State v. Houde

• Decision Date: 08 April 1955
• Citation: 114 A.2d 366,150 Me. 469
• Parties: STATE of Maine v. Roch HOUDE.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 366

114 A.2d 366

150 Me. 469

STATE of Maine v.Roch HOUDE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

April 8, 1955.

Henry H. Hastings, Bethel, for plaintiff.

John A. Platz, Lewiston, for defendant.

Before FELLOWS, C. J., and WILLIAMSON, TIRRELL, WEBBER, BELIVEAU, and TAPLEY, JJ.

WILLIAMSON, Justice.

The issue in this criminal case is whether a complaint that the respondent on a day certain in 1953 at Rumford 'did operate a motor vehicle, to wit, an automobile, upon a public way, to wit, U. S. RouteNo. 2 in said Rumford, in a reckless manner against the peace of the State and contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided' is sufficient in law to charge the offense of 'reckless driving.'The case comes from the Superior Court on exceptions to the overruling of respondent's demurrer.

The pertinent provisions of the statutes and constitution read:

'Whoever operates any vehicle upon any way, or in any place to which the public has a right of access:

'I.Recklessly; or

'II.In a wanton manner causing injury to any person or property; shall be guilty of reckless driving * * *.'R.S.1944, c. 19, § 119, now R.S.1954, c. 22, § 148.

'In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have a right * * *;

'To demand the nature and cause of the accusation, and have a copy thereof; * * *.'Maine Constitution Article I, Section 6.

The constitutionality of the statute is unquestioned.'Recklessly', 'in a wanton manner', and 'reckless driving' are words sufficiently definite and certain in meaning and descriptive of the prohibited acts to form the basis for the establishment of the offense.SeeState v. Hamilton, 1949, 133 W.Va. 394, 56 S.E.2d 544, 12 A.L.R.2d 573 and Annot.;5 Am.Jur., Automobiles, § 802;61 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, § 609.Whether this particular complaint meets the constitutional guarantee is a different and distinct question, and it is to this issue that the respondent directs his attack.

The offense is here charged in the statutory language or its equivalent.The words 'in a reckless manner' used by the State of course have the same meaning as 'recklessly' in the statute.There is, however, no statement whatsoever, apart from date and place, of the facts on which the charge is grounded.

The core of the offense of 'reckless driving' plainly lies not in the act of operating a motor vehicle, but in the manner and circumstances of its operation.For example, a particular manner of operation lawful in the daylight, or upon a dry highway, or in the country, may be reckless at night, or under conditions of ice or storm, or on a crowded city street.Until the manner and surrounding circumstances of operation are known, it is impossible to determine whether or not there has been a violation of the statute.From the statement 'in a reckless manner' taken alone, as in this complaint, the respondent gains no information of the facts from which the State will seek to prove the ultimate fact of 'reckless driving'.

In our view the complaint is insufficient under the rule well stated by our Court in State v. Strout, 1933, 132 Me. 134, at page 136, 167 A. 859 arising as here on demurrer, in these words:

'If the statute does not sufficiently set out the facts which make the crime, so that a person of common understanding may have adequate notice of the nature of the charge which he is called upon to meet, then a more definite statement of the facts than is contained in the statute becomes necessary.* * *

'In order to properly inform the accused of the 'nature and cause of the accusation,' the commission of the offense must be fully, plainly, substantially, and formally set forth.

'The object of an indictment is, first, (a) to furnish reasonable fullness of recital of the alleged crime, that a defense may not be rested upon the hypothesis of one thing, with the hazard of surprise by evidence, on the part of the government, of an entirely different thing; (b) to enable the defendant to avail himself of his...