cut defendant down from the clothesline, and took him to a nearby store where they could summon medical attention and aid from the sheriff and fire department. While at that store and again on the morning of August 18, 1967, at the hospital, defendant told witnesses and law-enforcement agents that he and his family had been besieged by at least four people who shot him, tied him to the clothesline support, and ignited the house and garage.

Further investigation by law-enforcement agents caused them to doubt defendant's story. Subsequent questioning of defendant led to his giving an oral inculpatory statement which later was transcribed. Following a hearing as required by State ex rel. Rasmussen v. Tahash,...