State v. Hudson, CC-81-62
Decision Date | 18 May 1982 |
Docket Number | No. CC-81-62,CC-81-62 |
Citation | 56 Or.App. 462,642 P.2d 331 |
Parties | STATE of Oregon, Appellant, v. Clifford HUDSON, Jr., Respondent. ; CA A22231. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Thomas H. Denney, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief were Dave Frohnmayer, Atty. Gen., and William F. Gary, Sol. Gen., Salem.
Marilyn C. McManus, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief was Gary D. Babcock, Public Defender, Salem.
Before GILLETTE, P. J., JOSEPH, C. J., and YOUNG, J GILLETTE, Presiding Judge.
The state appeals, pursuant to ORS 138.060(3), from an order made prior to trial dismissing an indictment charging defendant with manslaughter in the second degree. The motion was made and granted on the ground that the victim died more than one year and one day after the accident which admittedly caused her death. The defendant argued, and the trial court accepted, the theory that Oregon follows the common law rule that a death must occur within one year and one day of the incident precipitating it in order to support a conviction for homicide. We reverse.
The rule at common law that a death was not a homicide unless it resulted within a year and a day from the time of the act which was alleged to have caused it appears to have been derived from the practical difficulty in proving, in less scientifically-advanced times, that an injury inflicted more than one year prior to a person's death was the proximate cause of the death. See, e.g., Perkins, Criminal Law 28-29 (2d ed. 1969); see also, Note, 19 Chi.-Kent Law Review 181 (1941); Note, 65 Dickenson Law Review 166 (1961); and see generally, Annot., 60 A.L.R.3d 1323 (1974). To the extent that this is the origin of the rule, it obviously has lost much of its justification through the advances of science.
The first question to be asked with respect to the rule is whether it has ever existed in Oregon. Although the answer is not entirely free from doubt, we conclude that it has. In Bowen v. State, 1 Or. 270, 272, (1859), the Supreme Court noted:
If the Supreme Court did not feel the rule applied in Oregon, there would have been no occasion to discuss the defendant's assignment of error in the manner in which it was discussed. Much later, in State v. Kelley, 118 Or. 397, 411-12, 247 P. 146 (1926), a defendant argued that a homicide indictment was insufficient, because it did not allege that the decedent died within a year and a day from the time that the fatal shot was fired. The Supreme Court held that an allegation in the indictment that the defendant killed the victim on a certain date was a sufficient allegation that the victim had died on that date. Again, it does not appear to us that there would have been any justification for answering the assignment of error in this way unless the rule was regarded by the Supreme Court as applying in Oregon. 1 Our conclusion that the year and a day rule existed in Oregon brings us to the state's principle argument: that the rule was abrogated by the enactment of the homicide provisions of the Oregon Criminal Code of 1971.
The Oregon Criminal Code of 1971 was a comprehensive...
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