State v. Hudspeth

Decision Date09 December 1935
Docket NumberCr. 3967
PartiesSTATE v. HUDSPETH
CourtArkansas Supreme Court

Appeal from Boone Circuit Court; William T. Mills, Special Judge reversed.

Judgment reversed, and cause dismissed.

Carl E. Bailey, Attorney General, and Guy E. Williams, Assistant, for appellant.

John L. Carter, Sam Rorex and Edward H. Coulter, for appellee.

OPINION

MEHAFFY, J.

The appellee was indicted January 15, 1932, for receiving deposits into an insolvent bank. On April 30, 1932, he made bond in the sum of $ 750 for his appearance in court. On July 18, 1932, he filed motion for a change of venue. This motion was overruled by the court. On July 18, 1932, appellee entered his plea of guilty, and it was ordered and adjudged by the court that the cause be continued until the January term of court, 1933, for sentence and judgment.

On July 17, 1933, appellee filed the following motion:

"Comes the defendant, A. T. Hudspeth, and respectfully represents to the court:

"That at the January, 1932, term of the circuit court of this county an indictment was returned against him in the above-entitled cause, said indictment was returned, being No 7; that at the same term of said court an indictment was returned against him, No. 13, charging him with the crime of embezzlement of money from said Citizens' Bank & Trust Company; that at the same term of said court an indictment was returned against him, No. 16, charging him with the crime of embezzlement of funds of J. H. Fowler; that at the same term of said court an indictment was returned against this defendant's son, W. A. Hudspeth, charging him with the crime of receiving deposits in the People's Saving Bank of Harrison, Ark., knowing said institution to be in an insolvent condition, and a similar indictment was returned against G. C. Coffman, charging him with the crime of receiving deposits in said People's Saving Bank, knowing said institution to be in an insolvent condition; that similar indictments were returned against G. C. Alexander Dan Holmes and T. E. Milburn, officers of the said Citizens' Bank & Trust Company of Harrison, Arkansas, charging them with receiving deposits and assenting to the receipt of deposits in said Citizens' Bank & Trust Company, knowing said institution to be in an insolvent condition; that all of said indictments were pending in the Boone Circuit Court at the July, 1932, term of said court; that at the same time an indictment was pending in the circuit court of Searcy County, Arkansas, against A. A. Hudspeth, charging him with the crime in connection with the failure of the First State Bank of Marshall, Arkansas, and that at said time it was contemplated that efforts to secure indictments against this defendant and other persons theretofore associated with him and in his employment in various banks in this judicial district would be made, this defendant having been the chief officer and managerial head of eleven banks in this judicial district, all of which had theretofore been declared insolvent.

"That at the said July, 1932, term of the Boone Circuit Court this defendant filed a motion for a change of venue in the causes pending against him, which motion was supported by the affidavits of W. T. Raley, S.D. Jones, A. H. Boyd, W. H. Watkins, Ralph Jefferson, W. E. Halbrook and W. H. Pettit, reputable citizens of this county, to the effect that the citizenship of this county was so prejudiced against this defendant that he could not obtain a fair and impartial trial here; that said motion was overruled by the court and exceptions saved to said action by the defendant on the __ day of July, 1932; that said cause was set for trial the following day to be called at 8 o'clock A. M.; that, prior to the calling of said cause as above stated, this defendant was approached by officers of the court and those interested in the prosecution for a compromise of all of said cases, and that the following agreement was finally arrived at and entered into by and between the court and the prosecuting attorney and the defendant and his attorneys, to-wit:

"That all the above-mentioned indictments, except the indictments in this cause referred to herein as No. 7, should be dismissed against all of defendants upon defendants paying the costs in each action, including a prosecuting attorney's fee of $ 25 in each case; that no further indictments or prosecutions would be instigated against any of the officers or employees of any of said above-mentioned institutions in this judicial district; that this defendant would enter his plea of guilty in this particular cause, which plea was at said time entered; that he should receive a sentence in the penitentiary of this State of the term of one year, and that, prior to the pronouncement of said sentence and judgment of the court, all the above- mentioned cases should be dismissed, and that at this defendant's own option he might receive his sentence at the October, 1932, adjourned term of this court, which it was then contemplated would be held, or defendant might elect to receive his sentence at the January, 1933, term of this court, or, at defendant's election and option, the pronouncement of said sentence would be deferred until the July, 1933, term of this court; that all of said agreements on the part of the officials of the court and those interested in the prosecution were conditions precedent to the entering of said plea of guilty and were to be performed prior to the pronouncement of sentence and judgment upon said defendant.

"That at the January, 1933, term of said court this court, in an open statement to a reporter of the Harrison Daily Times, a newspaper published at Harrison, Boone County, Arkansas, and having a general circulation, therein indicated that the court did not intend to abide by certain portions of that agreement as hereinbefore set out, which statement was in substance as follows:

"'That he (Judge Koone) would leave the cause up to Hudspeth either to present himself at the present session and accept sentence of a year in the penitentiary, or delay until the July term of court and be sentenced to ten years.'

"That said agreements, on the part of the officials of the court and the prosecution, have not been performed, and that further indictments have been procured by the prosecution and court officials, and are now pending against this defendant and other officials connected with said banking institutions; that the court and the prosecuting attorney, in public and private statements, have indicated that they do not intend to perform said agreement in the future.

"That therefore this defendant desires to withdraw his said conditional plea of guilty and to enter his plea of 'not guilty' to this cause; that he is innocent of the charge herein and entered said plea of guilty solely for the purpose of protecting his friends and former business employees and associates, as well as himself, from further trouble or prosecutions in connection with said bank failures.

"That he is entitled to withdraw said conditional plea of guilty because, (1) said plea was conditional as hereinbefore set out, and (2) the said agreement on the part of the court officials and the prosecution has not been performed or kept.

"Wherefore defendant prays that he be permitted to withdraw his conditional plea of guilty herein and enter his plea of not guilty to this charge, and that he be granted leave to adduce testimony in support of this motion."

On July 18, 1933, appellee filed a motion to disqualify the presiding judge. Evidence was heard on this motion, and the motion was overruled. The court then overruled appellee's motion to withdraw his plea of guilty, and sentenced him for three years in the penitentiary. The appellee filed his motion for a new trial, which was overruled, and an appeal was prosecuted to this court.

The case was decided by this court on December 4, 1933, and is reported as Hudspeth v. State, 188 Ark. 323, 67 S.W.2d 191.

On February 4, 1935, appellee filed in the Boone Circuit Court a petition for a writ of error coram nobis. In the petition he made a lengthy statement about the financial condition of the country and about the condition of banks and alleged his indictment, and motion for change of venue, and the agreement that he claimed to have had with the officers, and stated, among other things, that he was convinced that his life would be in danger if he proceeded to trial, and entered a plea of guilty, and that he would not otherwise have entered such a plea; that upon entering his plea, the cause was continued for the term without the pronouncement of sentence; that he thereafter filed his petition asking that the judgment of conviction be set aside, and that he be permitted to go on trial in the case on its merits; that his petition was overruled and sentence passed on him condemning him to serve three years in the penitentiary; that an appeal was taken, and that the judgment was modified by the Supreme Court by reducing the penalty to one year; that he had been denied his constitutional rights; that preliminary steps for...

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23 cases
  • Larimore v. State
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Arkansas
    • February 10, 1997
    ...we grant leave, the trial court must then determine the merits of the petition. This follows the rule first stated in State v. Hudspeth, 191 Ark. 963, 88 S.W.2d 858 (1935). An issue in that case was whether a writ of error coram nobis is available after appeal. Id. at 970, 88 S.W.2d at 861.......
  • State v. Tejeda-Acosta
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Arkansas
    • May 23, 2013
    ...on his counsel's part. Appellee has therefore not stated appropriate grounds for relief in coram-nobis proceedings. See State v. Hudspeth, 191 Ark. 963, 969, 88 S.W.2d 858, 861 (1935) (stating that “[i]f one is caused to enter a plea of guilty in a criminal case from fear or duress, he is e......
  • Rogers v. Jones
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Mississippi
    • March 27, 1961
    ...proper office of the writ of error coram nobis as well as an inquiry into the sanity of one convicted. 'In the case of State v. Hudspeth, 191 Ark. 963, 88 S.W.2d 858, 861, this court said: 'If one is caused to enter a plea of guilty in a criminal case from fear or duress, he is entitled to ......
  • Noble v. State
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Arkansas
    • April 9, 2015
    ...jurisdiction because the writ of error coram nobis lies to correct a judgment by the court that rendered it. See State v. Hudspeth, 191 Ark. 963, 88 S.W.2d 858 (1935). This court has articulated the rules for a writ of error coram nobis as follows:A writ of error coram nobis is an extraordi......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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