State v. Huettl

Decision Date01 March 2013
Docket NumberNo. 31,141.,31,141.
Citation305 P.3d 956
PartiesSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Jeff HUETTL, Defendant–Appellant.
CourtCourt of Appeals of New Mexico

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Yvonne M. Chicoine, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee.

Jacqueline L. Cooper, Chief Public Defender, Karl Erich Martell, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant.

OPINION

SUTIN, Judge.

{1} Defendant Jeff Huettl appeals his convictions for one count each of possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) and possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant argues that his rights under both the New Mexico and the United States Constitutions were violated by the warrantless police entry into the motel room in which he was arrested. He also argues that his Sixth Amendment constitutional right to confront witnesses against him was violated when the State failed to present the testimony of the forensic scientist who placed the seized substance on the spectrophotometer machine for testing and, instead, the State presented testimony of a different analyst who interpreted the results of the machine's data. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

{2} In October 2009, Police Officer John Clay in Roswell, New Mexico, was dispatched to the Frontier Motel to look into an “unknown disturbance” in Room 102 of the motel. From the outside of Room 102, through a gap in the curtains, Officer Clay observed Defendant sitting at a table using a lighter under a spoon attempting to heat up an unknown substance and then attempting to draw the substance into a syringe. Based on his training and experience, Officer Clay deduced that Defendant was preparing illegal narcotics (either methamphetamine or heroin) for injection. Officer Clay called for back-up, then went to the motel office to get a key for Room 102. Two fellow officers arrived; Officer Clay was concerned that if they did not enter the room immediately, the supposed illegal substance would be lost or destroyed or that Defendant was in danger of a possible overdose. Officer Clay and the other two officers used the key to enter Room 102. Defendant was arrested. Officer Clay collected a spoon with a white crystalline substance in it, a loaded syringe, a number of other syringes, and a small baggie as evidence. Field testing of the spoon and the loaded syringe indicated the presence of methamphetamine and amphetamine, and the evidence was later sent to the crime lab.

{3} In regard to the laboratory tests that proved the evidence included methamphetamine, the State presented forensic scientist and forensic lab supervisor, Shawn Hightower. Mr. Hightower explained that the evidence was analyzed using an infrared spectrophotometer, an instrument that directs infrared light onto the sample. Because different compounds transmit and absorb infrared light at different rates, the instrument generates data that gives analysts a “clear picture” and a “unique picture” of different compounds. The raw data produced by the spectrophotometer is interpreted by an analyst. As to the evidence in this case, Mr. Hightower reviewed the data and formed an expert opinion that the residue from the spoon and the substance from the plastic bag were methamphetamine. Mr. Hightower did not personally place the evidence onto the spectrophotometer because that aspect of the testing was done by another lab analyst, Karla Nardoni.

{4} A jury found Defendant guilty of possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia. On appeal, Defendant contends that the district court erred in denying his pretrial motion to suppress evidence, which was made pursuant to an argument that the warrantless police entry into Room 102 was not justified by any exception to the warrant requirement. Defendant further contends that the district court erred in permitting Mr. Hightower to testify about the spectrophotometer testing because [Mr.] Hightower ... was not the person who actually tested the purported methamphetamine.” According to Defendant, because he did not have an opportunity to cross-examine Ms. Nardoni, he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.

{5} For the purpose of conducting a thorough analysis of Defendant's confrontation claim, we requested supplemental briefing. The parties were asked to respond to the proposed conclusion that Defendant's confrontation right had been violated by the State's presentation of Mr. Hightower's testimony insofar as his testimony necessarily implied the propriety and correctness of Ms. Nardoni's testing process. In our order for supplemental briefing we also proposed the theory that Mr. Hightower's testimony, insofar as it relied upon Ms. Nardoni's work, “was effectively the functional equivalent of ex parte in court testimony” which was “no different than if a report containing the details of the conduct of the testing process ... had either been relied on alone, or had been identified by a testifying surrogate[.]

{6} We hold that exigent circumstances justified the officers' warrantless entry and that the court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress. We further hold that because the evidence shows that Ms. Nardoni's role in the actual testing process appeared to have been limited to simply placing the substance onto the spectrophotometer, and because Mr. Hightower testified only as to his own analysis and interpretation of the data generated by the spectrophotometer, concluding that the evidence contained methamphetamine, Defendant's right to confrontation was not violated. Accordingly, we affirm.

DISCUSSIONThe Suppression Issue

{7} Defendant unsuccessfully moved before trial to suppress “all evidence and statements obtained in violation of Article II, Section 10 [ ] of the New Mexico Constitution and the Fourth Amendment [to] the United States Constitution.” The motion was premised on Defendant's contention that the police entry into Room 102 was “warrantless and without basis in any exception to the warrant requirement.” “An officer's warrantless entry into a person's home is the exact type of intrusion against which the language of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution is directed.” State v. Gutierrez, 2008–NMCA–018, ¶ 16, 143 N.M. 422, 176 P.3d 1154. It is well established in New Mexico that exigent circumstances, including the need to prevent destruction of evidence, may justify a warrantless home entry. Id.

{8} In denying Defendant's motion, the district court entered the following conclusions of law.

2. Officer Clay observed Defendant in plain view and had probable cause to believe that Defendant was in the act of possessing and using illegal drugs.

3. Officer Clay had probable cause to believe that Defendant was engaged in illegal activity and that if immediate entry into the room was not made[,] that evidence would be lost or destroyed.

4. Exigent circumstances existed for Officer Clay and the other officers to enter the room and seize the items observed without a warrant.

5. Defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy to that which could be observed by Officer Clay through partially opened curtains when Officer Clay was standing on a common walkway where anyone could see through the window without intruding into the room or using artificial means to observe.

6. Defendant's rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution were not violated.

(Citations omitted.)

{9} On appellate review of a motion to suppress evidence, we review the district court's factual determinations for substantial evidence and its legal determinations de novo. State v. Ketelson, 2011–NMSC–023, ¶ 9, 150 N.M. 137, 257 P.3d 957. Additionally, we review the district court's determination that an exigency existed de novo. State v. Allen, 2011–NMCA–019, ¶ 14, 149 N.M. 267, 247 P.3d 1152.

{10} Relying on State v. Garcia, 2005–NMSC–017, ¶ 29, 138 N.M. 1, 116 P.3d 72, and State v. Gomez, 1997–NMSC–006, ¶ 39, 122 N.M. 777, 932 P.2d 1, Defendant states that the New Mexico Constitution “requires a warrantless seizure of evidence from within a vehicle to be justified by a particularized showing of exigent circumstances.” Defendant argues that there was no particularized showing that Defendant was in danger or that the evidence would have been destroyed. Accordingly, Defendant contends that the district court erred in finding that exigent circumstances justified a departure from the warrant requirement.

{11} Warrantless entry into a residence under the exigent circumstances rule requires probable cause plus exigent circumstances. State v. Nance, 2011–NMCA–048, ¶ 12, 149 N.M. 644, 253 P.3d 934,cert. denied,2011–NMCERT–004, 150 N.M. 648, 264 P.3d 1171. Because Defendant does not raise an issue as to probable cause, we deem Defendant to have abandoned any argument to that effect. See State v. Dickert, 2012–NMCA–004, ¶ 34, 268 P.3d 515 (recognizing that “issues not argued on appeal are deemed abandoned”). We therefore focus on exigent circumstances.

{12} “Exigent circumstances means an emergency situation requiring swift action to prevent imminent danger to life or ... to forestall the imminent ... destruction of evidence.” Campos v. State, 117 N.M. 155, 158, 870 P.2d 117, 120 (1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The standard for determining exigency is an objective one; the question is whether in a given situation a prudent, cautious, and trained officer, based on facts known, could reasonably conclude swift action was necessary.” Allen, 2011–NMCA–019, ¶ 15, 149 N.M. 267, 247 P.3d 1152 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

{13} The district court did not err in concluding that an exigency justified the officers' warrantless entry into Room 102. Officer Clay testified that Defendant's apparent intention to “shoot-up...

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