State v. Hudgins

• Decision Date: 03 April 2015
• Docket Number: 108,599.
• Citation: 301 Kan. 629,346 P.3d 1062
• Parties: STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Kaston HUDGINS, Appellant.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

301 Kan. 629

346 P.3d 1062

STATE of Kansas, Appellee

v.Kaston HUDGINS, Appellant.

108,599.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

April 3, 2015.

Randall L. Hodgkinson, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the briefs for appellant.

Nathan R. Coleman, county attorney, argued the cause, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, was with him on the brief for appellee.

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by BILES, J.:

In July 2009, while fleeing police during a high-speed chase, Kaston Hudgins rear ended another vehicle, killing both occupants.A jury convicted him of two counts of first-degree felony murder and one count of fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer.In this direct appeal from those convictions, Hudgins challenges: (1) time constraints imposed on defense counsel's voir dire; (2) admonishments by the district court in the jury's presence about the time defense counsel was taking during voir dire; (3)the district court's refusal to change venue; (4) prosecutorial misconduct; (5) the exclusion of evidence; and (6)the State's decision to charge felony murder rather than the more specific offense of involuntary manslaughter while driving under the influence.He also argues cumulative error denied him a fair trial.We affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

A Cherokee County sheriff's deputy initiated a traffic stop after he saw a vehicle driven by Hudgins run a stop sign.Hudgins pulled over but sped away while the deputy was making initial radio contact with dispatchers.The uniformed deputy pursued Hudgins in a marked patrol car with its top, front, and back emergency lights activated and an audible siren in operation.The chase began about 9:15 p.m.While evading the deputy, Hudgins periodically turned his vehicle's headlights off and on, drove in the left-hand lane toward oncoming traffic, and passed at least one other vehicle on the shoulder.Vehicle speeds reached 120 miles per hour.

About 11 miles from where the pursuit began, Hudgins crashed into the rear of another vehicle at an intersection.His vehicle was estimated to be travelling about 98 miles per hour with the headlights turned off the instant before the collision.The two occupants in the second vehicle, a mother and her 13–year–old daughter, died.Hudgins was 22 years old at the time.His blood alcohol level was .15 grams per 100 milliliters of blood.

The State charged Hudgins with two counts of first-degree felony murder based on the underlying felony of fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer and one count of fleeing and eluding a law enforcement officer.A jury convicted him of all three counts.He was sentenced to two concurrent hard–20 sentences for the felony murders, plus a consecutive 6–month prison sentence for felony fleeing and eluding.Hudgins timely appeals.Jurisdiction is proper under K.S.A.2014 Supp. 22–3601(b)(3)(life sentence).

Time Constraints on Defense Counsel's Voir Dire

The district court agreed with counsel to use an extensive, jointly prepared 18–page questionnaire that was mailed to prospective jurors in the weeks leading up to trial.This questionnaire covered such subjects as the possible influence of pretrial publicity, prospective jurors' biographical and family information; political and religious views; attitudes toward mental illness, alcoholism, law enforcement, and the criminal justice system; knowledge of the case and opinions of guilt; and relationships with potential witnesses and the victims.

More than 120 prospective jurors were summoned the first day of jury selection, which ultimately took about a day and half.From this larger group, the clerk initially called at random 42 names to sit in the jury box for voir dire examination.When one of those 42 was excused for cause, the clerk randomly picked a new person to replace the one excused.The State would then conduct an initial questioning of the new panelist to determine whether there was cause to strike, then defense counsel was free to resume examining any prospective juror in the box.The prospective jurors who had not yet been called into the jury box stayed in the courtroom and observed the proceedings.

The attorneys and the court ultimately questioned a total of 62 persons, from which a final group of 42 were passed for cause by both sides.After peremptory challenges, 12 jurors and 2 alternates were impaneled to hear the case, none of whom had been the subject earlier of unsuccessful defense motions to strike for cause.Approximately 60 prospective jurors, who were originally summoned on the first day, were never questioned, and the district court released them on the second day of the proceedings.

During the first afternoon of voir dire, shortly after the court had ruled on a for-cause challenge to a prospective juror made by defense counsel, the court commented to defense counsel, “I'm going to have to ask that you pick up the pace a little bit.”It appears from the record this remark came after defense counsel was silent for about 3 minutes while reading a questionnaire before resuming questioning.Counsel responded, “I will your honor, I just had to review this.”

Later, near the end of the first day while in chambers away from the prospective jurors, the district court asked defense counsel to “[g]ive me your best estimate of how much longer you think you'll be.”Counsel responded he was not sure.Earlier, the court had advised that the panel appeared to be “getting very restless,” adding, “I counted one time you went three minutes without saying a single word.That's when I interrupted you.And [the jury panel] is reading that.And they don't like that.”

The district court further noted it had approved the questionnaire's use to facilitate the selection process, and defense counsel agreed, commenting that his voir dire preparation had consumed nearly 30 hours.The trial court then responded,

“Well, I would expect with that kind of preparation that this would be snap, snap, snap, moving right along.And yet it almost leaves me with the impression that each of these is a new case study for you, that you're going through that questionnaire as though you haven't seen it before.”

Shortly thereafter, the court emphasized, “I don't want to cut you off.I certainly don't want to prejudice your client.But I have an obligation to move this case along.”

At about 5 p.m., the district court told the prospective jurors it had believed the jury was going to be picked by that time, but it was apparent selection could not be completed, even if the session continued until 5:30 p.m.The court then called a recess until the next morning, adding it would “put some time limits on [defense counsel] to complete this.”It remarked the jury would be picked by mid-morning the next day.

The following day, defense counsel continued questioning individual potential jurors for approximately an hour before the court called all counsel into chambers.Again outside the jury's presence, the court reminded defense counsel it had agreed months earlier to allow the detailed written questionnaires so the attorneys would have necessary information before voir dire.The court then criticized defense counsel's questions that morning, which focused on relationships with and attitudes toward law enforcement.The court said such questions were not relevant because the essential facts were not in dispute and it was unclear how police officer credibility would play a factor in this particular case.Defense counsel replied that his inquiries sought to discover inherent biases.The court responded:

“But you have been at this for over five—yeah, little bit over five hours.And I think if you want to ask them a few—each one a question or two, okay.

“But I said yesterday, at 10:30 you're done.And I don't want to just embarrass you by saying I'm taking this over.But if you've got a few more questions to ask, go ahead.And then if you have anybody you want to challenge for cause, do it so that we can conclude this thing.”

The court then reconvened at 10:08 a.m., leaving defense counsel 22 minutes to finish.After additional questioning, defense counsel passed for cause the panel of 42 as then constituted.

Hudgins complains on appeal that the district court“cut-off otherwise searching questioning of potential jurors after less than five hours.”He further argues: “[W]hen the district court arbitrarily cut off defense counsel's reasonable and searching questioning of jurors regarding their prior opinions and biases, it similarly cut off any way to reliably guarantee that this jury was impartial.”Hudgins claims the restriction on defense counsel's voir dire violated his rights under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitutionandsection 10 of the Kansas ConstitutionBill of Rights and that we should reverse his convictions and remand the case for a new trial “before an impartial jury.”In his argument regarding the district court's denial of his motion to change venue, which we address below, Hudgins also suggests the lack of “full and liberal voir dire” prevented him from ensuring pretrial publicity did not impermissibly bias the jury pool.

Standard of Review

A district court“may limit [voir dire] examination by the defendant, his attorney, or the prosecuting attorney if the court believes such examination to be harassment, is causing unnecessary delay or serves no useful purpose.”K.S.A. 22–3408(3).The trial court has broad discretion in controlling voir dire in criminal cases.State v. Hayes,258 Kan. 629, 631, 908 P.2d 597(1995).And because the appropriate scope and extent of voir dire varies from case to case, no fixed rules apply.Deference to the trial court's discretion is the hallmark of voir dire issues in criminal appeals.258 Kan. at 631, 908 P.2d 597.

To obtain reversal under these circumstances, a defendant must demonstrate that (1)the district court abused its discretion in limiting voir dire; and (2)the defendant was prejudiced...