State v. Howard
| Decision Date | 10 March 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 110,439,110,439 |
| Citation | 305 Kan. 984,389 P.3d 1280 |
| Parties | STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Cameron HOWARD, Appellant. |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Craig M. Divine, of Divine Law Office, LLC, of Kansas City, Missouri, and Clayton E. Gillette, of Gillette Law Office, LLC, of Kansas City, Missouri, argued the cause and were on the briefs for appellant.
Jacob M. Gontesky, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Steven J. Obermeier, assistant district attorney, Stephen M. Howe, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with him on the briefs for appellee.
Cameron Howard was convicted of criminal possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, and we granted review.
The relevant facts are uncontested. On October 19, 2006, Cameron Howard pled guilty to one count of "Burglary First Degree, Class B Felony" in the circuit court of Jackson County, Missouri. Howard was then adjudged guilty by the Missouri court. Following the plea and adjudication, the court ordered that the "imposition of sentence be suspended and [the] defendant is placed on probation for a period of three (3) years...." In Yale v. City of Independence , 846 S.W.2d 193, 196 (Mo.1993), the Missouri Supreme Court held that a "suspended imposition of sentence" does not constitute a conviction under Missouri law.
On October 17, 2008, the Missouri court determined that Howard had successfully completed his probation and discharged him from the court's jurisdiction. It further ordered that the file be "a closed record to the extent provided by law," as prescribed by Mo. Rev. Stat. § 610.105.1.
Nearly 3 years later, on September 15, 2011, Police Officer Chad Loughman was near 7720 State Line Road in Prairie Village, Johnson County, Kansas, looking for drivers who would pull into a gas station parking lot to avoid a traffic light—a traffic violation in Prairie Village. Loughman observed Howard pull into the parking lot and then out of it, effectively avoiding the traffic light. Loughman also noticed that Howard and his passenger had the shoulder straps of their seatbelts behind them, leading him to believe that they were not properly wearing the belts.
Loughman pulled Howard over and asked for his identification. At this time, Loughman saw that the passenger had reclined her seat since he had first seen the vehicle. Loughman called in Howard's identification to dispatch, which informed him that there was a warrant for Howard's arrest from Leawood Municipal Court. After learning of the warrant, Loughman called for backup, and Sergeant James Carney came to the scene.
After Carney arrived, Loughman had Howard step out of the car and stand at the rear passenger's door with Carney. Loughman then scanned the car, looking underneath Howard's seat for a weapon. Loughman found no weapons but discovered a plastic baggie with a ripped out corner in the center console. Loughman then secured Howard in the back of Carney's police car and told Howard he was being put under arrest pursuant to the Leawood warrant.
Loughman then took the passenger's identification and learned from dispatch that there was a warrant for her arrest from Prairie Village Municipal Court. Loughman had the passenger step out of the car and, because she was pregnant, had her sit on the curb about 6 to 8 feet away from the car.
After removing the passenger, Loughman moved the passenger seat forward and found a firearm, subsequently classified in the record as an AK–47 pistol, that was concealed under a floor mat. It is unclear exactly where the weapon was located in the car because the officer testified that the firearm was concealed by "[t]he driver's side rear floormat" and the "front passenger seat, that floormat."
After finding the firearm, Loughman Mirandized Howard. Loughman then asked Howard about the plastic baggie. Howard responded that the baggie had previously held marijuana.
Howard was subsequently charged with criminal possession of a firearm by a convicted felon under K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 21–6304(a)(2) for possession of a firearm within 5 years after having been convicted of a felony under the laws of another state. The charge was based on the AK–47 found in Howard's car on the day of the traffic stop and on the prior Missouri burglary charge.
Before Howard's trial, both he and the State filed a number of motions. Howard filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Missouri judgment was not a conviction and thus he could not be convicted under K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 21–6304. Howard also filed a motion to suppress any evidence related to his possession of the firearm because the evidence was obtained through a warrantless search of his car. Finally, the State filed a motion in limine requesting that the court preclude Howard from "introducing evidence that [Howard] legally purchased the firearm in the state of Missouri or any federal records pertaining [to] the purchase of the firearm."
After hearing arguments regarding the parties' motions, the district court granted the State's motion in limine and denied Howard's motion to dismiss and his motion to suppress evidence.
On May 31, 2013, Howard waived his right to a jury trial and the district court held a bench trial on stipulated facts. The court entered a guilty verdict and sentenced Howard to 18 months of probation. Howard timely appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the conviction. State v. Howard , 51 Kan.App.2d 28, 339 P.3d 809 (2014).
In his petition for review, Howard raised three arguments: (1) He cannot be guilty of criminal possession of a firearm by a convicted felon because a completed Missouri suspended imposition of sentence (SIS) is not a conviction and he therefore was not a convicted felon; (2) his firearm should have been suppressed as evidence because it was obtained through an illegal search of his car; and (3) the evidence that Howard passed a federal background check before successfully purchasing the firearm in Missouri should not have been excluded at the district court because that evidence shows Howard did not know he was a convicted felon and thus establishes a mistake of fact defense. This court granted review with respect to all issues.
The Court of Appeals considered each of Howard's issues. With regard to the first issue, the panel held that a completed Missouri SIS is a conviction for purposes of the Kansas statute. 51 Kan.App.2d at 36, 339 P.3d 809. As to the third issue, the panel concluded that the district court did not err in excluding the evidence that Howard passed a federal background check before purchasing the firearm. 51 Kan.App.2d at 49, 339 P.3d 809. We agree with both of these conclusions. Because we cannot improve upon the panel's thorough and well-reasoned analysis, we adopt it here.
Before moving to the remaining issue, we briefly consider one of Howard's arguments on the first issue that the panel did not address. Howard contends that considering a completed Missouri SIS to be a conviction results in an absurd interpretation of K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 21–6304 because the Kansas Legislature does not prescribe a method by which Kansas firearms dealers must uncover whether a person has a Missouri SIS before a sale.
While Howard's contentions may warrant this court's attention in a future case, they do not do so here. The question before this court does not pertain to the sale and purchase of firearms or concern the manner of the acquisition of weapons, but with the possession of firearms. For this reason, we conclude that Howard's argument is inapplicable to the case before us and is best left for another day.
Our adoption of the panel's analysis on issues one and three leaves us with only Howard's second issue to address. We do so now.
Howard contends that the firearm found in his car was obtained through an illegal search in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Consequently, Howard argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the firearm as evidence.
In reviewing the granting or denial of a motion to suppress evidence, this court determines whether the factual findings underlying the trial court's suppression decision are supported by substantial competent evidence. An appellate court does not reweigh the evidence or reassess the credibility of the witnesses. The ultimate legal conclusion drawn from those factual findings is reviewed under a de novo standard. State v. Carlton , 297 Kan. 642, 645, 304 P.3d 323 (2013).
The facts in this case are not in dispute. Thus, the only issue here is a legal one and the review is therefore de novo.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, applicable to the States via the Fourteenth Amendment, establishes "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches...." Section 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights provides identical protection. State v. Morris , 276 Kan. 11, 17, 72 P.3d 570 (2003). If conduct is prohibited by one, it is prohibited by the other. 276 Kan. at 17, 72 P.3d 570. Under both, a warrantless search is per se unreasonable, and the fruits of that search are inadmissible, unless the search falls within one of the established exceptions to the search warrant requirement. Mapp v. Ohio , 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961) ; State v. Richard , 300 Kan. 715, 726, 333 P.3d 179 (2014). Those exceptions are "consent; search incident to a lawful arrest; stop and frisk; probable cause plus exigent circumstances; the emergency doctrine; inventory searches; plain view or feel; and administrative searches of closely regulated businesses." Richard , 300 Kan. at 726–27, 333 P.3d 179.
In this case, Officer Loughman did not have a warrant when he searched Howard's car. Thus, the firearm that the search revealed would be excluded from evidence unless some recognized exception applies. The Court...
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